GHSA-XCFP-8R3C-9QRJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-20 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns
xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate() in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE.
XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008. The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path was missed.
Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding:
-
The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net's XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore receives migration notifications originating from any other netns on the host.
-
An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update handling inside a netns is silently broken.
Thread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate function pointer, drop the &init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate() and pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller's net (already in scope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb->sk)) all the way down. struct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API, so the function-pointer signature change is internal.
pfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other pfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x), sock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the &init_net outlier.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63914"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller\u0027s netns\n\nxfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate()\nin net/key/af_key.c both hardcode \u0026init_net for the multicast that\nannounces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE.\n\nXFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the\nrest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008.\nThe other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using\nxs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb-\u003esk); only the migrate path\nwas missed.\n\nTwo consequences of the init_net hardcoding:\n\n 1. The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the\n km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net\u0027s\n XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on\n the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore\n receives migration notifications originating from any other\n netns on the host.\n\n 2. An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed\n to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the\n notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update\n handling inside a netns is silently broken.\n\nThread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate\nfunction pointer, drop the \u0026init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate()\nand pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller\u0027s net (already in\nscope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb-\u003esk)) all the way down.\nstruct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API,\nso the function-pointer signature change is internal.\n\npfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net,\npfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other\npfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x),\nsock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the\n\u0026init_net outlier.",
"id": "GHSA-xcfp-8r3c-9qrj",
"modified": "2026-07-20T15:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T18:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63914"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00f2c451e57df50b1151d9b2254878f106b7c892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26ce8dbf2e23fe4fcc3351d19ef6d3fb703ed126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/448bb92ca101dde8a6e88b4dc824044b4e341604"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6df8157547347b5257bf640a0ae3dfc4411e06cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e2a4f7ca0952820731ef7bdadfc9a9e9d3571b4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a306cf2ac8849c487791369fad6f216399d000f6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bafc7d0774b9bf52909c70ed990bc5ccf7ec4bad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe463798343382c8fe9416a95959f005a3c30aa5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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