mal-2026-3777
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Full C2 implant disguised as vue-template-compiler fork. postinstall-run.cjs loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs which contains base64-encoded C2 agent. Decoded payload: registers victim (hostname, username, OS) to Cloudflare tunnel C2 at maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com, beacons for tasks, reports results, uploads files. Persists agent ID in ~/.gradle-cache/.aid. Has C2_TLS_INSECURE env var bypass. Package mirrors vue-template-compiler version 2.7.16 and claims to be an 'API-compatible fork with postinstall hooks' — social engineering for npm override/alias substitution.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (de772e4b79f4da4ae64ea768f8ddc74bd6cd5d5c41f971d30de12ca0c8ed70c1)
This package impersonates the legitimate vue-template-compiler (same version 2.7.18, framed as an "API-compatible fork"), and its package.json description instructs consumers to alias the real name to this one via npm overrides or resolve.alias. On install, the postinstall hook (postinstall-run.cjs) loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs, which assembles ~80 base64 string fragments in BOOTSTRAP_B64, Buffer.from-decodes them, writes the result to ~/.gradle/daemon/tooling-api-runtime.mjs (a cover-story path mimicking a Gradle cache), and then spawns node on that file with detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true, and child.unref() so the process survives npm install. The decoded payload is a remote-access trojan that polls https://maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com/ for commands, executes arbitrary shell commands on the installer's host, and exfiltrates files. Three independent block signals: (1) typosquat-with-divergent-API against a top-tier Vue package, (2) obfuscated base64-chunked executable payload decoded and exec'd at install, (3) persistent detached RAT beaconing to an attacker-controlled Cloudflare quick-tunnel.
Source: ghsa-malware (058983390d0c65259c8cc8fc39e4eeeee617130be84ce97e0b71f790a4b14313)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "tooling-bootstrap.cjs",
"sha256": "c59e160a8c9712a28201a6ac89fc9f322d678c2f77c6504c826ea0e4c5a2fa5e",
"tlsh": "6c82d5a7ce8b2d548760464226de5ac9184e43872c92b8ec776e868d1f0f83f91f11ed"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "da31f9bf893f17a852542b11918c1f380c6ca55bc199019805950128a9c4077e",
"tlsh": "9821f868c43c9e531bf816e8aa550007e626b8034e54ad1632d342188a8f7bf41ff06e"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "vue-template-compiler-plugin-2.7.18.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "fd056dcb2e16c8f5bc04e9ed74267b7d07813425",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-k+LxuKgfH3XcoEAN1nsfogt/IuH1xJsQuPuOW477QR+Lz2waarZ+x+UN2M6cn9EOwMOoc4fA08/hD7JzaS3R2A=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vue-template-compiler-plugin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.7.18"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-gvmg-cf54-7769"
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://safedep.io"
],
"name": "SafeDep",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-002723",
"import_time": "2026-05-15T07:37:18.18038023Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-14T19:25:25Z",
"sha256": "de772e4b79f4da4ae64ea768f8ddc74bd6cd5d5c41f971d30de12ca0c8ed70c1",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"2.7.18"
]
},
{
"id": "GHSA-gvmg-cf54-7769",
"import_time": "2026-08-25T17:25:28.259638275Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-25T16:54:23Z",
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"sha256": "058983390d0c65259c8cc8fc39e4eeeee617130be84ce97e0b71f790a4b14313",
"source": "ghsa-malware"
}
]
},
"details": "Full C2 implant disguised as vue-template-compiler fork. postinstall-run.cjs loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs which contains base64-encoded C2 agent. Decoded payload: registers victim (hostname, username, OS) to Cloudflare tunnel C2 at maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com, beacons for tasks, reports results, uploads files. Persists agent ID in ~/.gradle-cache/.aid. Has C2_TLS_INSECURE env var bypass. Package mirrors vue-template-compiler version 2.7.16 and claims to be an \u0027API-compatible fork with postinstall hooks\u0027 \u2014 social engineering for npm override/alias substitution.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (de772e4b79f4da4ae64ea768f8ddc74bd6cd5d5c41f971d30de12ca0c8ed70c1)\nThis package impersonates the legitimate vue-template-compiler (same version 2.7.18, framed as an \"API-compatible fork\"), and its package.json description instructs consumers to alias the real name to this one via npm overrides or resolve.alias. On install, the postinstall hook (postinstall-run.cjs) loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs, which assembles ~80 base64 string fragments in BOOTSTRAP_B64, Buffer.from-decodes them, writes the result to ~/.gradle/daemon/tooling-api-runtime.mjs (a cover-story path mimicking a Gradle cache), and then spawns node on that file with detached: true, stdio: \u0027ignore\u0027, windowsHide: true, and child.unref() so the process survives npm install. The decoded payload is a remote-access trojan that polls https://maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com/ for commands, executes arbitrary shell commands on the installer\u0027s host, and exfiltrates files. Three independent block signals: (1) typosquat-with-divergent-API against a top-tier Vue package, (2) obfuscated base64-chunked executable payload decoded and exec\u0027d at install, (3) persistent detached RAT beaconing to an attacker-controlled Cloudflare quick-tunnel.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (058983390d0c65259c8cc8fc39e4eeeee617130be84ce97e0b71f790a4b14313)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-3777",
"modified": "2026-08-25T17:27:32.573416781Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T11:26:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/vue-template-compiler-plugin/v/2.7.18"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://app.safedep.io/community/malysis/01KRG9A28GEBVA4BBGNAVPY7V8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gvmg-cf54-7769"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in vue-template-compiler-plugin (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.