gsd-2021-47069
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2024-03-01 06:04
Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry
do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address. The
sender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send.
This leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive
call might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid
address, causing the following crash:
RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60
Call Trace:
__x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490
do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343
The race occurs as:
1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct
ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it
holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not
been overwritten.
2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info->e_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and
do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call
__pipelined_op.
3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(&this->state,
STATE_READY). Here is where the race window begins. (`this` is
`ewq_addr`.)
4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it
will see `state == STATE_READY` and break.
5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed
to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive's
stack. (Although the address may not get overwritten until another
function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an
indefinite time.)
6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a
`struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to
the wake_q_add_safe call. In the lucky case where nothing has
overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr->task` is the right task_struct.
In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a
bogus address as the receiver's task_struct causing the crash.
do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after
setting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return.
Change __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver's
task_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this`
which sits on the receiver's stack.
As Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in
ipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare. Fix
those in the same way.
Aliases
{ "gsd": { "metadata": { "exploitCode": "unknown", "remediation": "unknown", "reportConfidence": "confirmed", "type": "vulnerability" }, "osvSchema": { "aliases": [ "CVE-2021-47069" ], "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry\n\ndo_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address. The\nsender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send.\n\nThis leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive\ncall might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid\naddress, causing the following crash:\n\n RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60\n Call Trace:\n __x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490\n do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343\n\nThe race occurs as:\n\n1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct\n ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it\n holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not\n been overwritten.\n\n2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info-\u003ee_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and\n do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call\n __pipelined_op.\n\n3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(\u0026this-\u003estate,\n STATE_READY). Here is where the race window begins. (`this` is\n `ewq_addr`.)\n\n4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it\n will see `state == STATE_READY` and break.\n\n5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed\n to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive\u0027s\n stack. (Although the address may not get overwritten until another\n function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an\n indefinite time.)\n\n6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a\n `struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to\n the wake_q_add_safe call. In the lucky case where nothing has\n overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr-\u003etask` is the right task_struct.\n In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a\n bogus address as the receiver\u0027s task_struct causing the crash.\n\ndo_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after\nsetting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return.\nChange __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver\u0027s\ntask_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this`\nwhich sits on the receiver\u0027s stack.\n\nAs Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in\nipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare. Fix\nthose in the same way.", "id": "GSD-2021-47069", "modified": "2024-03-01T06:04:48.313787Z", "schema_version": "1.4.0" } }, "namespaces": { "cve.org": { "CVE_data_meta": { "ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org", "ID": "CVE-2021-47069", "STATE": "PUBLIC" }, "affects": { "vendor": { "vendor_data": [ { "product": { "product_data": [ { "product_name": "Linux", "version": { "version_data": [ { "version_affected": "\u003c", "version_name": "0d97a82ba830", "version_value": "4528c0c32308" }, { "version_value": "not down converted", "x_cve_json_5_version_data": { "defaultStatus": "affected", "versions": [ { "status": "affected", "version": "5.6" }, { "lessThan": "5.6", "status": "unaffected", "version": "0", "versionType": "custom" }, { "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*", "status": "unaffected", "version": "5.10.40", "versionType": "custom" }, { "lessThanOrEqual": "5.12.*", "status": "unaffected", "version": "5.12.7", "versionType": "custom" }, { "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "unaffected", "version": "5.13", "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix" } ] } } ] } } ] }, "vendor_name": "Linux" } ] } }, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": { "description_data": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry\n\ndo_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address. The\nsender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send.\n\nThis leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive\ncall might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid\naddress, causing the following crash:\n\n RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60\n Call Trace:\n __x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490\n do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343\n\nThe race occurs as:\n\n1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct\n ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it\n holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not\n been overwritten.\n\n2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info-\u003ee_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and\n do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call\n __pipelined_op.\n\n3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(\u0026this-\u003estate,\n STATE_READY). Here is where the race window begins. (`this` is\n `ewq_addr`.)\n\n4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it\n will see `state == STATE_READY` and break.\n\n5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed\n to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive\u0027s\n stack. (Although the address may not get overwritten until another\n function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an\n indefinite time.)\n\n6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a\n `struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to\n the wake_q_add_safe call. In the lucky case where nothing has\n overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr-\u003etask` is the right task_struct.\n In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a\n bogus address as the receiver\u0027s task_struct causing the crash.\n\ndo_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after\nsetting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return.\nChange __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver\u0027s\ntask_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this`\nwhich sits on the receiver\u0027s stack.\n\nAs Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in\nipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare. Fix\nthose in the same way." } ] }, "generator": { "engine": "bippy-1e70cc10feda" }, "problemtype": { "problemtype_data": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "n/a" } ] } ] }, "references": { "reference_data": [ { "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4528c0c323085e645b8765913b4a7fd42cf49b65", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4528c0c323085e645b8765913b4a7fd42cf49b65" }, { "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/807fa14536b26803b858da878b643be72952a097", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/807fa14536b26803b858da878b643be72952a097" }, { "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a11ddb37bf367e6b5239b95ca759e5389bb46048", "refsource": "MISC", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a11ddb37bf367e6b5239b95ca759e5389bb46048" } ] } }, "nvd.nist.gov": { "cve": { "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry\n\ndo_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address. The\nsender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send.\n\nThis leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive\ncall might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid\naddress, causing the following crash:\n\n RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60\n Call Trace:\n __x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490\n do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343\n\nThe race occurs as:\n\n1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct\n ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it\n holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not\n been overwritten.\n\n2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info-\u003ee_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and\n do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call\n __pipelined_op.\n\n3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(\u0026this-\u003estate,\n STATE_READY). Here is where the race window begins. (`this` is\n `ewq_addr`.)\n\n4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it\n will see `state == STATE_READY` and break.\n\n5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed\n to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive\u0027s\n stack. (Although the address may not get overwritten until another\n function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an\n indefinite time.)\n\n6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a\n `struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to\n the wake_q_add_safe call. In the lucky case where nothing has\n overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr-\u003etask` is the right task_struct.\n In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a\n bogus address as the receiver\u0027s task_struct causing the crash.\n\ndo_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after\nsetting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return.\nChange __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver\u0027s\ntask_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this`\nwhich sits on the receiver\u0027s stack.\n\nAs Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in\nipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare. Fix\nthose in the same way." } ], "id": "CVE-2021-47069", "lastModified": "2024-03-01T22:22:25.913", "metrics": {}, "published": "2024-03-01T22:15:46.857", "references": [ { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4528c0c323085e645b8765913b4a7fd42cf49b65" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/807fa14536b26803b858da878b643be72952a097" }, { "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a11ddb37bf367e6b5239b95ca759e5389bb46048" } ], "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis" } } } }
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- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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