GHSA-X6GC-QJWW-67R2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix SCMI device destroy lifetimes
scmi_child_dev_find() drops the reference returned by device_find_child() before returning the scmi_device pointer. A concurrent unregister can then release the device while the destroy path is still using the returned pointer.
Make the lookup helper return the device_find_child() reference and keep it until scmi_device_destroy() has finished unregistering the child.
Also split device_unregister() in __scmi_device_destroy() so the SCMI bus ID is not made reusable until after device_del() has removed the old scmi_dev.N name from sysfs. This avoids a new SCMI device reusing the same ID while the old device is still registered.
The final device release callback is also a possible cleanup path when SCMI children are deleted by driver core recursion rather than __scmi_device_destroy(). Release the SCMI bus ID from a common helper used by destroy, register-failure and final-release paths, and clear scmi_dev->id after freeing it so the final release cannot free the same ID again.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93081"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:02Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: arm_scmi: Fix SCMI device destroy lifetimes\n\nscmi_child_dev_find() drops the reference returned by\ndevice_find_child() before returning the scmi_device pointer. A\nconcurrent unregister can then release the device while the destroy path\nis still using the returned pointer.\n\nMake the lookup helper return the device_find_child() reference and keep\nit until scmi_device_destroy() has finished unregistering the child.\n\nAlso split device_unregister() in __scmi_device_destroy() so the SCMI bus\nID is not made reusable until after device_del() has removed the old\nscmi_dev.N name from sysfs. This avoids a new SCMI device reusing the\nsame ID while the old device is still registered.\n\nThe final device release callback is also a possible cleanup path when\nSCMI children are deleted by driver core recursion rather than\n__scmi_device_destroy(). Release the SCMI bus ID from a common helper\nused by destroy, register-failure and final-release paths, and clear\nscmi_dev-\u003eid after freeing it so the final release cannot free the same\nID again.",
"id": "GHSA-x6gc-qjww-67r2",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93081"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6abe8fe36b29ff51d1a42c2f338972883f4751a5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c59b3393df1348a12308aaabd5fbc58ed6b21cf5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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