rustsec-2022-0042
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2022-05-10 12:00
Modified
2025-12-17 17:06
Summary
malicious crate `rustdecimal`
Details

The Rust Security Response WG and the crates.io team were notified on 2022-05-02 of the existence of the malicious crate rustdecimal, which contained malware. The crate name was intentionally similar to the name of the popular rust_decimal crate, hoping that potential victims would misspell its name (an attack called "typosquatting").

To protect the security of the ecosystem, the crates.io team permanently removed the crate from the registry as soon as it was made aware of the malware. An analysis of all the crates on crates.io was also performed, and no other crate with similar code patterns was found.

Keep in mind that the rust_decimal crate was not compromised, and it is still safe to use.

Analysis of the crate

The crate had less than 500 downloads since its first release on 2022-03-25, and no crates on the crates.io registry depended on it.

The crate contained identical source code and functionality as the legit rust_decimal crate, except for the Decimal::new function.

When the function was called, it checked whether the GITLAB_CI environment variable was set, and if so it downloaded a binary payload into /tmp/git-updater.bin and executed it. The binary payload supported both Linux and macOS, but not for Windows.

An analysis of the binary payload was not possible, as the download URL didn't work anymore when the analysis was performed.

Recommendations

If your project or organization is running GitLab CI, we strongly recommend checking whether your project or one of its dependencies depended on the rustdecimal crate, starting from 2022-03-25. If you notice a dependency on that crate, you should consider your CI environment to be compromised.

In general, we recommend regularly auditing your dependencies, and only depending on crates whose author you trust. If you notice any suspicious behavior in a crate's source code please follow the Rust security policy and report it to the Rust Security Response WG.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank GitHub user @safinaskar for identifying the malicious crate in this GitHub issue.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "code-execution"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rustdecimal",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/rustdecimal"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-7pwq-f4pq-78gm",
    "MAL-2022-1"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "The Rust Security Response WG and the crates.io team [were notified][1] on\n2022-05-02 of the existence of the malicious crate `rustdecimal`, which\ncontained malware. The crate name was intentionally similar to the name of the\npopular [`rust_decimal`][2] crate, hoping that potential victims would misspell\nits name (an attack called \"typosquatting\").\n\nTo protect the security of the ecosystem, the crates.io team permanently\nremoved the crate from the registry as soon as it was made aware of the\nmalware. An analysis of all the crates on crates.io was also performed, and no\nother crate with similar code patterns was found.\n\nKeep in mind that the [`rust_decimal`][2] crate was **not** compromised, and it\nis still safe to use.\n\n## Analysis of the crate\n\nThe crate had less than 500 downloads since its first release on 2022-03-25,\nand no crates on the crates.io registry depended on it.\n\nThe crate contained identical source code and functionality as the legit\n`rust_decimal` crate, except for the `Decimal::new` function.\n\nWhen the function was called, it checked whether the `GITLAB_CI` environment\nvariable was set, and if so it downloaded a binary payload into\n`/tmp/git-updater.bin` and executed it. The binary payload supported both Linux\nand macOS, but not for Windows.\n\nAn analysis of the binary payload was not possible, as the download URL didn\u0027t\nwork anymore when the analysis was performed.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nIf your project or organization is running GitLab CI, we strongly recommend\nchecking whether your project or one of its dependencies depended on the\n`rustdecimal` crate, starting from 2022-03-25. If you notice a dependency on\nthat crate, you should consider your CI environment to be compromised.\n\nIn general, we recommend regularly auditing your dependencies, and only\ndepending on crates whose author you trust. If you notice any suspicious\nbehavior in a crate\u0027s source code please follow [the Rust security\npolicy][3] and report it to the Rust Security Response WG.\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nWe want to thank GitHub user [`@safinaskar`][4] for identifying the\nmalicious crate in [this GitHub issue][1].\n\n[1]: https://github.com/paupino/rust-decimal/issues/514#issuecomment-1115408888\n[2]: https://crates.io/crates/rust_decimal\n[3]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security\n[4]: https://github.com/safinaskar",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2022-0042",
  "modified": "2025-12-17T17:06:41Z",
  "published": "2022-05-10T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/rustdecimal"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0042.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/rustlang-security-announcements/c/5DVtC8pgJLw?pli=1"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "malicious crate `rustdecimal`"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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