mal-2026-12290
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (bd6182daf75450f1e553f81c3979a275c481690e27d04712285b85a25ebadc3b)
On require of this package, index.js loads platform.js which selects a platform-specific payload (linux_x64/linux_arm64/darwin/win32), downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from a pool of .workers.dev hosts, writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_ or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_.exe, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd with unref, so execution survives the parent process. Destination hostnames are not stored as plain literals — they are assembled at runtime from split fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf101-a','df.worke','rs.d','ev'].join('')) to evade string scans. If HTTPS retrieval fails, the code falls back to DNS TXT lookups against numbered subdomains of dl.well1.site and reassembles a base64-encoded binary from the concatenated TXT records, bypassing HTTPS egress inspection. The disguised on-disk filenames (dotnet_diag_,.cache*), the anonymous Workers hosting, the absence of any hash or signature verification, and the covert DNS delivery channel are inconsistent with the package's advertised 'API client bindings' purpose.
Source: ghsa-malware (cfb495e3d789da9f3a203ef37fbc3f6c631ec4cc6f6838063724fdfa280859d6)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "_platform.js",
"sha256": "f37ca6ece7f85dc15a9ac7e71e808cc7c5d56391fcb2627af61a91b4d565a0c3",
"tlsh": "f5a1955a16a9701c8bb0abe087174415f65bf2533391c294fb5ca9945fb312483b2efc"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "twork-data-services-customer-api-v2-customer-vip-status-20.9.7.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "e0f3a7e987ab2cd615b5a90b84162c711457a876",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-OAZMCyNwDuQs8u7h2+2p45PQnDMpMFI5IM0roEnD/a+ejaBcVLAK0AVB4aPZ27GJeEOuqFTbnpkxwVvSdfPNbQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "twork-data-services-customer-api-v2-customer-vip-status"
},
"versions": [
"20.9.7"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-xcx3-rr77-frhq"
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-014595",
"import_time": "2026-08-05T09:28:28.817626752Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-05T09:13:18Z",
"sha256": "bd6182daf75450f1e553f81c3979a275c481690e27d04712285b85a25ebadc3b",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"20.9.7"
]
},
{
"id": "GHSA-xcx3-rr77-frhq",
"import_time": "2026-08-25T17:25:28.28749412Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-25T16:31:52Z",
"sha256": "cfb495e3d789da9f3a203ef37fbc3f6c631ec4cc6f6838063724fdfa280859d6",
"source": "ghsa-malware",
"versions": [
"20.9.7"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (bd6182daf75450f1e553f81c3979a275c481690e27d04712285b85a25ebadc3b)\nOn require of this package, index.js loads _platform.js which selects a platform-specific payload (linux_x64/linux_arm64/darwin/win32), downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from a pool of *.workers.dev hosts, writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_\u003chex\u003e or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_\u003chex\u003e.exe, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd with unref, so execution survives the parent process. Destination hostnames are not stored as plain literals \u2014 they are assembled at runtime from split fragments (e.g. [\u0027oob-worker.cf101-a\u0027,\u0027df.worke\u0027,\u0027rs.d\u0027,\u0027ev\u0027].join(\u0027\u0027)) to evade string scans. If HTTPS retrieval fails, the code falls back to DNS TXT lookups against numbered subdomains of dl.well1.site and reassembles a base64-encoded binary from the concatenated TXT records, bypassing HTTPS egress inspection. The disguised on-disk filenames (dotnet_diag_*,.cache_*), the anonymous Workers hosting, the absence of any hash or signature verification, and the covert DNS delivery channel are inconsistent with the package\u0027s advertised \u0027API client bindings\u0027 purpose.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (cfb495e3d789da9f3a203ef37fbc3f6c631ec4cc6f6838063724fdfa280859d6)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-12290",
"modified": "2026-08-25T17:27:31.753396480Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T09:13:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/twork-data-services-customer-api-v2-customer-vip-status/v/20.9.7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xcx3-rr77-frhq"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in twork-data-services-customer-api-v2-customer-vip-status (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.