GHSA-XVPQ-5JW7-83GF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location
itg3200_read_all_channels() takes __be16 *buf' as a parameter and
fills the i2c_msg destination as(char )&buf'. Since buf' is the
parameter (a pointer),&buf' is the address of the local pointer
slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address
of the caller's scan buffer. The (char ) cast hides the type
mismatch.
i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16) = 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak.
The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value, where that is correct.
Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's buffer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63934"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:11Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location\n\nitg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf\u0027 as a parameter and\nfills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)\u0026buf\u0027. Since `buf\u0027 is the\nparameter (a pointer), `\u0026buf\u0027 is the address of the local pointer\nslot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address\nof the caller\u0027s scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type\nmismatch.\n\ni2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16)\n= 8 bytes into the parameter\u0027s stack slot, which is discarded when\nthe function returns. The caller\u0027s scan buffer in\nitg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so\niio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack\ncontents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a\nfunctional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is\ndelivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak.\n\nThe non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through\nitg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `\u0026out\u0027 on a local s16 value,\nwhere that is correct.\n\nDrop the spurious `\u0026\u0027 so the i2c read writes into the caller\u0027s\nbuffer.",
"id": "GHSA-xvpq-5jw7-83gf",
"modified": "2026-07-19T18:31:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T18:31:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63934"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15a0b3f33ffb6c78b3de6f69b026ceb09b973dd1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31bbd4b87dd6701fa10e03ba7f6268e49e178d16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63203bd072b613c18c237b906b1c9d2dc4527337"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bdc3023d62ed5c7d591f0eb27a5adb37fb892ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8654b5e2617819ff4f7c78071dfd0275e971a9b6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90e809376b0f0d1ddec2eec954aecdd2a5b40b0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b64dd5f3b38911054cbcc570df617e3e8e75e562"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfc3283859cfdeacadf80d5e6880bdf871ffeaa6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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