GSD-2021-21423

Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:23
Details
`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen's `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the "main" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the "main" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.
Aliases
Aliases

{
  "GSD": {
    "alias": "CVE-2021-21423",
    "description": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.",
    "id": "GSD-2021-21423"
  },
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2021-21423"
      ],
      "details": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.",
      "id": "GSD-2021-21423",
      "modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:10.514361Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
    "cve.org": {
      "CVE_data_meta": {
        "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "ID": "CVE-2021-21423",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC",
        "TITLE": "Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere in projen"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "projen",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_value": "\u003e= 0.6.0, \u003c 0.16.41"
                        }
                      ]
                    }
                  }
                ]
              },
              "vendor_name": "projen"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "data_format": "MITRE",
      "data_type": "CVE",
      "data_version": "4.0",
      "description": {
        "description_data": [
          {
            "lang": "eng",
            "value": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch."
          }
        ]
      },
      "generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 0.0.9"
      },
      "impact": {
        "cvss": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.8,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        }
      },
      "problemtype": {
        "problemtype_data": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "CWE-527: Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "reference_data": [
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq",
            "refsource": "CONFIRM",
            "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen"
          }
        ]
      },
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      }
    },
    "gitlab.com": {
      "advisories": [
        {
          "affected_range": "\u003e=0.6.0 \u003c0.16.41",
          "affected_versions": "All versions starting from 0.6.0 before 0.16.41",
          "cvss_v2": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N",
          "cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "cwe_ids": [
            "CWE-1035",
            "CWE-527",
            "CWE-937"
          ],
          "date": "2021-04-15",
          "description": "Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository.",
          "fixed_versions": [
            "0.16.41"
          ],
          "identifier": "CVE-2021-21423",
          "identifiers": [
            "CVE-2021-21423",
            "GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq"
          ],
          "not_impacted": "All versions before 0.6.0, all versions starting from 0.16.41",
          "package_slug": "npm/projen",
          "pubdate": "2021-04-06",
          "solution": "Upgrade to version 0.16.41 or above.",
          "title": "Exposure of CVS Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere",
          "urls": [
            "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21423"
          ],
          "uuid": "f209183a-08fe-44e3-b97f-6553b9b96db4"
        }
      ]
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
      "configurations": {
        "CVE_data_version": "4.0",
        "nodes": [
          {
            "children": [],
            "cpe_match": [
              {
                "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:projen_project:projen:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
                "cpe_name": [],
                "versionEndExcluding": "0.16.41",
                "versionStartIncluding": "0.6.0",
                "vulnerable": true
              }
            ],
            "operator": "OR"
          }
        ]
      },
      "cve": {
        "CVE_data_meta": {
          "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
          "ID": "CVE-2021-21423"
        },
        "data_format": "MITRE",
        "data_type": "CVE",
        "data_version": "4.0",
        "description": {
          "description_data": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch."
            }
          ]
        },
        "problemtype": {
          "problemtype_data": [
            {
              "description": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "CWE-527"
                }
              ]
            }
          ]
        },
        "references": {
          "reference_data": [
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq",
              "refsource": "CONFIRM",
              "tags": [
                "Mitigation",
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/security/advisories/GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Patch",
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/projen/projen/commit/36030c6a4b1acd0054673322612e7c70e9446643"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
                "Product",
                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/projen"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "impact": {
        "baseMetricV2": {
          "acInsufInfo": false,
          "cvssV2": {
            "accessComplexity": "LOW",
            "accessVector": "NETWORK",
            "authentication": "SINGLE",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.5,
            "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N",
            "version": "2.0"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 8.0,
          "impactScore": 4.9,
          "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
          "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
          "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
          "severity": "MEDIUM",
          "userInteractionRequired": false
        },
        "baseMetricV3": {
          "cvssV3": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 8.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
          "impactScore": 5.2
        }
      },
      "lastModifiedDate": "2021-04-15T14:37Z",
      "publishedDate": "2021-04-06T19:15Z"
    }
  }
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


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