rustsec-2026-0181
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2026-06-06 12:00
Modified
2026-06-13 08:34
Summary
DoS vulnerability in HTTP/1.x chunked encoding parser triggered by maliciously crafted chunk lengths
Details

When using the affected versions of the vibeio-http crate, an attacker could craft a malicious HTTP/1.x request with a large chunk length (between usize::MAX - 1 and usize::MAX inclusive) and send it, causing the server to crash (integer overflow panic in debug builds, split_to out of bounds panic in release builds).

This was fixed in vibeio-http 0.3.2 by erroring on the chunk length if it exceeds usize::MAX - 2 (using checked_add() instead of + operator), preventing integer overflow.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "vibeio-http",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/vibeio-http"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "When using the affected versions of the `vibeio-http` crate, an attacker could craft a malicious HTTP/1.x request with a large chunk length (between `usize::MAX - 1` and `usize::MAX` inclusive) and send it, causing the server to crash (integer overflow panic in debug builds, split_to out of bounds panic in release builds).\n\nThis was fixed in `vibeio-http` 0.3.2 by erroring on the chunk length if it exceeds `usize::MAX - 2` (using `checked_add()` instead of `+` operator), preventing integer overflow.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0181",
  "modified": "2026-06-13T08:34:52Z",
  "published": "2026-06-06T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/vibeio-http"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0181.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ferronweb/vibeio-http/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#vibeio-http-032"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "DoS vulnerability in HTTP/1.x chunked encoding parser triggered by maliciously crafted chunk lengths"
}


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