GSD-2021-41272
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:23Details
Besu is an Ethereum client written in Java. Starting in version 21.10.0, changes in the implementation of the SHL, SHR, and SAR operations resulted in the introduction of a signed type coercion error in values that represent negative values for 32 bit signed integers. Smart contracts that ask for shifts between approximately 2 billion and 4 billion bits (nonsensical but valid values for the operation) will fail to execute and hence fail to validate. In networks where vulnerable versions are mining with other clients or non-vulnerable versions this will result in a fork and the relevant transactions will not be included in the fork. In networks where vulnerable versions are not mining (such as Rinkeby) no fork will result and the validator nodes will stop accepting blocks. In networks where only vulnerable versions are mining the relevant transaction will not be included in any blocks. When the network adds a non-vulnerable version the network will act as in the first case. Besu 21.10.2 contains a patch for this issue. Besu 21.7.4 is not vulnerable and clients can roll back to that version. There is a workaround available: Once a transaction with the relevant shift operations is included in the canonical chain, the only remediation is to make sure all nodes are on non-vulnerable versions.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2021-41272",
"description": "Besu is an Ethereum client written in Java. Starting in version 21.10.0, changes in the implementation of the SHL, SHR, and SAR operations resulted in the introduction of a signed type coercion error in values that represent negative values for 32 bit signed integers. Smart contracts that ask for shifts between approximately 2 billion and 4 billion bits (nonsensical but valid values for the operation) will fail to execute and hence fail to validate. In networks where vulnerable versions are mining with other clients or non-vulnerable versions this will result in a fork and the relevant transactions will not be included in the fork. In networks where vulnerable versions are not mining (such as Rinkeby) no fork will result and the validator nodes will stop accepting blocks. In networks where only vulnerable versions are mining the relevant transaction will not be included in any blocks. When the network adds a non-vulnerable version the network will act as in the first case. Besu 21.10.2 contains a patch for this issue. Besu 21.7.4 is not vulnerable and clients can roll back to that version. There is a workaround available: Once a transaction with the relevant shift operations is included in the canonical chain, the only remediation is to make sure all nodes are on non-vulnerable versions.",
"id": "GSD-2021-41272"
},
"gsd": {
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"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
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"details": "Besu is an Ethereum client written in Java. Starting in version 21.10.0, changes in the implementation of the SHL, SHR, and SAR operations resulted in the introduction of a signed type coercion error in values that represent negative values for 32 bit signed integers. Smart contracts that ask for shifts between approximately 2 billion and 4 billion bits (nonsensical but valid values for the operation) will fail to execute and hence fail to validate. In networks where vulnerable versions are mining with other clients or non-vulnerable versions this will result in a fork and the relevant transactions will not be included in the fork. In networks where vulnerable versions are not mining (such as Rinkeby) no fork will result and the validator nodes will stop accepting blocks. In networks where only vulnerable versions are mining the relevant transaction will not be included in any blocks. When the network adds a non-vulnerable version the network will act as in the first case. Besu 21.10.2 contains a patch for this issue. Besu 21.7.4 is not vulnerable and clients can roll back to that version. There is a workaround available: Once a transaction with the relevant shift operations is included in the canonical chain, the only remediation is to make sure all nodes are on non-vulnerable versions.",
"id": "GSD-2021-41272",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:27.069665Z",
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}
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"TITLE": "SHL, SHR, and SAR operations trigger native exception at key values in besu"
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"lastModifiedDate": "2021-12-16T16:05Z",
"publishedDate": "2021-12-13T21:15Z"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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