ts-2023-001
Vulnerability from tailscale

Description: An issue in the Tailscale coordination server allowed a malicious individual to share nodes from other tailnets to themselves, if they knew the node ID of the target.

What happened?

A bug in Tailscale’s node sharing logic allowed the creation of sharing invitations by unauthorized users. A malicious individual who knew a target node’s database ID could generate and accept a sharing invite for that node without being an admin of the target node’s tailnet.

This was possible for any node in any tailnet, as long as the individual knew the target’s node ID. The node ID is an integer used in the admin panel’s database, and is not related to the node “StableID” that is visible to Tailscale clients. A node’s ID is only visible in the API or admin console, by admins of either the node’s tailnet or a tailnet to which that node has already been shared. IDs are random 64-bit numbers that are not sequential or otherwise easily guessable.

The bug was introduced on 2022-09-14, reported to us on 2023-01-11, and remediated on 2023-01-12.

Who is affected?

All tailnets with nodes are affected.

What is the impact?

This vulnerability was not triggered or exploited. Analysis of tailnet logs shows that no unauthorized shares were created or accepted while the vulnerability was present, except as part of the proof of concept from the individual who reported the vulnerability.

Admins of a tailnet can review nodes that are shared out of their tailnet in the admin console. Sharing invites are logged as events in configuration audit logs. Admins can also review invites created and accepted in their configuration audit logs in the admin console.

What do I need to do?

No action is required. Tailscale has deployed a fix to the coordination server as of 2023-01-12, and verified that the vulnerability was not exploited.

Credits

We would like to thank Benjamin Roberts (tsujamin) for reporting this issue.

Show details on source website


{
   guidislink: false,
   id: "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/#ts-2023-001",
   link: "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/#ts-2023-001",
   links: [
      {
         href: "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/#ts-2023-001",
         rel: "alternate",
         type: "text/html",
      },
   ],
   published: "Tue, 17 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT",
   summary: "<p><strong><em>Description</em></strong>: An issue in the Tailscale coordination server allowed a malicious individual to share nodes from other tailnets to themselves, if they knew the node ID of the target.</p>\n<h4>What happened?</h4>\n<p>A bug in Tailscale’s node sharing logic allowed the creation of sharing invitations by unauthorized users. A malicious individual who knew a target node’s database ID could generate and accept a sharing invite for that node without being an admin of the target node’s tailnet.</p>\n<p>This was possible for any node in any tailnet, as long as the individual knew the target’s node ID. The node ID is an integer used in the admin panel’s database, and is not related to the node “StableID” that is visible to Tailscale clients. A node’s ID is only visible in the API or admin console, by admins of either the node’s tailnet or a tailnet to which that node has already been shared. IDs are random 64-bit numbers that are not sequential or otherwise easily guessable.</p>\n<p>The bug was introduced on 2022-09-14, reported to us on 2023-01-11, and remediated on 2023-01-12.</p>\n<h4>Who is affected?</h4>\n<p>All tailnets with nodes are affected.</p>\n<h4>What is the impact?</h4>\n<p><strong>This vulnerability was not triggered or exploited</strong>. Analysis of tailnet logs shows that no unauthorized shares were created or accepted while the vulnerability was present, except as part of the proof of concept from the individual who reported the vulnerability.</p>\n<p>Admins of a tailnet can review <a href=\"https://login.tailscale.com/admin/machines?q=shared%3Aout\">nodes that are shared out of their tailnet</a> in the admin console. Sharing invites are logged as <a href=\"https://tailscale.com/kb/1203/audit-logging/#events-for-shared-nodes\">events in configuration audit logs</a>. Admins can also review <a href=\"https://login.tailscale.com/admin/logs?events=%5B%22INVITECREATENODE_SHARE%22%2C%22INVITEACCEPTNODE_SHARE%22%5D\">invites created and accepted in their configuration audit logs</a> in the admin console.</p>\n<h4>What do I need to do?</h4>\n<p><strong>No action is required</strong>. Tailscale has deployed a fix to the coordination server as of 2023-01-12, and verified that the vulnerability was not exploited.</p>\n<h4>Credits</h4>\n<p>We would like to thank Benjamin Roberts (<a href=\"https://github.com/tsujamin\">tsujamin</a>) for reporting this issue.</p>",
   summary_detail: {
      base: "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/index.xml",
      language: null,
      type: "text/html",
      value: "<p><strong><em>Description</em></strong>: An issue in the Tailscale coordination server allowed a malicious individual to share nodes from other tailnets to themselves, if they knew the node ID of the target.</p>\n<h4>What happened?</h4>\n<p>A bug in Tailscale’s node sharing logic allowed the creation of sharing invitations by unauthorized users. A malicious individual who knew a target node’s database ID could generate and accept a sharing invite for that node without being an admin of the target node’s tailnet.</p>\n<p>This was possible for any node in any tailnet, as long as the individual knew the target’s node ID. The node ID is an integer used in the admin panel’s database, and is not related to the node “StableID” that is visible to Tailscale clients. A node’s ID is only visible in the API or admin console, by admins of either the node’s tailnet or a tailnet to which that node has already been shared. IDs are random 64-bit numbers that are not sequential or otherwise easily guessable.</p>\n<p>The bug was introduced on 2022-09-14, reported to us on 2023-01-11, and remediated on 2023-01-12.</p>\n<h4>Who is affected?</h4>\n<p>All tailnets with nodes are affected.</p>\n<h4>What is the impact?</h4>\n<p><strong>This vulnerability was not triggered or exploited</strong>. Analysis of tailnet logs shows that no unauthorized shares were created or accepted while the vulnerability was present, except as part of the proof of concept from the individual who reported the vulnerability.</p>\n<p>Admins of a tailnet can review <a href=\"https://login.tailscale.com/admin/machines?q=shared%3Aout\">nodes that are shared out of their tailnet</a> in the admin console. Sharing invites are logged as <a href=\"https://tailscale.com/kb/1203/audit-logging/#events-for-shared-nodes\">events in configuration audit logs</a>. Admins can also review <a href=\"https://login.tailscale.com/admin/logs?events=%5B%22INVITECREATENODE_SHARE%22%2C%22INVITEACCEPTNODE_SHARE%22%5D\">invites created and accepted in their configuration audit logs</a> in the admin console.</p>\n<h4>What do I need to do?</h4>\n<p><strong>No action is required</strong>. Tailscale has deployed a fix to the coordination server as of 2023-01-12, and verified that the vulnerability was not exploited.</p>\n<h4>Credits</h4>\n<p>We would like to thank Benjamin Roberts (<a href=\"https://github.com/tsujamin\">tsujamin</a>) for reporting this issue.</p>",
   },
   title: "TS-2023-001",
   title_detail: {
      base: "https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins/index.xml",
      language: null,
      type: "text/plain",
      value: "TS-2023-001",
   },
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.

Security Advisory comment format.

This schema specifies the format of a comment related to a security advisory.

UUIDv4 of the comment
UUIDv4 of the Vulnerability-Lookup instance
When the comment was created originally
When the comment was last updated
Title of the comment
Description of the comment
The identifier of the vulnerability (CVE ID, GHSA-ID, PYSEC ID, etc.).



Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.