{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "land.oras:oras-java-sdk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:47:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `pullArtifact` methods in `Registry` and `OCILayout` use the `org.opencontainers.image.title` annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer\u0027s blob anywhere the JVM process can write.\n\n### Details\n\nTwo call sites are affected.\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java`, `pullLayer` (reached from `Registry.pullArtifact`):\n\n```java\nPath targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));\n...\nFiles.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);\n```\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java`, `OCILayout.pullArtifact`:\n\n```java\nFiles.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));\n```\n\nThe annotation comes from the remote manifest. `Path.resolve` treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows `..` segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. `REPLACE_EXISTING` overwrites files that exist at that destination.\n\nThe unpack branch of `pullLayer` (taken when the layer carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`) is not affected, because it dispatches through `ArchiveUtils.untar` / `unzip`, which apply `outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget)` after normalization. The non unpack branch and `OCILayout.pullArtifact` lack the equivalent check.\n\n`fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path)` is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.",
  "id": "GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T15:47:36Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:47:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-java/security/advisories/GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-java"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation"
}