MAL-2026-18751
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages – Published: 2026-11-07 10:21 – Updated: 2026-11-07 20:38 – Source website| Ecosystem | Package | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI |
qzc690385
|
1.0.01.0.11.0.21.0.31.0.41.0.51.0.61.0.71.0.81.0.91.1.01.1.11.1.21.1.3
|
At install time, setup.py polls the local Xinference API at http://127.0.0.1:9997/v1/model_registrations/flexible, selects model registrations whose names begin with 'xcmd0', url-safe-base64-decodes the suffix into a shell command, and runs it via subprocess.run(['/bin/sh', '-c',...]). The stdout/stderr of each execution is chunked, base64-encoded, and written back as new model registrations named 'zqx9p00', 'zqx9p01', 'zqx9err', with a 'zqx9alive' registration used as a liveness beacon. The command bytes are obfuscated as the url-safe-base64 suffix of a model name (reassembled by replacing '-'/'_' and padding '=' before base64 decode), so the payload only materializes after decode. The package has no declared purpose, an empty PKG-INFO, and a random-looking name, and ships no legitimate functionality. The effect is a bidirectional command-execution and output-exfiltration channel driven at pip install time: any party able to post model registrations to the installer's Xinference service (locally, or via SSRF/misconfiguration of that service) can run arbitrary shell commands on the installer's host as the installing user and read the results back through the same registry.
In this campaign, packages execute malicious code during installation. The exact behavior varies between versions: fingerprinting environment, exposing a backdoor server listening for remote commands, downloading remote commands from a hardcoded location. Next stages seem to be downloaded from localhost, what suggests the code may still be a preparation for the real attack.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-11-qzc
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
-
The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine.
-
backdoor
-
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
No description from this source.
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| Type | Indicator | Hashes |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence file |
setup.py
|
sha256
d2b9c88e30eefcae8d13c3fbc9f7fbba3b597f4809c3b12acea77f564b87282etlsh
4571a341e8115967db87ccb840a0e8622b9e6a4fa107647933bd43661fcc439c6b56fd |
| Package archive |
qzc690385-1.0.0.tar.gz
|
blake2b_256
d89988040c162ba45c2ba9fa502853198c50f044c56289b4c55252d83943f985md5
2999895313a23863cd0a3ee7269506absha256
d94e0d5acdff4d40b504f49a9c258e070201bf4e077e5d674eda702216b2cc08 |
- CWE-506 - Embedded Malicious Code
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"artifacts": [
"qzc690385-1.0.0.tar.gz"
],
"path": "setup.py",
"sha256": "d2b9c88e30eefcae8d13c3fbc9f7fbba3b597f4809c3b12acea77f564b87282e",
"tlsh": "4571a341e8115967db87ccb840a0e8622b9e6a4fa107647933bd43661fcc439c6b56fd"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "qzc690385-1.0.0.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "d89988040c162ba45c2ba9fa502853198c50f044c56289b4c55252d83943f985",
"md5": "2999895313a23863cd0a3ee7269506ab",
"sha256": "d94e0d5acdff4d40b504f49a9c258e070201bf4e077e5d674eda702216b2cc08"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "qzc690385"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0",
"1.0.1",
"1.0.2",
"1.0.3",
"1.0.4",
"1.0.5",
"1.0.6",
"1.0.7",
"1.0.8",
"1.0.9",
"1.1.0",
"1.1.1",
"1.1.2",
"1.1.3"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022543",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T10:36:42.4789447Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T10:21:05Z",
"sha256": "84cc8690335a9ed7454c095286b0a9fd18141513f6d619e62a28d1b5f4751beb",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022545",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T10:36:42.670969727Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T10:21:20Z",
"sha256": "8fdb508a0701cb28bc4c5613c93d04d825da018b4b1318ed50a53672cb33e1bc",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.1"
]
},
{
"id": "pypi/2026-11-qzc/qzc690385",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T15:10:15.5525287Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T14:42:00.030569Z",
"sha256": "38936057b5c5ae57efbe9fc39bb036a1c848141352548997ae9ddb9d54737468",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"1.0.0",
"1.0.1",
"1.0.2",
"1.0.3",
"1.0.4",
"1.0.5",
"1.0.6",
"1.0.7",
"1.0.8",
"1.0.9",
"1.1.0",
"1.1.1",
"1.1.2",
"1.1.3"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022553",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.696593549Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:17:33Z",
"sha256": "9e7cea30fe3b1852ec4ed833d3ad2ba466bdbc812bef71f984e433017bd0044c",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.2"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022555",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.82123902Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:17:46Z",
"sha256": "28f5ce815f3d6529385dfd196d0b0d88f8b5b35c4e6311a627d14d48e3087dc7",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.3"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022550",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.532309905Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:17:12Z",
"sha256": "4f83452b8f5689bce9944fdd53f53a111df02f4415ac76e2d1f924ec6c695be2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.1.1"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022548",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.404553025Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:16:56Z",
"sha256": "769e3917f43083b27dfab168a49801cf5d70393de27f359bc406ff2260f23edb",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.8"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022554",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.750018046Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:17:40Z",
"sha256": "c140ddb16b3010e95b7cd6a5283ebeb396788619d6c05a1b182f4d7c58d14b0b",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.6"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022552",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.646398655Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:17:26Z",
"sha256": "c84f2c4bdfe6ef8f3702be8282a050f2d8deee0ca079552175ad0f8d739fcfde",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.9"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022557",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.947587803Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:18:01Z",
"sha256": "2695339afa450d24b1d27daf6cbea4e17c12f8968bfd22b65d9308e47ac607fc",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.4"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022551",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.59573241Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:17:19Z",
"sha256": "2ce9b59b878d5e873c8270d9a988097b87c56cb2cd2c25f956deec2cd66c98d2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.5"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022549",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.485260591Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:17:04Z",
"sha256": "6385ebf21c2ba4f27313c2b478821c42ef0a4ae99d70aa04c4313039e2b52fcd",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.1.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022547",
"import_time": "2026-11-07T20:36:36.34320596Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-07T20:16:48Z",
"sha256": "69d0a61f0c5e4cac02d592cc7882a0eac8d95f78cbee7fd341fdf63ffe78b2b4",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.7"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (769e3917f43083b27dfab168a49801cf5d70393de27f359bc406ff2260f23edb)\nAt install time, setup.py polls the local Xinference API at http://127.0.0.1:9997/v1/model_registrations/flexible, selects model registrations whose names begin with \u0027xcmd0\u0027, url-safe-base64-decodes the suffix into a shell command, and runs it via subprocess.run([\u0027/bin/sh\u0027, \u0027-c\u0027,...]). The stdout/stderr of each execution is chunked, base64-encoded, and written back as new model registrations named \u0027zqx9p00\u003cout\u003e\u0027, \u0027zqx9p01\u003cout\u003e\u0027, \u0027zqx9err\u0027, with a \u0027zqx9alive\u0027 registration used as a liveness beacon. The command bytes are obfuscated as the url-safe-base64 suffix of a model name (reassembled by replacing \u0027-\u0027/\u0027_\u0027 and padding \u0027=\u0027 before base64 decode), so the payload only materializes after decode. The package has no declared purpose, an empty PKG-INFO, and a random-looking name, and ships no legitimate functionality. The effect is a bidirectional command-execution and output-exfiltration channel driven at pip install time: any party able to post model registrations to the installer\u0027s Xinference service (locally, or via SSRF/misconfiguration of that service) can run arbitrary shell commands on the installer\u0027s host as the installing user and read the results back through the same registry.\n\n## Source: kam193 (38936057b5c5ae57efbe9fc39bb036a1c848141352548997ae9ddb9d54737468)\nIn this campaign, packages execute malicious code during installation. The exact behavior varies between versions: fingerprinting environment, exposing a backdoor server listening for remote commands, downloading remote commands from a hardcoded location. Next stages seem to be downloaded from localhost, what suggests the code may still be a preparation for the real attack.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-11-qzc\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim\u0027s machine.\n\n\n - backdoor\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-18751",
"modified": "2026-11-07T20:38:29.181377334Z",
"published": "2026-11-07T10:21:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.0/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.1/"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/qzc690385"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.2/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.3/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.1.1/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.8/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.6/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.9/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.4/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.5/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.1.0/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/qzc690385/1.0.7/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in qzc690385 (PyPI)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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