mal-2026-15867
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (c5b8886bf47df30ba72e888647d651e72defd41c1172a4307c438562183d7a32)
package.json declares a dependency whose key equals the package's own name (@bx-ui-framework/common) and whose value is a bare HTTPS URL (https://repo.remoteknight.com/bx-ui-framework/common) rather than a registry version range. On npm install, npm fetches whatever bytes that URL returns and installs them as the resolved dependency, executing any lifecycle scripts they contain. There is no version pin, no commit SHA, and no integrity/hash check. The shipped index.js is an inert stub, so the manifest line is the entire delivery mechanism: whoever controls repo.remoteknight.com controls code that runs on every installer's machine. The self-referential dependency name is the dependency-confusion shape used to win resolution over an internal package of the same name.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "d9dcb9705ddd05fd3a8561d52677dc710750791f4fa7b6a5bc694264cd81b342",
"tlsh": "69e02b2604b01cbf18dd00919839110276d14f2f74087c09628b651882dd9f214fc34d"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "common-1.2.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "7275c06ca5beab202a343eac57a7130792603f48",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-wTJ6DBZmQi7W5cRzJnYS49vNzoxPZX9Ohl8hTzOcF+WIpM+Wl/ah+XWmqwy4JEi8uMNsVkvK51mSUFaZ+PQUhQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@bx-ui-framework/common"
},
"versions": [
"1.2.0",
"15.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-019404",
"import_time": "2026-09-04T01:24:41.239460723Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-04T01:12:12Z",
"sha256": "c5b8886bf47df30ba72e888647d651e72defd41c1172a4307c438562183d7a32",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.2.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-019402",
"import_time": "2026-09-04T01:24:40.845465249Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-04T01:11:52Z",
"sha256": "eaf088c94d8e8bc845892780de97d0663c5119c34f0a7ec49b80956af75affee",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"15.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c5b8886bf47df30ba72e888647d651e72defd41c1172a4307c438562183d7a32)\npackage.json declares a dependency whose key equals the package\u0027s own name (@bx-ui-framework/common) and whose value is a bare HTTPS URL (https://repo.remoteknight.com/bx-ui-framework/common) rather than a registry version range. On npm install, npm fetches whatever bytes that URL returns and installs them as the resolved dependency, executing any lifecycle scripts they contain. There is no version pin, no commit SHA, and no integrity/hash check. The shipped index.js is an inert stub, so the manifest line is the entire delivery mechanism: whoever controls repo.remoteknight.com controls code that runs on every installer\u0027s machine. The self-referential dependency name is the dependency-confusion shape used to win resolution over an internal package of the same name.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-15867",
"modified": "2026-09-04T01:26:40Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T01:11:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@bx-ui-framework/common/v/1.2.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@bx-ui-framework/common/v/15.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @bx-ui-framework/common (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.