GSD-2023-34459
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:20Details
OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.
A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.
A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.
The problem has been patched in version 4.9.2.
Some workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.
Aliases
Aliases
{
"GSD": {
"alias": "CVE-2023-34459",
"id": "GSD-2023-34459"
},
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-34459"
],
"details": "OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.\n\nA contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.\n\nA contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 4.9.2.\n\nSome workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.",
"id": "GSD-2023-34459",
"modified": "2023-12-13T01:20:30.593743Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
"ID": "CVE-2023-34459",
"STATE": "PUBLIC"
},
"affects": {
"vendor": {
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{
"product": {
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"product_name": "openzeppelin-contracts",
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"version_value": "\u003e= 4.7.0, \u003c 4.9.2"
}
]
}
}
]
},
"vendor_name": "OpenZeppelin"
}
]
}
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.\n\nA contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.\n\nA contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 4.9.2.\n\nSome workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves."
}
]
},
"impact": {
"cvss": [
{
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
]
},
"problemtype": {
"problemtype_data": [
{
"description": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-354",
"lang": "eng",
"value": "CWE-354: Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value"
}
]
}
]
},
"references": {
"reference_data": [
{
"name": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55"
},
{
"name": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2",
"refsource": "MISC",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2"
}
]
},
"source": {
"advisory": "GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p",
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"gitlab.com": {
"advisories": [
{
"affected_range": "\u003e=4.7.0 \u003c4.9.2",
"affected_versions": "All versions starting from 4.7.0 before 4.9.2",
"cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1035",
"CWE-354",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2023-06-19",
"description": "OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.\n\nA contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.\n\nA contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 4.9.2.\n\nSome workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.",
"fixed_versions": [
"4.9.2"
],
"identifier": "CVE-2023-34459",
"identifiers": [
"GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p",
"CVE-2023-34459"
],
"not_impacted": "All versions before 4.7.0, all versions starting from 4.9.2",
"package_slug": "npm/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable",
"pubdate": "2023-06-19",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 4.9.2 or above.",
"title": "Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value",
"urls": [
"https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p",
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34459",
"https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55",
"https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2",
"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p"
],
"uuid": "99e97dc4-0b58-4482-9b64-777e0f576fbc"
},
{
"affected_range": "\u003e=4.7.0 \u003c4.9.2",
"affected_versions": "All versions starting from 4.7.0 before 4.9.2",
"cvss_v3": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1035",
"CWE-354",
"CWE-937"
],
"date": "2023-06-26",
"description": "OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.\n\nA contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.\n\nA contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 4.9.2.\n\nSome workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.",
"fixed_versions": [
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],
"identifier": "CVE-2023-34459",
"identifiers": [
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"GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p"
],
"not_impacted": "All versions before 4.7.0, all versions starting from 4.9.2",
"package_slug": "npm/@openzeppelin/contracts",
"pubdate": "2023-06-16",
"solution": "Upgrade to version 4.9.2 or above.",
"title": "Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value",
"urls": [
"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34459",
"https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/4d2383e17186be3e8ccf5a442e9686ecc7de1c55",
"https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.2",
"https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-wprv-93r4-jj2p"
],
"uuid": "ec4ca7f4-09b6-4745-81bd-c6e89d03f408"
}
]
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"value": "OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. Starting in version 4.7.0 and prior to version 4.9.2, when the `verifyMultiProof`, `verifyMultiProofCalldata`, `procesprocessMultiProof`, or `processMultiProofCalldat` functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.\n\nA contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertedly for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.\n\nA contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (`verify`, `verifyCalldata`, `processProof`, or `processProofCalldata`), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 4.9.2.\n\nSome workarounds are available. For those using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves."
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"impact": {
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"baseScore": 5.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
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"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 3.6
}
},
"lastModifiedDate": "2023-06-26T18:50Z",
"publishedDate": "2023-06-16T23:15Z"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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