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PYSEC-2026-3956

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-17 11:16 - Updated: 2026-09-10 12:38
VLAI
Details

openssl_encrypt (pip) versions <= 1.4.7 contain an information exposure vulnerability where the 'hsm fido2-test' and 'hsm onlykey-test' diagnostic commands unconditionally print the full derived hardware pepper as hex to stdout/stderr (crypt_cli.py, handle_hsm_command). The printed value can persist in terminal scrollback, session recordings, or CI logs. Impact is limited because the pepper is derived from a random per-invocation test salt and is salt-bound, so the leaked value cannot be used to decrypt real files. A related plugin issue logged raw prf_data outside the secret-redaction path. Fixed in 1.4.8 (and 1.5.0) by removing the hex dumps and routing plugin debug output through the redaction layer.

Impacted products
Name purl
openssl-encrypt pkg:pypi/openssl-encrypt

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {},
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "openssl-encrypt",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/openssl-encrypt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.2.2",
        "0.2.3",
        "0.2.4",
        "0.2.5",
        "0.2.6",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.3.1",
        "0.3.2",
        "0.3.3",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.2",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.4.4",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.5.1",
        "0.5.3",
        "0.6.0rc1",
        "0.7.0rc2",
        "0.7.1",
        "0.7.2",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.8.2",
        "0.9.2",
        "1.0.0",
        "1.0.1",
        "1.0.2",
        "1.0.3",
        "1.1.0",
        "1.2.0",
        "1.2.1",
        "1.3.0",
        "1.3.1",
        "1.3.2",
        "1.3.3",
        "1.3.4",
        "1.3.5",
        "1.4.0",
        "1.4.0b3",
        "1.4.0b4",
        "1.4.0b5",
        "1.4.0b6",
        "1.4.0b7",
        "1.4.0b8",
        "1.4.1",
        "1.4.1rc2",
        "1.4.2",
        "1.4.4",
        "1.4.5",
        "1.4.6"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74870",
    "GHSA-p9g8-wvh4-2jmx"
  ],
  "details": "openssl_encrypt (pip) versions \u003c= 1.4.7 contain an information exposure vulnerability where the \u0027hsm fido2-test\u0027 and \u0027hsm onlykey-test\u0027 diagnostic commands unconditionally print the full derived hardware pepper as hex to stdout/stderr (crypt_cli.py, handle_hsm_command). The printed value can persist in terminal scrollback, session recordings, or CI logs. Impact is limited because the pepper is derived from a random per-invocation test salt and is salt-bound, so the leaked value cannot be used to decrypt real files. A related plugin issue logged raw prf_data outside the secret-redaction path. Fixed in 1.4.8 (and 1.5.0) by removing the hex dumps and routing plugin debug output through the redaction layer.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3956",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T12:38:48.872999Z",
  "published": "2026-08-17T11:16:41.293Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-p9g8-wvh4-2jmx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openssl-encrypt-before-hardware-pepper-information-disclosure"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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