GHSA-XWR6-736M-C3P5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: universal-pidff: stop the device when force-feedback init fails
universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with hid_hw_start() and then, if force-feedback initialisation fails, returns the error through a label that only does "return error". The device is left started.
The HID core does not unwind on the driver's behalf. __hid_device_probe() releases the devres group, closes the report and clears hdev->driver:
if (ret) {
devres_release_group(&hdev->dev, hdev->devres_group_id);
hid_close_report(hdev);
hdev->driver = NULL;
}
The hidraw character device that hid_hw_start() registered through hid_connect() is allocated with kzalloc() and added with cdev_device_add(), so it is not devres-managed and survives that. With hdev->driver NULL, hid_device_remove() skips hid_hw_stop() as well, because it only unwinds while a driver is still attached. The registration therefore outlives the device on both paths.
Opening the surviving /dev/hidrawX writes into freed memory. KASAN reports a use-after-free write from hidraw_open() -> hid_hw_open() -> the transport's open callback, which takes a spinlock inside the freed object. A descriptor that carries a PID usage page and no input reports is enough: hidraw claims the device so hid_hw_start() succeeds, while hid->inputs stays empty so force-feedback init fails. The other failure returns in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() - no output reports, an allocation failure, pidff_init_fields(), pidff_check_autocenter(), an unusable effect count, input_ff_create() - all reach the same label.
Stop the device on that path. hid-dr.c and hid-emsff.c, which start the device with the same HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF mask, already do this. The two earlier gotos must keep returning without hid_hw_stop(), since neither has a started device, so give the path that fails after the start its own label.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee baul.lee@xbow.com
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89624"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: universal-pidff: stop the device when force-feedback init fails\n\nuniversal_pidff_probe() starts the device with hid_hw_start() and then, if\nforce-feedback initialisation fails, returns the error through a label that\nonly does \"return error\". The device is left started.\n\nThe HID core does not unwind on the driver\u0027s behalf. __hid_device_probe()\nreleases the devres group, closes the report and clears hdev-\u003edriver:\n\n\tif (ret) {\n\t\tdevres_release_group(\u0026hdev-\u003edev, hdev-\u003edevres_group_id);\n\t\thid_close_report(hdev);\n\t\thdev-\u003edriver = NULL;\n\t}\n\nThe hidraw character device that hid_hw_start() registered through\nhid_connect() is allocated with kzalloc() and added with cdev_device_add(),\nso it is not devres-managed and survives that. With hdev-\u003edriver NULL,\nhid_device_remove() skips hid_hw_stop() as well, because it only unwinds\nwhile a driver is still attached. The registration therefore outlives the\ndevice on both paths.\n\nOpening the surviving /dev/hidrawX writes into freed memory. KASAN reports\na use-after-free write from hidraw_open() -\u003e hid_hw_open() -\u003e the\ntransport\u0027s open callback, which takes a spinlock inside the freed object.\nA descriptor that carries a PID usage page and no input reports is enough:\nhidraw claims the device so hid_hw_start() succeeds, while hid-\u003einputs\nstays empty so force-feedback init fails. The other failure returns in\nhid_pidff_init_with_quirks() - no output reports, an allocation failure,\npidff_init_fields(), pidff_check_autocenter(), an unusable effect count,\ninput_ff_create() - all reach the same label.\n\nStop the device on that path. hid-dr.c and hid-emsff.c, which start the\ndevice with the same HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT \u0026 ~HID_CONNECT_FF mask, already do\nthis. The two earlier gotos must keep returning without hid_hw_stop(),\nsince neither has a started device, so give the path that fails after the\nstart its own label.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee \u003cbaul.lee@xbow.com\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-xwr6-736m-c3p5",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01d9874e84d3ab78fd212ad822412eb3af84497f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c457bb516b61edeab940235a011928e26925381e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce08c5555cabcd444d8b77fa69a7cb68bb05f611"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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