gsd-2021-47069
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2024-03-01 06:04
Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address. The sender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send. This leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive call might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid address, causing the following crash: RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60 Call Trace: __x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490 do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343 The race occurs as: 1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not been overwritten. 2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info->e_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call __pipelined_op. 3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(&this->state, STATE_READY). Here is where the race window begins. (`this` is `ewq_addr`.) 4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it will see `state == STATE_READY` and break. 5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive's stack. (Although the address may not get overwritten until another function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an indefinite time.) 6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a `struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to the wake_q_add_safe call. In the lucky case where nothing has overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr->task` is the right task_struct. In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a bogus address as the receiver's task_struct causing the crash. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after setting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return. Change __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver's task_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this` which sits on the receiver's stack. As Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in ipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare. Fix those in the same way.
Aliases



{
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2021-47069"
      ],
      "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry\n\ndo_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address.  The\nsender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send.\n\nThis leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive\ncall might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid\naddress, causing the following crash:\n\n  RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60\n  Call Trace:\n   __x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490\n   do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343\n\nThe race occurs as:\n\n1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct\n   ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it\n   holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not\n   been overwritten.\n\n2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info-\u003ee_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and\n   do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call\n   __pipelined_op.\n\n3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(\u0026this-\u003estate,\n   STATE_READY).  Here is where the race window begins.  (`this` is\n   `ewq_addr`.)\n\n4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it\n   will see `state == STATE_READY` and break.\n\n5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed\n   to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive\u0027s\n   stack.  (Although the address may not get overwritten until another\n   function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an\n   indefinite time.)\n\n6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a\n   `struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to\n   the wake_q_add_safe call.  In the lucky case where nothing has\n   overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr-\u003etask` is the right task_struct.\n   In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a\n   bogus address as the receiver\u0027s task_struct causing the crash.\n\ndo_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after\nsetting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return.\nChange __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver\u0027s\ntask_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this`\nwhich sits on the receiver\u0027s stack.\n\nAs Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in\nipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare.  Fix\nthose in the same way.",
      "id": "GSD-2021-47069",
      "modified": "2024-03-01T06:04:48.313787Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
    "cve.org": {
      "CVE_data_meta": {
        "ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org",
        "ID": "CVE-2021-47069",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "Linux",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "0d97a82ba830",
                          "version_value": "4528c0c32308"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_value": "not down converted",
                          "x_cve_json_5_version_data": {
                            "defaultStatus": "affected",
                            "versions": [
                              {
                                "status": "affected",
                                "version": "5.6"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThan": "5.6",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "0",
                                "versionType": "custom"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.10.40",
                                "versionType": "custom"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "5.12.*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.12.7",
                                "versionType": "custom"
                              },
                              {
                                "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
                                "status": "unaffected",
                                "version": "5.13",
                                "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
                              }
                            ]
                          }
                        }
                      ]
                    }
                  }
                ]
              },
              "vendor_name": "Linux"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "data_format": "MITRE",
      "data_type": "CVE",
      "data_version": "4.0",
      "description": {
        "description_data": [
          {
            "lang": "eng",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry\n\ndo_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address.  The\nsender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send.\n\nThis leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive\ncall might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid\naddress, causing the following crash:\n\n  RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60\n  Call Trace:\n   __x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490\n   do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343\n\nThe race occurs as:\n\n1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct\n   ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it\n   holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not\n   been overwritten.\n\n2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info-\u003ee_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and\n   do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call\n   __pipelined_op.\n\n3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(\u0026this-\u003estate,\n   STATE_READY).  Here is where the race window begins.  (`this` is\n   `ewq_addr`.)\n\n4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it\n   will see `state == STATE_READY` and break.\n\n5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed\n   to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive\u0027s\n   stack.  (Although the address may not get overwritten until another\n   function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an\n   indefinite time.)\n\n6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a\n   `struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to\n   the wake_q_add_safe call.  In the lucky case where nothing has\n   overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr-\u003etask` is the right task_struct.\n   In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a\n   bogus address as the receiver\u0027s task_struct causing the crash.\n\ndo_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after\nsetting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return.\nChange __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver\u0027s\ntask_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this`\nwhich sits on the receiver\u0027s stack.\n\nAs Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in\nipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare.  Fix\nthose in the same way."
          }
        ]
      },
      "generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1e70cc10feda"
      },
      "problemtype": {
        "problemtype_data": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "n/a"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "reference_data": [
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4528c0c323085e645b8765913b4a7fd42cf49b65",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4528c0c323085e645b8765913b4a7fd42cf49b65"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/807fa14536b26803b858da878b643be72952a097",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/807fa14536b26803b858da878b643be72952a097"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a11ddb37bf367e6b5239b95ca759e5389bb46048",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a11ddb37bf367e6b5239b95ca759e5389bb46048"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
      "cve": {
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipc/mqueue, msg, sem: avoid relying on a stack reference past its expiry\n\ndo_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with a stack local address.  The\nsender (do_mq_timedsend) uses this address to later call pipelined_send.\n\nThis leads to a very hard to trigger race where a do_mq_timedreceive\ncall might return and leave do_mq_timedsend to rely on an invalid\naddress, causing the following crash:\n\n  RIP: 0010:wake_q_add_safe+0x13/0x60\n  Call Trace:\n   __x64_sys_mq_timedsend+0x2a9/0x490\n   do_syscall_64+0x80/0x680\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n  RIP: 0033:0x7f5928e40343\n\nThe race occurs as:\n\n1. do_mq_timedreceive calls wq_sleep with the address of `struct\n   ext_wait_queue` on function stack (aliased as `ewq_addr` here) - it\n   holds a valid `struct ext_wait_queue *` as long as the stack has not\n   been overwritten.\n\n2. `ewq_addr` gets added to info-\u003ee_wait_q[RECV].list in wq_add, and\n   do_mq_timedsend receives it via wq_get_first_waiter(info, RECV) to call\n   __pipelined_op.\n\n3. Sender calls __pipelined_op::smp_store_release(\u0026this-\u003estate,\n   STATE_READY).  Here is where the race window begins.  (`this` is\n   `ewq_addr`.)\n\n4. If the receiver wakes up now in do_mq_timedreceive::wq_sleep, it\n   will see `state == STATE_READY` and break.\n\n5. do_mq_timedreceive returns, and `ewq_addr` is no longer guaranteed\n   to be a `struct ext_wait_queue *` since it was on do_mq_timedreceive\u0027s\n   stack.  (Although the address may not get overwritten until another\n   function happens to touch it, which means it can persist around for an\n   indefinite time.)\n\n6. do_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() still believes `ewq_addr` is a\n   `struct ext_wait_queue *`, and uses it to find a task_struct to pass to\n   the wake_q_add_safe call.  In the lucky case where nothing has\n   overwritten `ewq_addr` yet, `ewq_addr-\u003etask` is the right task_struct.\n   In the unlucky case, __pipelined_op::wake_q_add_safe gets handed a\n   bogus address as the receiver\u0027s task_struct causing the crash.\n\ndo_mq_timedsend::__pipelined_op() should not dereference `this` after\nsetting STATE_READY, as the receiver counterpart is now free to return.\nChange __pipelined_op to call wake_q_add_safe on the receiver\u0027s\ntask_struct returned by get_task_struct, instead of dereferencing `this`\nwhich sits on the receiver\u0027s stack.\n\nAs Manfred pointed out, the race potentially also exists in\nipc/msg.c::expunge_all and ipc/sem.c::wake_up_sem_queue_prepare.  Fix\nthose in the same way."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2021-47069",
        "lastModified": "2024-03-01T22:22:25.913",
        "metrics": {},
        "published": "2024-03-01T22:15:46.857",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4528c0c323085e645b8765913b4a7fd42cf49b65"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/807fa14536b26803b858da878b643be72952a097"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a11ddb37bf367e6b5239b95ca759e5389bb46048"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
      }
    }
  }
}


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