mal-2026-16408
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e0bb29642def9150e89bacf4da4e1a64f7bc972cd145053cbb0feee0baa768f3)
The sdist's setup.py defines a _wus_boot() function that is invoked at module top-level before setup(...), so it runs automatically on pip install snap-queue. The function uses subprocess.Popen to launch pythonw.exe (replacing python.exe in sys.executable) running a sibling file _snapqueue_core.py with creationflags=0x08000000 (CREATE_NO_WINDOW), and wraps the whole call in a blanket try/except: pass. Standard modules are aliased under underscore names (_os, _sys, _sp) to reduce visual prominence. The launched _snapqueue_core.py is undocumented in README and package metadata and is unrelated to the advertised FIFO-queue functionality. The combined shape — install-time execution, deliberate console-window suppression on Windows, error-swallowing, and detachment of the child from the pip process — is a hidden install-time stager that hands control on the installer's machine to undocumented sibling code the moment the package is installed.
Source: kam193 (62bf582784fd41b3484157f6454ddcb6ab2ae10a5d93abeb19a5bfa5642b7e64)
During installation, the package attempts to silently execute code. In analyzed versions, the payload file was missing.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-09-snap-queue
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "setup.py",
"sha256": "5811bccc1108a96fe402483138d9bbae0d9b1e0c22d46e292bde310f5da15152",
"tlsh": "12111200c91514b08647e19d194688a91f3b66a378d2b0e579dcc1d07f886f686b9aa6"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "snap_queue-1.0.0.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "ac54369ccfa1c796764948293044590d8869075c4682cd34317937c2c728d90c",
"md5": "2319f04e55102e6ab41c5ce19c543aac",
"sha256": "28e86fd26e0b5965b4afb2d6efc0550a61522418d410f1d85577ef24b1e9fc05"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "snap-queue"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "ANALYST"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-09-snap-queue/snap-queue",
"import_time": "2026-09-22T18:44:15.285683562Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-22T18:42:22.198932Z",
"sha256": "62bf582784fd41b3484157f6454ddcb6ab2ae10a5d93abeb19a5bfa5642b7e64",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "pypi/2026-09-snap-queue/snap-queue",
"import_time": "2026-09-22T19:16:00.430452065Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-22T18:42:22.198932Z",
"sha256": "66d21211753dd05cd26db975d94b4567f80e382f6bbfef1f3202595e73a20724",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020329",
"import_time": "2026-09-23T02:26:00.069486802Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-23T01:51:03Z",
"sha256": "e0bb29642def9150e89bacf4da4e1a64f7bc972cd145053cbb0feee0baa768f3",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e0bb29642def9150e89bacf4da4e1a64f7bc972cd145053cbb0feee0baa768f3)\nThe sdist\u0027s setup.py defines a `_wus_boot()` function that is invoked at module top-level before `setup(...)`, so it runs automatically on `pip install snap-queue`. The function uses `subprocess.Popen` to launch `pythonw.exe` (replacing `python.exe` in `sys.executable`) running a sibling file `_snapqueue_core.py` with `creationflags=0x08000000` (CREATE_NO_WINDOW), and wraps the whole call in a blanket `try/except: pass`. Standard modules are aliased under underscore names (`_os`, `_sys`, `_sp`) to reduce visual prominence. The launched `_snapqueue_core.py` is undocumented in README and package metadata and is unrelated to the advertised FIFO-queue functionality. The combined shape \u2014 install-time execution, deliberate console-window suppression on Windows, error-swallowing, and detachment of the child from the pip process \u2014 is a hidden install-time stager that hands control on the installer\u0027s machine to undocumented sibling code the moment the package is installed.\n\n## Source: kam193 (62bf582784fd41b3484157f6454ddcb6ab2ae10a5d93abeb19a5bfa5642b7e64)\nDuring installation, the package attempts to silently execute code. In analyzed versions, the payload file was missing.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-09-snap-queue\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16408",
"modified": "2026-09-23T02:27:56.630403668Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T18:42:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/snap-queue"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/snap-queue/1.0.0/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in snap-queue (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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