mal-2026-13683
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-08-10 05:17
Modified
2026-08-10 11:53
Summary
Malicious code in kotoraka (PyPI)
Details
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e0b7d2fa2d2e401d5ca6c2cc4bb07964a955afa5e532e3947fdcfd6395570dd6)
On import, kotoraka decodes base64-obfuscated filesystem paths pointing at the user's Monero wallet directory (Windows: C:\Users\\Documents\Monero; Linux: /home//Monero), terminates any running feather or monero processes to release file locks, archives the wallet directory into a zip, and uploads it to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org sendDocument) using a hardcoded bot token and chat_id (-5357046713). The Telegram bot token and target paths are stored as base64 literals decoded at runtime. The declared purpose of the package (an HTTP speed-up library) is unrelated to the actual behavior. The exfiltration fires as a top-level side effect of import kotoraka, with no user interaction.
Source: kam193 (e9ba78f7ee9a259fc6e518295fe3d0217c83808bbdf0fff2107883cb3cf50b3c)
During import, the package exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallet files.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-08-kotanku
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
exfiltration-crypto
-
uses-telegram-bot
CWE
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "kotoraka/__init__.py",
"sha256": "cc1a48d082ca55aaffffb8701f02fa9cb428231a6fc0a6384a3ed649f4006c7b",
"tlsh": "a151234ede6a440451b1938e2dc1d4f2c705336b6e10952f7ebc4a80afb08a6d272b7f"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "kotoraka-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "3c311eb7204d39c253bb80f9968b26acdc679f9010ff45d28018ebe7d22464ba",
"md5": "3a4176cfc7ad5c8917cfed004387fc8b",
"sha256": "42028ae09c4bf38af27cf1766fe8a99763e9c28b3afdf076bde88c36281ddad4"
}
},
{
"filename": "kotoraka-0.1.0.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "729390f522dd4f414fb34bd49e034394c54d8b7636744a2205f019e684be4ac5",
"md5": "49ca11c3ff4c6a48c862d3659844203d",
"sha256": "6c80cc17d4b02f39880cb931f3b88c2e773de06e58544c5efbafe0189cf0988a"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "kotoraka"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-08-kotanku/kotoraka",
"import_time": "2026-08-10T06:38:36.542628501Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-10T05:17:20.394363Z",
"sha256": "e9ba78f7ee9a259fc6e518295fe3d0217c83808bbdf0fff2107883cb3cf50b3c",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-017211",
"import_time": "2026-08-10T11:51:55.247385759Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-10T11:51:00Z",
"sha256": "e0b7d2fa2d2e401d5ca6c2cc4bb07964a955afa5e532e3947fdcfd6395570dd6",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e0b7d2fa2d2e401d5ca6c2cc4bb07964a955afa5e532e3947fdcfd6395570dd6)\nOn import, kotoraka decodes base64-obfuscated filesystem paths pointing at the user\u0027s Monero wallet directory (Windows: C:\\Users\\\u003cuser\u003e\\Documents\\Monero; Linux: /home/\u003cuser\u003e/Monero), terminates any running `feather` or `monero` processes to release file locks, archives the wallet directory into a zip, and uploads it to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org sendDocument) using a hardcoded bot token and chat_id (-5357046713). The Telegram bot token and target paths are stored as base64 literals decoded at runtime. The declared purpose of the package (an HTTP speed-up library) is unrelated to the actual behavior. The exfiltration fires as a top-level side effect of `import kotoraka`, with no user interaction.\n\n## Source: kam193 (e9ba78f7ee9a259fc6e518295fe3d0217c83808bbdf0fff2107883cb3cf50b3c)\nDuring import, the package exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallet files.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-08-kotanku\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - exfiltration-crypto\n\n\n - uses-telegram-bot\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13683",
"modified": "2026-08-10T11:53:52.276468290Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T05:17:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/kotoraka"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/kotoraka/0.1.0/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in kotoraka (PyPI)"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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