GHSA-XP2H-P3FR-J2J5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-20 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:33
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

parisc: Fix double SIGFPE crash

Camm noticed that on parisc a SIGFPE exception will crash an application with a second SIGFPE in the signal handler. Dave analyzed it, and it happens because glibc uses a double-word floating-point store to atomically update function descriptors. As a result of lazy binding, we hit a floating-point store in fpe_func almost immediately.

When the T bit is set, an assist exception trap occurs when when the co-processor encounters any floating-point instruction except for a double store of register %fr0. The latter cancels all pending traps. Let's fix this by clearing the Trap (T) bit in the FP status register before returning to the signal handler in userspace.

The issue can be reproduced with this test program:

root@parisc:~# cat fpe.c

static void fpe_func(int sig, siginfo_t i, void v) { sigset_t set; sigemptyset(&set); sigaddset(&set, SIGFPE); sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, NULL); printf("GOT signal %d with si_code %ld\n", sig, i->si_code); }

int main() { struct sigaction action = { .sa_sigaction = fpe_func, .sa_flags = SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO }; sigaction(SIGFPE, &action, 0); feenableexcept(FE_OVERFLOW); return printf("%lf\n",1.7976931348623158E308*1.7976931348623158E308); }

root@parisc:~# gcc fpe.c -lm root@parisc:~# ./a.out Floating point exception

root@parisc:~# strace -f ./a.out execve("./a.out", ["./a.out"], 0xf9ac7034 / 20 vars /) = 0 getrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM_INFINITY}) = 0 ... rt_sigaction(SIGFPE, {sa_handler=0x1110a, sa_mask=[], sa_flags=SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0 --- SIGFPE {si_signo=SIGFPE, si_code=FPE_FLTOVF, si_addr=0x1078f} --- --- SIGFPE {si_signo=SIGFPE, si_code=FPE_FLTOVF, si_addr=0xf8f21237} --- +++ killed by SIGFPE +++ Floating point exception

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-37991"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-20T18:15:45Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nparisc: Fix double SIGFPE crash\n\nCamm noticed that on parisc a SIGFPE exception will crash an application with\na second SIGFPE in the signal handler.  Dave analyzed it, and it happens\nbecause glibc uses a double-word floating-point store to atomically update\nfunction descriptors. As a result of lazy binding, we hit a floating-point\nstore in fpe_func almost immediately.\n\nWhen the T bit is set, an assist exception trap occurs when when the\nco-processor encounters *any* floating-point instruction except for a double\nstore of register %fr0.  The latter cancels all pending traps.  Let\u0027s fix this\nby clearing the Trap (T) bit in the FP status register before returning to the\nsignal handler in userspace.\n\nThe issue can be reproduced with this test program:\n\nroot@parisc:~# cat fpe.c\n\nstatic void fpe_func(int sig, siginfo_t *i, void *v) {\n        sigset_t set;\n        sigemptyset(\u0026set);\n        sigaddset(\u0026set, SIGFPE);\n        sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, \u0026set, NULL);\n        printf(\"GOT signal %d with si_code %ld\\n\", sig, i-\u003esi_code);\n}\n\nint main() {\n        struct sigaction action = {\n                .sa_sigaction = fpe_func,\n                .sa_flags = SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO };\n        sigaction(SIGFPE, \u0026action, 0);\n        feenableexcept(FE_OVERFLOW);\n        return printf(\"%lf\\n\",1.7976931348623158E308*1.7976931348623158E308);\n}\n\nroot@parisc:~# gcc fpe.c -lm\nroot@parisc:~# ./a.out\n Floating point exception\n\nroot@parisc:~# strace -f ./a.out\n execve(\"./a.out\", [\"./a.out\"], 0xf9ac7034 /* 20 vars */) = 0\n getrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM_INFINITY}) = 0\n ...\n rt_sigaction(SIGFPE, {sa_handler=0x1110a, sa_mask=[], sa_flags=SA_RESTART|SA_SIGINFO}, NULL, 8) = 0\n --- SIGFPE {si_signo=SIGFPE, si_code=FPE_FLTOVF, si_addr=0x1078f} ---\n --- SIGFPE {si_signo=SIGFPE, si_code=FPE_FLTOVF, si_addr=0xf8f21237} ---\n +++ killed by SIGFPE +++\n Floating point exception",
  "id": "GHSA-xp2h-p3fr-j2j5",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:56Z",
  "published": "2025-05-20T18:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37991"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a1aff3616b3b57aa4a5f8a7762cce1e82493fe6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a098c51d18ec99485668da44294565c43dbc106"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c639af49e9e5615a8395981eaf5943fb40acd6f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/757ba4d17b868482837c566cfefca59e2296c608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf21e890f56b7d0038ddaf25224e4f4c69ecd143"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de3629baf5a33af1919dec7136d643b0662e85ef"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df3592e493d7f29bae4ffde9a9325de50ddf962e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec4584495868bd465fe60a3f771915c0e7ce7951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/08/msg00010.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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