MAL-2026-6095 (GHSA-H957-H3MC-79QR)
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages – Published: 2026-06-18 03:56 – Updated: 2026-07-10 16:55 – Source website| Ecosystem | Package | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| npm |
oem-agentic-shared
|
Affected: All versions (semver)
99.9.1
|
oem-agentic-shared@99.9.1 is a hollow stub: index.js exports an empty object and package.json has empty author, empty description, and no real functionality. Its sole effect on install is to pull in a single dependency declared as a direct HTTPS tarball URL — ltidisafe pinned to https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.0.9.tgz — instead of an npm-registry version. The Google Cloud Storage bucket is not associated with this package's name and is not a known publisher CDN, so the tarball contents bypass npm-registry scanning entirely and any lifecycle scripts inside that tarball execute on npm install. The wrapper-plus-off-registry-tarball shape is a known smuggling pattern whose only purpose is to inject attacker-controlled, unscanned code into the installer's dependency graph.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
| Type | Indicator | Hashes |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence file |
package.json
|
sha256
09ae14c795f7e12e7fe1d101133077ea55e3b808408c6dff4ecebed10e203468tlsh
28e07d3009605a330ec511b1881b5117f3718e5f0804bc0c2adf041c508eb7338fe25c |
| Evidence file |
index.js
|
sha256
322ee46d71101bed25f260f2e78a419b5472e28d1ba02831ced05c73b44e5bb8tlsh
0e80040d043171c70355404dd140d441d4c04471400550110fc44ddd0004c0c01f0754 |
| Package archive |
oem-agentic-shared-99.9.1.tgz
|
sha1
8406d06c4ac1bd857eee94e0c4f3874e2427848esha512_sri
sha512-gBzHuVslA6mV5wCTZyiRJQXkJJunwrUST/N1jPYhOGOD0b9e0jedIEZTLqru2XNmxR849uMqE05pGiSBxJGg8Q== |
- CWE-506 - Embedded Malicious Code
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.npmjs.com/package/oem-agentic-shared/… | PACKAGE |
| https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h957-h3mc-79qr | ADVISORY |
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "09ae14c795f7e12e7fe1d101133077ea55e3b808408c6dff4ecebed10e203468",
"tlsh": "28e07d3009605a330ec511b1881b5117f3718e5f0804bc0c2adf041c508eb7338fe25c"
},
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "322ee46d71101bed25f260f2e78a419b5472e28d1ba02831ced05c73b44e5bb8",
"tlsh": "0e80040d043171c70355404dd140d441d4c04471400550110fc44ddd0004c0c01f0754"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "oem-agentic-shared-99.9.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "8406d06c4ac1bd857eee94e0c4f3874e2427848e",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-gBzHuVslA6mV5wCTZyiRJQXkJJunwrUST/N1jPYhOGOD0b9e0jedIEZTLqru2XNmxR849uMqE05pGiSBxJGg8Q=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "oem-agentic-shared"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"99.9.1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-h957-h3mc-79qr"
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-006964",
"import_time": "2026-06-18T05:42:04.856292316Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-18T03:56:46Z",
"sha256": "f612eb2fa947323c936a0bb1becc602f0f837f9023edac22a945470566386a8c",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"99.9.1"
]
},
{
"id": "GHSA-h957-h3mc-79qr",
"import_time": "2026-07-10T16:54:13.250084365Z",
"modified_time": "2026-07-10T16:24:51Z",
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"sha256": "e13b6880f6fcb8357aa28f079843c0f1296d6bb1be362258da49ea56b2a501e8",
"source": "ghsa-malware"
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (f612eb2fa947323c936a0bb1becc602f0f837f9023edac22a945470566386a8c)\noem-agentic-shared@99.9.1 is a hollow stub: index.js exports an empty object and package.json has empty author, empty description, and no real functionality. Its sole effect on install is to pull in a single dependency declared as a direct HTTPS tarball URL \u2014 `ltidisafe` pinned to `https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.0.9.tgz` \u2014 instead of an npm-registry version. The Google Cloud Storage bucket is not associated with this package\u0027s name and is not a known publisher CDN, so the tarball contents bypass npm-registry scanning entirely and any lifecycle scripts inside that tarball execute on `npm install`. The wrapper-plus-off-registry-tarball shape is a known smuggling pattern whose only purpose is to inject attacker-controlled, unscanned code into the installer\u0027s dependency graph.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (e13b6880f6fcb8357aa28f079843c0f1296d6bb1be362258da49ea56b2a501e8)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-6095",
"modified": "2026-07-10T16:55:50Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T03:56:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/oem-agentic-shared/v/99.9.1"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h957-h3mc-79qr"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in oem-agentic-shared (npm)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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