GHSA-X4GP-PQPJ-F43Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-18 21:56 – Updated: 2025-07-28 15:46
VLAI?
Summary
curve25519-dalek has timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`'s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`
Details

Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in curve25519-dalek.

The Scalar29::sub (32-bit) and Scalar52::sub (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (jns on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt:

  • 32-bit (see L106): https://godbolt.org/z/zvaWxzvqv
  • 64-bit (see L48): https://godbolt.org/z/PczYj7Pda

A similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation:

https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ

As discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away.

The fix can be validated in godbolt here:

  • 32-bit: https://godbolt.org/z/jc9j7eb8E
  • 64-bit: https://godbolt.org/z/x8d46Yfah

The problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner alexander.wagner@aisec.fraunhofer.de and Lea Themint lea.thiemt@tum.de using their DATA tool:

https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "curve25519-dalek"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-58262"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-18T21:56:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Timing variability of any kind is problematic when working with  potentially secret values such as elliptic curve scalars, and such issues can potentially leak private keys and other secrets. Such a problem was recently discovered in `curve25519-dalek`.\n\nThe `Scalar29::sub` (32-bit) and `Scalar52::sub` (64-bit) functions contained usage of a mask value inside a loop where LLVM saw an opportunity to insert a branch instruction (`jns` on x86) to conditionally bypass this code section when the mask value is set to zero as can be seen in godbolt:\n\n- 32-bit (see L106): https://godbolt.org/z/zvaWxzvqv\n- 64-bit (see L48): https://godbolt.org/z/PczYj7Pda\n\nA similar problem was recently discovered in the Kyber reference implementation:\n\nhttps://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/g/pqc-forum/c/hqbtIGFKIpU/m/cnE3pbueBgAJ\n\nAs discussed on that thread, one portable solution, which is also used in this PR, is to introduce a volatile read as an optimization barrier, which prevents the compiler from optimizing it away.\n\nThe fix can be validated in godbolt here:\n\n- 32-bit: https://godbolt.org/z/jc9j7eb8E\n- 64-bit: https://godbolt.org/z/x8d46Yfah\n\nThe problem was discovered and the solution independently verified by Alexander Wagner \u003calexander.wagner@aisec.fraunhofer.de\u003e and Lea Themint \u003clea.thiemt@tum.de\u003e using their DATA tool:\n\nhttps://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/DATA",
  "id": "GHSA-x4gp-pqpj-f43q",
  "modified": "2025-07-28T15:46:43Z",
  "published": "2024-06-18T21:56:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58262"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/pull/659"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/commit/415892acf1cdf9161bd6a4c99bc2f4cb8fae5e6a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0344.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "curve25519-dalek has timing variability in `curve25519-dalek`\u0027s `Scalar29::sub`/`Scalar52::sub`"
}


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