mal-2026-16406
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (33e855a3ce62e35b613e702e710b81900769c241707c80f6a61462df0927529c)
The package presents itself as a crypto trading and backtesting toolkit, but ships no library code matching that description — SOURCES.txt lists only LICENSE, README, setup.py, and egg-info metadata, and top_level.txt is empty. setup.py unconditionally invokes _wus_boot() before setup() during pip install, which spawns a sibling script _cryptotr_b2ca69.py via subprocess.Popen using pythonw.exe with Windows creationflags 0x08000000 (CREATE_NO_WINDOW) to hide the console window, guarded by a tempdir lockfile (13f8811c38.lk) to avoid re-entry. Stealth markers (hidden-window flag, pythonw preference, silent try/except wrapping, obfuscated identifiers) and the absence of any advertised library content match a dropper cover-story pattern rather than a legitimate build step, and the child process runs on every install with no user interaction.
Source: kam193 (734dc70863cedc4f248265b79254d8bc4ac9dbbc40337ad7a5bbd45d9314500b)
During installation, the package attempts to silently execute code. In analyzed versions, the payload file was missing.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-09-snap-queue
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "setup.py",
"sha256": "214e5b1768fad2a230c6f450c7c2ed91d4f47f67d074cb10483afe446d3fbb39",
"tlsh": "40213500c921207086dbd25d492194f45f6f1be32993a5d5b78c4680ff845f6cb76768"
},
{
"path": "crypto_trader_py.egg-info/SOURCES.txt",
"sha256": "e2214b23a1eca4fb2594a3886b5aeeb90cf26a189e6645e35fcfbe39439a36ef",
"tlsh": "a2c0e953992dbb52277585c0e17f9f10e85666c32976a6f3e345898cd8d4401e40e411"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "crypto_trader_py-1.0.0.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "e83c7e9a1405f2b629e95e48ccd7a6f3c0b963756862923d895716e9af6a8750",
"md5": "c207a33ef58d51816496c8999ad1d565",
"sha256": "c20440226e70689325df502dae45e7dd813c91670a2367c57f3fe7e2a739d478"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "crypto-trader-py"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "ANALYST"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-09-snap-queue/crypto-trader-py",
"import_time": "2026-09-22T18:44:15.282333629Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-22T18:40:26.644355Z",
"sha256": "734dc70863cedc4f248265b79254d8bc4ac9dbbc40337ad7a5bbd45d9314500b",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020310",
"import_time": "2026-09-22T22:16:11.255604423Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-22T21:51:13Z",
"sha256": "33e855a3ce62e35b613e702e710b81900769c241707c80f6a61462df0927529c",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (33e855a3ce62e35b613e702e710b81900769c241707c80f6a61462df0927529c)\nThe package presents itself as a crypto trading and backtesting toolkit, but ships no library code matching that description \u2014 SOURCES.txt lists only LICENSE, README, setup.py, and egg-info metadata, and top_level.txt is empty. setup.py unconditionally invokes _wus_boot() before setup() during `pip install`, which spawns a sibling script `_cryptotr_b2ca69.py` via subprocess.Popen using `pythonw.exe` with Windows creationflags 0x08000000 (CREATE_NO_WINDOW) to hide the console window, guarded by a tempdir lockfile (`13f8811c38.lk`) to avoid re-entry. Stealth markers (hidden-window flag, pythonw preference, silent try/except wrapping, obfuscated identifiers) and the absence of any advertised library content match a dropper cover-story pattern rather than a legitimate build step, and the child process runs on every install with no user interaction.\n\n## Source: kam193 (734dc70863cedc4f248265b79254d8bc4ac9dbbc40337ad7a5bbd45d9314500b)\nDuring installation, the package attempts to silently execute code. In analyzed versions, the payload file was missing.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-09-snap-queue\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16406",
"modified": "2026-09-22T22:18:05.249145036Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T18:40:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/crypto-trader-py"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/crypto-trader-py/1.0.0/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in crypto-trader-py (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.