mal-2026-6184
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (9ad49caeee790003270d74c5b17a58d0cef6f04d881efe83b0f6c7e11515e934)
package.json declares a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node index.js") that fires automatically on npm install. index.js requires os, dns, https, querystring, and the package's own package.json, then collects the installer's hostname (os.hostname()), username (os.userInfo().username), home directory (os.homedir()), configured DNS servers (dns.getServers()), current working directory, and the full contents of package.json, and POSTs them via HTTPS to the hardcoded webhook https://eo1e4fhn1i67p8r.m.pipedream.net/. This is the canonical dependency-confusion / recon-beacon shape: host identifiers and internal package metadata leave the machine unconditionally at install time to an attacker-controlled endpoint, giving the attacker reconnaissance data on internal package names, corporate hostnames, and user identities to fuel follow-on supply-chain attacks.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "a7e18272aee814e3f4f821b4b911ff6586a8ee7170087ebdb52d99f61d0e789a",
"tlsh": "8811afd885e123600d7645c47899d00916aad737790e6ddcf5cc06d04f89abd60b3af5"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "component-intelligence-2.0.6.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "b4553f86de5b9418a4e20dcd0f4ab8f807b94a85",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-zjkAaMsFeEqiE3wBWzihg8kfpCQvb8ZIsWqc2OUiubCbHhnvduS7LM4X87P7KIi8nknMOhJRm5PG//7XnhKT/g=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@qlab/component-intelligence"
},
"versions": [
"2.0.6"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007053",
"import_time": "2026-06-19T05:16:49.673638041Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-19T05:02:33Z",
"sha256": "9ad49caeee790003270d74c5b17a58d0cef6f04d881efe83b0f6c7e11515e934",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"2.0.6"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9ad49caeee790003270d74c5b17a58d0cef6f04d881efe83b0f6c7e11515e934)\npackage.json declares a preinstall hook (`\"preinstall\": \"node index.js\"`) that fires automatically on `npm install`. index.js requires os, dns, https, querystring, and the package\u0027s own package.json, then collects the installer\u0027s hostname (`os.hostname()`), username (`os.userInfo().username`), home directory (`os.homedir()`), configured DNS servers (`dns.getServers()`), current working directory, and the full contents of package.json, and POSTs them via HTTPS to the hardcoded webhook `https://eo1e4fhn1i67p8r.m.pipedream.net/`. This is the canonical dependency-confusion / recon-beacon shape: host identifiers and internal package metadata leave the machine unconditionally at install time to an attacker-controlled endpoint, giving the attacker reconnaissance data on internal package names, corporate hostnames, and user identities to fuel follow-on supply-chain attacks.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-6184",
"modified": "2026-06-19T05:02:33Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T05:02:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@qlab/component-intelligence/v/2.0.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @qlab/component-intelligence (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.