SA25P004

Vulnerability from csaf_abb - Published: 2026-01-19 00:30 - Updated: 2026-01-19 00:30
Summary
Automation Studio Insufficient Server Certificate Validation

Notes

Summary
ABB became aware of vulnerability in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory. An update is available that resolves a vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may enable an attacker to masquerade as a trusted party when B&R Automation Studio establishes a connection with a server via the ANSL over TLS or OPC-UA protocol.
General security recommendations
For any installation of software related ABB products we strongly recommend the following (non-exhaustive) list of cyber security practices: – Isolate special purpose networks (e.g. for automation systems) and remote devices behind firewalls and separate them from any general-purpose network (e.g. office or home networks). – Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your devices, components, peripheral equipment, and networks. – Never connect programming software or computers containing programing software to any network other than the network for the devices that it is intended for. – Scan all data imported into your environment before use to detect potential malware infections. – Minimize network exposure for all applications and endpoints to ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet unless they are designed for such exposure and the intended use requires such. – Ensure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system, and firmware patches as well as anti-virus and firewall. – When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices. More information on recommended practices can be found in the following documents: - Defense in Depth for B&R products : https://www.br-automation.com/fileadmin/Cyber_Security_-_Defense_in_Depth_for_BR_Products-bdd37e82.pdf
Notice
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by B&R. B&R provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall B&R or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or conse-quential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if B&R or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from B&R, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
Support
For additional instructions and support please contact your local B&R service organization. For contact information, see https://www.br-automation.com/en/about-us/locations/. Information about ABB’s cyber security program and capabilities can be found at www.abb.com/cybersecurity.
Purpose
B&R has a rigorous internal cyber security continuous improvement process which involves regular testing with industry leading tools and periodic assessments to identify potential product issues. Occasionally an issue is determined to be a design or coding flaw with implications that may impact product cyber security. When a potential product vulnerability is identified or reported, B&R immediately initiates our vulnerability handling process. This entails validating if the issue is in fact a product issue, identifying root causes, determining what related products may be impacted, developing a remediation, and notifying end users and governmental organizations. The resulting Cyber Security Advisory intends to notify customers of the vulnerability and provide details on which products are impacted, how to mitigate the vulnerability or explain workarounds that minimize the potential risk as much as possible. The release of a Cyber Security Advisory should not be misconstrued as an affirmation or indication of an active threat or ongoing campaign targeting the products mentioned here. If B&R is aware of any specific threats, it will be clearly mentioned in the communication. The publication of this Cyber Security Advisory is an example of B&R’s commitment to the user community in support of this critical topic. Responsible disclosure is an important element in the chain of trust we work to maintain with our many customers. The release of an Advisory provides timely information which is essential to help ensure our customers are fully informed.
Frequently Asked Questions
What causes the vulnerability? - The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation mechanisms for server certificates in the ANSL over TLS and OPC-UA client implementations. What is B&R Automation Studio? - B&R Automation Studio is an environment for developing and executing automation solutions, ranging from control and motion technology to HMI, operation, and integrated safety technology. What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? - An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could spoof a trusted server, potentially leading to the disclosure of confidential information or the alteration of data during transit. How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? - An attacker could attempt to exploit this vulnerability by generating a maliciously crafted server certificate and manipulating network routing or name resolution to redirect traffic through a compromised node under their control. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or other-wise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Miti-gating Factors above. Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely? - Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed. What does the update do? - The update removes the vulnerability by modifying the way that the ANSL and OPC-UA clients are validating server certificates. When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? - No, B&R discovered this vulnerability as a part of its own security analysis. When this security advisory was issued, had B&R received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? - No, B&R had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued

{
  "document": {
    "category": "csaf_security_advisory",
    "csaf_version": "2.0",
    "distribution": {
      "tlp": {
        "label": "WHITE"
      }
    },
    "lang": "En",
    "notes": [
      {
        "category": "summary",
        "text": "ABB became aware of vulnerability in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory. An update is available that resolves a vulnerability.\n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability may enable an attacker to masquerade as a trusted party when B\u0026R Automation Studio establishes a connection with a server via the ANSL over TLS or OPC-UA protocol.",
        "title": "Summary"
      },
      {
        "category": "other",
        "text": "For any installation of software related ABB products we strongly recommend the following (non-exhaustive) list of cyber security practices:\n\n\u2013 Isolate special purpose networks (e.g. for automation systems) and remote devices behind firewalls\nand separate them from any general-purpose network (e.g. office or home networks).\n\n\u2013 Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your devices, components, peripheral equipment, and networks.\n\n\u2013 Never connect programming software or computers containing programing software to any network other than the network for the devices that it is intended for.\n\n\u2013 Scan all data imported into your environment before use to detect potential malware infections.\n\n\u2013 Minimize network exposure for all applications and endpoints to ensure that they are not accessible\nfrom the Internet unless they are designed for such exposure and the intended use requires such.\n\n\u2013 Ensure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system, and firmware\npatches as well as anti-virus and firewall.\n\n\u2013 When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices.\n\nMore information on recommended practices can be found in the following documents:\n- Defense in Depth for B\u0026R products : https://www.br-automation.com/fileadmin/Cyber_Security_-_Defense_in_Depth_for_BR_Products-bdd37e82.pdf\n",
        "title": "General security recommendations"
      },
      {
        "category": "legal_disclaimer",
        "text": "The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by B\u0026R.\n\nB\u0026R provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall B\u0026R or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or conse-quential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if B\u0026R or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.\n\nThis document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from B\u0026R, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose.\n\nAll rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.\n",
        "title": "Notice"
      },
      {
        "category": "other",
        "text": "For additional instructions and support please contact your local B\u0026R service organization. For contact information, see https://www.br-automation.com/en/about-us/locations/.\n\nInformation about ABB\u2019s cyber security program and capabilities can be found at www.abb.com/cybersecurity.\n",
        "title": "Support"
      },
      {
        "category": "other",
        "text": "B\u0026R has a rigorous internal cyber security continuous improvement process which involves regular testing with industry leading tools and periodic assessments to identify potential product issues. Occasionally an issue is determined to be a design or coding flaw with implications that may impact product cyber security.\n\nWhen a potential product vulnerability is identified or reported, B\u0026R immediately initiates our vulnerability handling process. This entails validating if the issue is in fact a product issue, identifying root causes, determining what related products may be impacted, developing a remediation, and notifying end users and governmental organizations.\n\nThe resulting Cyber Security Advisory intends to notify customers of the vulnerability and provide details on which products are impacted, how to mitigate the vulnerability or explain workarounds that minimize the potential risk as much as possible. The release of a Cyber Security Advisory should not be misconstrued as an affirmation or indication of an active threat or ongoing campaign targeting the products mentioned here. If B\u0026R is aware of any specific threats, it will be clearly mentioned in the communication.\n\nThe publication of this Cyber Security Advisory is an example of B\u0026R\u2019s commitment to the user community in support of this critical topic. Responsible disclosure is an important element in the chain of trust we work to maintain with our many customers. The release of an Advisory provides timely information which is essential to help ensure our customers are fully informed.",
        "title": "Purpose"
      },
      {
        "category": "faq",
        "text": "What causes the vulnerability?\n- The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation mechanisms for server certificates in the ANSL over TLS and OPC-UA client implementations.\n\nWhat is B\u0026R Automation Studio?\n- B\u0026R Automation Studio is an environment for developing and executing automation solutions, ranging from control and motion technology to HMI, operation, and integrated safety technology.\n\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?\n- An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could spoof a trusted server, potentially leading to the disclosure of confidential information or the alteration of data during transit.\n\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?\n- An attacker could attempt to exploit this vulnerability by generating a maliciously crafted server certificate and manipulating network routing or name resolution to redirect traffic through a compromised node under their control. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or other-wise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Miti-gating Factors above.\n\nCould the vulnerability be exploited remotely? \n- Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed. \n\nWhat does the update do?\n- The update removes the vulnerability by modifying the way that the ANSL and OPC-UA clients are validating server certificates.\n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?\n- No, B\u0026R discovered this vulnerability as a part of its own security analysis. \n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had B\u0026R received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?\n- No, B\u0026R had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued ",
        "title": "Frequently Asked Questions"
      }
    ],
    "publisher": {
      "category": "vendor",
      "name": "ABB PSIRT",
      "namespace": "https://www.abb.com/global/en/company/about/cybersecurity/alerts-and-notifications"
    },
    "references": [
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "ABB CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY - PDF version ",
        "url": "https://www.br-automation.com/fileadmin/SA25P004-4f45197f.pdf"
      },
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "ABB CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY - CSAF version ",
        "url": "https://psirt.abb.com/csaf/2026/sa25p004.json"
      }
    ],
    "title": "Automation Studio Insufficient Server Certificate Validation",
    "tracking": {
      "current_release_date": "2026-01-19T00:30:00.000Z",
      "generator": {
        "date": "2026-01-19T14:13:15.972Z",
        "engine": {
          "name": "Secvisogram",
          "version": "2.5.42"
        }
      },
      "id": "SA25P004",
      "initial_release_date": "2026-01-19T00:30:00.000Z",
      "revision_history": [
        {
          "date": "2026-01-19T00:30:00.000Z",
          "legacy_version": "A",
          "number": "1",
          "summary": "Initial Version"
        }
      ],
      "status": "final",
      "version": "1"
    }
  },
  "product_tree": {
    "branches": [
      {
        "branches": [
          {
            "branches": [
              {
                "category": "product_version_range",
                "name": "\u003c6.5",
                "product": {
                  "name": "ABB Automation Studio \u003c6.5",
                  "product_id": "AV1"
                }
              },
              {
                "category": "product_version",
                "name": "6.5",
                "product": {
                  "name": "ABB Automation Studio 6.5",
                  "product_id": "FX1"
                }
              }
            ],
            "category": "product_name",
            "name": "Automation Studio"
          }
        ],
        "category": "vendor",
        "name": "ABB"
      }
    ]
  },
  "vulnerabilities": [
    {
      "cve": "CVE-2025-11043",
      "cwe": {
        "id": "CWE-295",
        "name": "Improper Certificate Validation"
      },
      "notes": [
        {
          "category": "description",
          "text": "An Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in the OPC-UA client and ANSL over TLS client used in Automation Studio versions before 6.5 could allow an unauthenticated attacker on the network to position themselves to intercept and interfere with data exchanges.\n",
          "title": "CVE Description"
        }
      ],
      "product_status": {
        "fixed": [
          "FX1"
        ],
        "known_affected": [
          "AV1"
        ]
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "category": "external",
          "summary": "NVD - CVE-2025-11043",
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11043"
        }
      ],
      "remediations": [
        {
          "category": "vendor_fix",
          "details": "The problem is corrected in the following product versions:\n\nB\u0026R Automation Studio version 6.5\n\nB\u0026R recommends that customers apply the update at earliest convenience.\n\nThe process to install updates is described in the user manual. The step to identify the installed product version is de-scribed in the user manual.\n",
          "product_ids": [
            "AV1"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "mitigation",
          "details": "To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to intercept and redirect the communication between B\u0026R Automation Studio and the target server, as well as present manipulated certificates that pass validation checks. B\u0026R recommends operating B\u0026R Automation Studio within Level 2 of the ABB ICS Cyber Security Reference Architecture when connecting to Level 1 devices via ANSL over TLS or OPC-UA. Operating in this trusted environment reduces the risk of successful exploitation drastically.\n\nRefer to section \u201cGeneral security recommendations\u201d for further advise on how to keep your system secure.\n",
          "product_ids": [
            "AV1"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "scores": [
        {
          "cvss_v3": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.4,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "environmentalScore": 7.1,
            "environmentalSeverity": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "remediationLevel": "OFFICIAL_FIX",
            "reportConfidence": "CONFIRMED",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "temporalScore": 7.1,
            "temporalSeverity": "HIGH",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/RL:O/RC:C",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "products": [
            "AV1"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "title": "CVE-2025-11043"
    }
  ]
}


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Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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