mal-2026-17776
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (07a616a1db0408a0570000c6514224d22e71c3ecee0f08268b5dd9bc96761fd2)
pay-methods-kmf@100.100.102 is a trivial stub (empty index.js, manifest description 'Frontend utilities') that ships a prebuilt Linux x64 native addon at prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node and loads it from postinstall.js via require('./prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node'). On install the postinstall path performs two concurrent exfiltration channels: (1) a DNS beacon that resolves a subdomain of the form ..db4jlbku53082dmp0d7g3mffj7s7aordk.oast.me against an interactsh/OAST collector, encoding the installer hostname and package name into the DNS label; and (2) the native addon calls gethostname, getpwuid, and getenv and issues an HTTP POST to the hardcoded bare IPv4 endpoint http://64.181.165.115/dc with body shape 'h=&u=&p=&r=', leaking the installer's hostname, username, package name, and configured npm registry URL (which may reveal internal/private registry hosts). The package ships no source for the binary, the compiled addon's symbol set (socket/connect/send/fork) is unrelated to any frontend utility, and both the OAST subdomain and the bare-IP POST endpoint are attacker-controlled infrastructure. Dependency-confusion-style version (100.100.102) and the registry-URL field in the exfil payload are consistent with internal-registry reconnaissance.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "postinstall.js",
"sha256": "c87a31c2ffd47105d39b97a9b2a13b65e811fa90c0491fd03ac8d52a53efa1f7",
"tlsh": "c8f05c99efd1a394226335d884bf000578f3d1272d8ac1c831427ac20f712642723dd9"
},
{
"path": "prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node",
"sha256": "1798796310908fa36529d480c1c8eb644195a9539cb574531b3eb3278458f1d5",
"tlsh": "2972251bb361c93fc4e84334054b5a6572b6a4746b7313231f04a67e3ce27985e7aa8f"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "pay-methods-kmf-100.100.102.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "a60e1287048b2b2acff868145247c68ddf29672a",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-00rDVzDRKPt7CM2JbDGvKMXzOwDPBfPqJpzbF4xdnaH9KNcmd5PCRvRaUL/pksp0fY6gVrC7zebGRqfv90vR4w=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pay-methods-kmf"
},
"versions": [
"100.100.102",
"100.100.100",
"100.100.101"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021396",
"import_time": "2026-10-11T14:18:02.165384269Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-11T13:53:06Z",
"sha256": "07a616a1db0408a0570000c6514224d22e71c3ecee0f08268b5dd9bc96761fd2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"100.100.102"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021420",
"import_time": "2026-10-11T14:18:04.16153773Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-11T13:56:46Z",
"sha256": "d83e40860a0d1540222f76bb58c3dfc3f12e6258aff42d6f8eff747bcdf28c5c",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"100.100.100"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021419",
"import_time": "2026-10-11T14:18:04.090942774Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-11T13:56:38Z",
"sha256": "f7a8a051b1961e3062a37b8ff1a9eb05025dc475bf1a5c694df49f0c90349c70",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"100.100.101"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (07a616a1db0408a0570000c6514224d22e71c3ecee0f08268b5dd9bc96761fd2)\npay-methods-kmf@100.100.102 is a trivial stub (empty index.js, manifest description \u0027Frontend utilities\u0027) that ships a prebuilt Linux x64 native addon at prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node and loads it from postinstall.js via require(\u0027./prebuilds/linux-x64/addon.node\u0027). On install the postinstall path performs two concurrent exfiltration channels: (1) a DNS beacon that resolves a subdomain of the form \u003chostname\u003e.\u003cpackagename\u003e.db4jlbku53082dmp0d7g3mffj7s7aordk.oast.me against an interactsh/OAST collector, encoding the installer hostname and package name into the DNS label; and (2) the native addon calls gethostname, getpwuid, and getenv and issues an HTTP POST to the hardcoded bare IPv4 endpoint http://64.181.165.115/dc with body shape \u0027h=\u003chostname\u003e\u0026u=\u003cuser\u003e\u0026p=\u003cpackage\u003e\u0026r=\u003cnpm_config_registry\u003e\u0027, leaking the installer\u0027s hostname, username, package name, and configured npm registry URL (which may reveal internal/private registry hosts). The package ships no source for the binary, the compiled addon\u0027s symbol set (socket/connect/send/fork) is unrelated to any frontend utility, and both the OAST subdomain and the bare-IP POST endpoint are attacker-controlled infrastructure. Dependency-confusion-style version (100.100.102) and the registry-URL field in the exfil payload are consistent with internal-registry reconnaissance.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17776",
"modified": "2026-10-11T14:19:59Z",
"published": "2026-10-11T13:53:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/pay-methods-kmf/v/100.100.102"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/pay-methods-kmf/v/100.100.100"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/pay-methods-kmf/v/100.100.101"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in pay-methods-kmf (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
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