GSD-2020-8828
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:21Details
As of v1.5.0, the default admin password is set to the argocd-server pod name. For insiders with access to the cluster or logs, this issue could be abused for privilege escalation, as Argo has privileged roles. A malicious insider is the most realistic threat, but pod names are not meant to be kept secret and could wind up just about anywhere.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2020-8828",
"description": "As of v1.5.0, the default admin password is set to the argocd-server pod name. For insiders with access to the cluster or logs, this issue could be abused for privilege escalation, as Argo has privileged roles. A malicious insider is the most realistic threat, but pod names are not meant to be kept secret and could wind up just about anywhere.",
"id": "GSD-2020-8828"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8828"
],
"details": "As of v1.5.0, the default admin password is set to the argocd-server pod name. For insiders with access to the cluster or logs, this issue could be abused for privilege escalation, as Argo has privileged roles. A malicious insider is the most realistic threat, but pod names are not meant to be kept secret and could wind up just about anywhere.",
"id": "GSD-2020-8828",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:21:53.915060Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
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"STATE": "PUBLIC"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "n/a",
"version": {
"version_data": [
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"version_value": "n/a"
}
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"value": "As of v1.5.0, the default admin password is set to the argocd-server pod name. For insiders with access to the cluster or logs, this issue could be abused for privilege escalation, as Argo has privileged roles. A malicious insider is the most realistic threat, but pod names are not meant to be kept secret and could wind up just about anywhere."
}
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"name": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo/releases",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo/releases"
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{
"name": "https://www.soluble.ai/blog/argo-cves-2020",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://www.soluble.ai/blog/argo-cves-2020"
},
{
"name": "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-cd/security_considerations/",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://argoproj.github.io/argo-cd/security_considerations/"
}
]
}
},
"gitlab.com": {
"advisories": [
{
"affected_range": "\u003c=1.5.0",
"affected_versions": "All versions up to 1.5.0",
"cvss_v2": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P",
"cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1035",
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-287",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2021-07-26",
"description": "As of v1.5.0, the default admin password is set to the argocd-server pod name. For insiders with access to the cluster or logs, this issue could be abused for privilege escalation, as Argo has privileged roles. A malicious insider is the most realistic threat, but pod names are not meant to be kept secret and could wind up just about anywhere.",
"fixed_versions": [],
"identifier": "CVE-2020-8828",
"identifiers": [
"GHSA-h8jc-jmrf-9h8f",
"CVE-2020-8828"
],
"not_impacted": "",
"package_slug": "go/github.com/argoproj/argo",
"pubdate": "2021-07-26",
"solution": "Unfortunately, there is no solution available yet.",
"title": "Insecure Default Initialization of Resource",
"urls": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8828",
"https://argoproj.github.io/argo-cd/security_considerations/",
"https://github.com/argoproj/argo/releases",
"https://www.soluble.ai/blog/argo-cves-2020",
"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h8jc-jmrf-9h8f"
],
"uuid": "f6b4ada5-b3ee-445a-a1ca-6ce046d60793"
}
]
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
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"cpe_match": [
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"cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:argo_continuous_delivery:*:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*",
"cpe_name": [],
"versionEndExcluding": "1.5.0",
"vulnerable": true
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"operator": "OR"
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"value": "As of v1.5.0, the default admin password is set to the argocd-server pod name. For insiders with access to the cluster or logs, this issue could be abused for privilege escalation, as Argo has privileged roles. A malicious insider is the most realistic threat, but pod names are not meant to be kept secret and could wind up just about anywhere."
}
]
},
"problemtype": {
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"references": {
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"refsource": "MISC",
"tags": [
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{
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},
"impact": {
"baseMetricV2": {
"acInsufInfo": false,
"cvssV2": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "SINGLE",
"availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 8.0,
"impactScore": 6.4,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"userInteractionRequired": false
},
"baseMetricV3": {
"cvssV3": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2021-07-21T11:39Z",
"publishedDate": "2020-04-08T20:15Z"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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