GSD-2021-21423
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:23Details
`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen's `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the "main" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the "main" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2021-21423",
"description": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.",
"id": "GSD-2021-21423"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21423"
],
"details": "`projen` is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as `package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `.gitignore`, GitHub Workflows, `eslint`, `jest`, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including `@projen rebuild` on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event, and thus always executes with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by `pull_request` events, which always execute with a `GITHUB_TOKEN` belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically `main` or `master`) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed `GITHUB_TOKEN` would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.",
"id": "GSD-2021-21423",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:10.514361Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
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"ID": "CVE-2021-21423",
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"TITLE": "Exposure of Version-Control Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere in projen"
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"affects": {
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}
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"generator": {
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"impact": {
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"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.8,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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{
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"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"gitlab.com": {
"advisories": [
{
"affected_range": "\u003e=0.6.0 \u003c0.16.41",
"affected_versions": "All versions starting from 0.6.0 before 0.16.41",
"cvss_v2": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N",
"cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1035",
"CWE-527",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2021-04-15",
"description": "Users of projen\u0027s `NodeProject` project type (including any project type derived from it) include a `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml` workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the \"main\" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the \"main\" repository.",
"fixed_versions": [
"0.16.41"
],
"identifier": "CVE-2021-21423",
"identifiers": [
"CVE-2021-21423",
"GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq"
],
"not_impacted": "All versions before 0.6.0, all versions starting from 0.16.41",
"package_slug": "npm/projen",
"pubdate": "2021-04-06",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 0.16.41 or above.",
"title": "Exposure of CVS Repository to an Unauthorized Control Sphere",
"urls": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21423"
],
"uuid": "f209183a-08fe-44e3-b97f-6553b9b96db4"
}
]
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"versionEndExcluding": "0.16.41",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.6.0",
"vulnerable": true
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}
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"integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 8.0,
"impactScore": 4.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"userInteractionRequired": false
},
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"impactScore": 5.2
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2021-04-15T14:37Z",
"publishedDate": "2021-04-06T19:15Z"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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