mal-2026-13666
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (1f5f2cf32e29ec0daedda5112ca2c560e69b4c4cd77850d6dc52d7a448e343a2)
The package is advertised as an 'Upstream driver interface for cubesat orbital command bus' but ships no driver, protocol, or telemetry code. Its sole module defines _exfil_flag(), which on import reads well-known secret/flag file paths (including /flag, /root/flag.txt, and /**/flag* globs), scans os.environ for keys containing flag, secret, ctf, key, or token, and falls back to serializing the entire environment. The result is cached in module global _BOOT_SECRET and returned by the public handle_command API, so any caller consuming the advertised interface receives the installer's environment variables and file-based secrets in place of telemetry. handle_command also re-runs the harvest on each invocation.
Source: kam193 (d669fdf7584f17d952cec3ed432bdb8f07672b43c3bc42ae68aa2d042d51481b)
Package appears to abuse PyPI for a CTF-like exercise. It can collect up to all environment variables. The package does not exfiltrate them on its own, suggesting there is another external trigger for that.
Originally detected by Aikido.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: 2026-08-cubesat-upstream-driver
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
dependency-confusion
-
other
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "cubesat_upstream_driver/__init__.py",
"sha256": "9b267c1b94f311314cce2df208b59fb8030d3129376a10f52966d6f67302a789",
"tlsh": "7831fec1bb693c53e0d25128953ac1052b2efd473a45207abacc53622f6c1acccb9689"
},
{
"path": "pyproject.toml",
"sha256": "c00189e7d418e6fd090733cb85dc1b0c42ffc73edea24e08a3dbe147faf9f3ee",
"tlsh": "c3f02d1bc9d65c279581608260020a01bef0942b1bc9c00e23efc009ebae8cac2fe828"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "cubesat_upstream_driver-1.0.1-py3-none-any.whl",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "3e894cfbbe93af11314f9ad2770da09844de83764b36e24957de07363edae3d5",
"md5": "8ff8584dd9385b84c682606ced403bc3",
"sha256": "1f90912d5cb8104ef518cd16a3de1b303f7b871a5b8a4096185595b54600e8f4"
}
},
{
"filename": "cubesat_upstream_driver-1.0.1.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "eb552d8df86746f5e01d0e939e35e8bd4f75138977ed9ec8ce3a5c6fdd7b2690",
"md5": "9ef7881f15529d3ee8fe774d80071bfa",
"sha256": "9fc77502c2bb533baf48b3b7adbbd9c33f7c61105bf84d7145bfa817af98059c"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "cubesat-upstream-driver"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-08-cubesat-upstream-driver/cubesat-upstream-driver",
"import_time": "2026-08-09T13:50:51.214656911Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-09T13:09:20.505024Z",
"sha256": "d669fdf7584f17d952cec3ed432bdb8f07672b43c3bc42ae68aa2d042d51481b",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"1.0.1"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-017205",
"import_time": "2026-08-10T11:51:54.663616204Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-10T11:49:31Z",
"sha256": "1f5f2cf32e29ec0daedda5112ca2c560e69b4c4cd77850d6dc52d7a448e343a2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1f5f2cf32e29ec0daedda5112ca2c560e69b4c4cd77850d6dc52d7a448e343a2)\nThe package is advertised as an \u0027Upstream driver interface for cubesat orbital command bus\u0027 but ships no driver, protocol, or telemetry code. Its sole module defines `_exfil_flag()`, which on import reads well-known secret/flag file paths (including `/flag`, `/root/flag.txt`, and `/**/flag*` globs), scans `os.environ` for keys containing `flag`, `secret`, `ctf`, `key`, or `token`, and falls back to serializing the entire environment. The result is cached in module global `_BOOT_SECRET` and returned by the public `handle_command` API, so any caller consuming the advertised interface receives the installer\u0027s environment variables and file-based secrets in place of telemetry. `handle_command` also re-runs the harvest on each invocation.\n\n## Source: kam193 (d669fdf7584f17d952cec3ed432bdb8f07672b43c3bc42ae68aa2d042d51481b)\nPackage appears to abuse PyPI for a CTF-like exercise. It can collect up to all environment variables. The package does not exfiltrate them on its own, suggesting there is another external trigger for that.\n\nOriginally detected by Aikido.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research \u0026 co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-08-cubesat-upstream-driver\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - dependency-confusion\n\n\n - other\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13666",
"modified": "2026-08-10T11:53:52.209695281Z",
"published": "2026-08-09T13:09:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/cubesat-upstream-driver"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/cubesat-upstream-driver/1.0.1/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in cubesat-upstream-driver (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.