GHSA-X7QQ-23VW-7PFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:56 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:56Impact
The LoginRadius backend did not validate OAuth state during the authentication flow.
Applications using this backend were vulnerable to login CSRF. An attacker could cause a victim's browser session to complete authentication using an attacker-controlled LoginRadius token, making the victim authenticated as the attacker's LoginRadius identity.
The issue affects only applications using the LoginRadius backend.
Patches
The issue has been fixed by enabling callback state validation for the LoginRadius backend.
Users should upgrade to a patched version.
Fix:
- https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1808
Workarounds
Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable the LoginRadius backend by removing it from SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS.
There is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable backend.
Credits
Reported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wang, Strick, Maurice, and Chenchen Yu from the University of Sydney security research team.
Reporter references:
- https://lzhou1110.github.io/
- https://zyy0530.github.io/
- https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/
- https://maurice.busystar.org/
- https://7thparkk.github.io/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "social-auth-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57177"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:56:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T18:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe LoginRadius backend did not validate OAuth state during the authentication flow.\n\nApplications using this backend were vulnerable to login CSRF. An attacker could cause a victim\u0027s browser session to complete authentication using an attacker-controlled LoginRadius token, making the victim authenticated as the attacker\u0027s LoginRadius identity.\n\nThe issue affects only applications using the LoginRadius backend.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed by enabling callback state validation for the LoginRadius backend.\n\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version.\n\nFix:\n\n* https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1808\n\n### Workarounds\n\nApplications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable the LoginRadius backend by removing it from `SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS`.\n\nThere is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable backend.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wang, Strick, Maurice, and Chenchen Yu from the University of Sydney security research team.\n\nReporter references:\n\n* https://lzhou1110.github.io/\n* https://zyy0530.github.io/\n* https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/\n* https://maurice.busystar.org/\n* https://7thparkk.github.io/",
"id": "GHSA-x7qq-23vw-7pfg",
"modified": "2026-09-24T19:56:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T19:56:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/security/advisories/GHSA-x7qq-23vw-7pfg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57177"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1808"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/commit/4d332820e6b0583fde522956105a0e2beced5335"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/releases/tag/5.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "social-auth-core has Login CSRF via Missing State Parameter in LoginRadius Backend"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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