SSA-446307
Vulnerability from csaf_siemens - Published: 2025-05-13 00:00 - Updated: 2025-08-12 00:00{
"document": {
"category": "csaf_security_advisory",
"csaf_version": "2.0",
"distribution": {
"text": "Disclosure is not limited. (TLPv2: TLP:CLEAR)",
"tlp": {
"label": "WHITE"
}
},
"lang": "en",
"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "SIMATIC IPC RS-828A is affected by an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Redfish interface of its Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) that could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access and compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability of the BMC and thus the entire system.\n\nSiemens has released a new version for SIMATIC IPC RS-828A - BMC firmware and recommends to update to the latest version.",
"title": "Summary"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "As a general security measure, Siemens strongly recommends to protect network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. In order to operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends to configure the environment according to Siemens\u0027 operational guidelines for Industrial Security (Download: \nhttps://www.siemens.com/cert/operational-guidelines-industrial-security), and to follow the recommendations in the product manuals.\nAdditional information on Industrial Security by Siemens can be found at: https://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity",
"title": "General Recommendations"
},
{
"category": "general",
"text": "For further inquiries on security vulnerabilities in Siemens products and solutions, please contact the Siemens ProductCERT: https://www.siemens.com/cert/advisories",
"title": "Additional Resources"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "The use of Siemens Security Advisories is subject to the terms and conditions listed on: https://www.siemens.com/productcert/terms-of-use.",
"title": "Terms of Use"
}
],
"publisher": {
"category": "vendor",
"contact_details": "productcert@siemens.com",
"name": "Siemens ProductCERT",
"namespace": "https://www.siemens.com"
},
"references": [
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-446307: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in BMC (CVE-2024-54085) affects SIMATIC IPC RS-828A - HTML Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-446307.html"
},
{
"category": "self",
"summary": "SSA-446307: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in BMC (CVE-2024-54085) affects SIMATIC IPC RS-828A - CSAF Version",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/csaf/ssa-446307.json"
}
],
"title": "SSA-446307: Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in BMC (CVE-2024-54085) affects SIMATIC IPC RS-828A",
"tracking": {
"current_release_date": "2025-08-12T00:00:00Z",
"generator": {
"engine": {
"name": "Siemens ProductCERT CSAF Generator",
"version": "1"
}
},
"id": "SSA-446307",
"initial_release_date": "2025-05-13T00:00:00Z",
"revision_history": [
{
"date": "2025-05-13T00:00:00Z",
"legacy_version": "1.0",
"number": "1",
"summary": "Publication Date"
},
{
"date": "2025-08-12T00:00:00Z",
"legacy_version": "1.1",
"number": "2",
"summary": "Added fix for SIMATIC IPC RS-828A - BMC firmware"
}
],
"status": "interim",
"version": "2"
}
},
"product_tree": {
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"branches": [
{
"category": "product_version_range",
"name": "vers:intdot/\u003c1.1.13",
"product": {
"name": "SIMATIC IPC RS-828A - BMC firmware",
"product_id": "1"
}
}
],
"category": "product_name",
"name": "SIMATIC IPC RS-828A - BMC firmware"
}
],
"category": "vendor",
"name": "Siemens"
}
]
},
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2024-54085",
"cwe": {
"id": "CWE-290",
"name": "Authentication Bypass by Spoofing"
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "AMI\u2019s SPx contains a vulnerability in the BMC where an Attacker may bypass authentication remotely through the Redfish Host Interface. A successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability.",
"title": "Summary"
}
],
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
"1"
]
},
"remediations": [
{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"details": "Update to V1.1.13 or later version",
"product_ids": [
"1"
],
"url": "https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109763408/"
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"baseScore": 10.0,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"1"
]
}
],
"title": "CVE-2024-54085"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.