gsd-2022-35949
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2023-12-13 01:19
Details
undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require("undici") undici.request({origin: "http://example.com", pathname: "//127.0.0.1"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2022-35949",
"description": "undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require(\"undici\") undici.request({origin: \"http://example.com\", pathname: \"//127.0.0.1\"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call.",
"id": "GSD-2022-35949",
"references": [
"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-35949.html"
]
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-35949"
],
"details": "undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require(\"undici\") undici.request({origin: \"http://example.com\", pathname: \"//127.0.0.1\"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call.",
"id": "GSD-2022-35949",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:19:33.582016Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
"ID": "CVE-2022-35949",
"STATE": "PUBLIC",
"TITLE": "`undici.request` vulnerable to SSRF using absolute URL on `pathname`"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
"vendor_data": [
{
"product": {
"product_data": [
{
"product_name": "undici",
"version": {
"version_data": [
{
"version_value": "\u003c= 5.8.1"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "nodejs"
}
]
}
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require(\"undici\") undici.request({origin: \"http://example.com\", pathname: \"//127.0.0.1\"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call."
}
]
},
"impact": {
"cvss": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 6.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3",
"refsource": "CONFIRM",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v5.8.2",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v5.8.2"
}
]
},
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"gitlab.com": {
"advisories": [
{
"affected_range": "\u003c=5.8.1",
"affected_versions": "All versions up to 5.8.1",
"cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1035",
"CWE-918",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2023-03-28",
"description": "undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require(\"undici\") undici.request({origin: \"http://example.com\", pathname: \"//127.0.0.1\"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call.",
"fixed_versions": [
"5.8.2"
],
"identifier": "CVE-2022-35949",
"identifiers": [
"CVE-2022-35949",
"GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3"
],
"not_impacted": "All versions after 5.8.1",
"package_slug": "npm/undici",
"pubdate": "2022-08-12",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 5.8.2 or above.",
"title": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
"urls": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35949",
"https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3",
"https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v5.8.2",
"https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895"
],
"uuid": "a54bc49a-fa85-4d70-8bc2-58c6cbc6f5a9"
}
]
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"configurations": {
"CVE_data_version": "4.0",
"nodes": [
{
"children": [],
"cpe_match": [
{
"cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:nodejs:undici:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
"cpe_name": [],
"versionEndIncluding": "5.8.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"operator": "OR"
}
]
},
"cve": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
"ID": "CVE-2022-35949"
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "undici is an HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js.`undici` is vulnerable to SSRF (Server-side Request Forgery) when an application takes in **user input** into the `path/pathname` option of `undici.request`. If a user specifies a URL such as `http://127.0.0.1` or `//127.0.0.1` ```js const undici = require(\"undici\") undici.request({origin: \"http://example.com\", pathname: \"//127.0.0.1\"}) ``` Instead of processing the request as `http://example.org//127.0.0.1` (or `http://example.org/http://127.0.0.1` when `http://127.0.0.1 is used`), it actually processes the request as `http://127.0.0.1/` and sends it to `http://127.0.0.1`. If a developer passes in user input into `path` parameter of `undici.request`, it can result in an _SSRF_ as they will assume that the hostname cannot change, when in actual fact it can change because the specified path parameter is combined with the base URL. This issue was fixed in `undici@5.8.1`. The best workaround is to validate user input before passing it to the `undici.request` call."
}
]
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-918"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3",
"refsource": "CONFIRM",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Mitigation",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v5.8.2",
"refsource": "MISC",
"tags": [
"Release Notes",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v5.8.2"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895",
"refsource": "MISC",
"tags": [
"Patch",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/124f7ebf705366b2e1844dff721928d270f87895"
}
]
}
},
"impact": {
"baseMetricV3": {
"cvssV3": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2023-03-28T17:10Z",
"publishedDate": "2022-08-12T23:15Z"
}
}
}
Loading...
Loading...
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.