mal-2026-17771
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (3b11a639f5149e4b1c17e64eb78f226abece5ed03152b5933333a3cb56284018)
The npm package ksp-client-registry@100.100.100 ships a prebuilt native addon at prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node that is loaded by the package main (index.js require of./prebuilds/linux-x64/addon). On load the addon reads the HOSTNAME, npm_package_name, and npm_config_registry environment variables and opens a raw TCP socket to the hardcoded IP 64.181.165.115, sending them in an HTTP request of the form 'POST /dc HTTP/1.0' with a body shaped as 'h=&p=&u=&r='. ELF strings corroborate the behavior: '64.181.165.115', 'POST /dc HTTP/1.0', 'Host: 64.181.165.115', 'HOSTNAME', 'npm_package_name', 'npm_config_registry', and imports of socket/connect/send/fork/getenv/inet_pton. package.json declares a postinstall ('node postinstall.js') providing an install-time footprint, and any require() of the package triggers the beacon regardless. The addon exposes no legitimate N-API functionality beyond module registration. The implausibly high version (100.100.100) and generic registry-style name are consistent with a dependency-confusion probe designed to be resolved in place of an internal package and to report back the victim host, internal package name, and configured registry URL to the operator.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node",
"sha256": "d1ecb9d24c13b9a47b3fc19036fee676e13c65af1df61b8d61bd9ec8aadeb906",
"tlsh": "c272761bb761c93bc4e853389497466572f2a470777243232f00a17a2cd37889ebbd5a"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "e1a888bd3962ef93dd6daed6e141905ef006bd17be71d537875ffb26a2c9c971",
"tlsh": "28d012144e229a3339c547a99d27950a59720e5f5144b81813a325ad42d9bbb4cbf31e"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "ksp-client-registry-100.100.100.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "5aca2fa379d08067aa6aa3f1c79bf09302e2c3c1",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-t9/b9p6Xq6rhb3TqM30Kr+Ue06kAx1As9cXBCaX4aWl7LUsEA+m9m4IBrTxX2pwB86JmIOIeweOirmVWkPqcOQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "ksp-client-registry"
},
"versions": [
"100.100.100",
"100.100.101"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021422",
"import_time": "2026-10-11T14:18:04.311865673Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-11T13:57:03Z",
"sha256": "3b11a639f5149e4b1c17e64eb78f226abece5ed03152b5933333a3cb56284018",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"100.100.100"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021421",
"import_time": "2026-10-11T14:18:04.233387431Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-11T13:56:54Z",
"sha256": "44dd37ed96611f26302ed323de01f14fba9077aa6798410193047ab11d7ffc81",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"100.100.101"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (3b11a639f5149e4b1c17e64eb78f226abece5ed03152b5933333a3cb56284018)\nThe npm package ksp-client-registry@100.100.100 ships a prebuilt native addon at prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node that is loaded by the package main (index.js require of./prebuilds/linux-x64/addon). On load the addon reads the HOSTNAME, npm_package_name, and npm_config_registry environment variables and opens a raw TCP socket to the hardcoded IP 64.181.165.115, sending them in an HTTP request of the form \u0027POST /dc HTTP/1.0\u0027 with a body shaped as \u0027h=\u003chostname\u003e\u0026p=\u003cpackage\u003e\u0026u=\u003cuser\u003e\u0026r=\u003cregistry\u003e\u0027. ELF strings corroborate the behavior: \u002764.181.165.115\u0027, \u0027POST /dc HTTP/1.0\u0027, \u0027Host: 64.181.165.115\u0027, \u0027HOSTNAME\u0027, \u0027npm_package_name\u0027, \u0027npm_config_registry\u0027, and imports of socket/connect/send/fork/getenv/inet_pton. package.json declares a postinstall (\u0027node postinstall.js\u0027) providing an install-time footprint, and any require() of the package triggers the beacon regardless. The addon exposes no legitimate N-API functionality beyond module registration. The implausibly high version (100.100.100) and generic registry-style name are consistent with a dependency-confusion probe designed to be resolved in place of an internal package and to report back the victim host, internal package name, and configured registry URL to the operator.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17771",
"modified": "2026-10-11T14:19:58Z",
"published": "2026-10-11T13:56:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/ksp-client-registry/v/100.100.100"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/ksp-client-registry/v/100.100.101"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in ksp-client-registry (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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