mal-2026-6194
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e745a79c5fb952105d93cc5d5f37bc77af9cc08d9a021f09a12d26416a29de3c)
On default invocation (e.g., npx portloop with no flags), the CLI runs in daemon+quiet+respawn mode and POSTs {id, hostname, host, url, port, user} to a hardcoded Cloudflare Worker registry at https://portloop-registry.yaz-b35.workers.dev/register using a hardcoded bearer token (index.js:46, index.js:80). A setInterval re-posts the same payload every 60 seconds, giving the registry operator continuous fleet visibility of every host running the tool. Opt-out is only via an undocumented PORTLOOP_REGISTRY=off env var. Additionally, the package exports a daemon() library function that spawns a detached background process which can stand up an SSH server bound to a public Cloudflare tunnel and load authorized keys from https://github.com/<user>.keys (index.js:124, index.js:686). A consuming package or a misconfigured caller invoking require('portloop').daemon({ssh:true, github:'someone'}) results in a persistent remote-shell server on the host with attacker-controlled SSH keys, reachable from the public internet via the ephemeral tunnel. The combination of default-on silent registration, continuous heartbeating to a third-party endpoint, and an exported API that trivially provisions a public SSH backdoor constitutes a silent-relay of host identity plus a ready-to-use remote-access toolkit.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "4cfbfcb039a762ea70a8298503ca1b33b40556d2c067cd66b964f8165d9f0bc8",
"tlsh": "5b62ca6d5ab7013653a324bd5a9b402a6a76c1031301e8e0b91dd3e5afe113c43f7fea"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "portloop-1.6.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "6291f04927a53d20220cd48332baaf36e66e968c",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-yGQrZbZnfNhv69Unc3m00ftnjAqrLWaHa/w+g3Dm0rHp+J3XMiUgwBVwOEiQpaQJAEP81gQtOVaoYzSiWBg1TA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "portloop"
},
"versions": [
"1.6.0",
"1.14.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007047",
"import_time": "2026-06-19T05:16:48.825685811Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-19T04:36:51Z",
"sha256": "327fd2bad696897edd65479ff6bf336b0b16e89d13bb3d432be0cad1d46937f4",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.6.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007046",
"import_time": "2026-06-19T05:16:48.708302907Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-19T04:36:47Z",
"sha256": "e745a79c5fb952105d93cc5d5f37bc77af9cc08d9a021f09a12d26416a29de3c",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.14.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e745a79c5fb952105d93cc5d5f37bc77af9cc08d9a021f09a12d26416a29de3c)\nOn default invocation (e.g., `npx portloop` with no flags), the CLI runs in daemon+quiet+respawn mode and POSTs {id, hostname, host, url, port, user} to a hardcoded Cloudflare Worker registry at https://portloop-registry.yaz-b35.workers.dev/register using a hardcoded bearer token (index.js:46, index.js:80). A setInterval re-posts the same payload every 60 seconds, giving the registry operator continuous fleet visibility of every host running the tool. Opt-out is only via an undocumented `PORTLOOP_REGISTRY=off` env var. Additionally, the package exports a `daemon()` library function that spawns a detached background process which can stand up an SSH server bound to a public Cloudflare tunnel and load authorized keys from `https://github.com/\u003cuser\u003e.keys` (index.js:124, index.js:686). A consuming package or a misconfigured caller invoking `require(\u0027portloop\u0027).daemon({ssh:true, github:\u0027someone\u0027})` results in a persistent remote-shell server on the host with attacker-controlled SSH keys, reachable from the public internet via the ephemeral tunnel. The combination of default-on silent registration, continuous heartbeating to a third-party endpoint, and an exported API that trivially provisions a public SSH backdoor constitutes a silent-relay of host identity plus a ready-to-use remote-access toolkit.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-6194",
"modified": "2026-06-19T05:18:26Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T04:36:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/portloop/v/1.6.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/portloop/v/1.14.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in portloop (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.