var-200806-0204
Vulnerability from variot
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Cisco PIX security appliance 7.1.x before 7.1(2)70, 7.2.x before 7.2(4), and 8.0.x before 8.0(3)10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted TCP ACK packet to the device interface. Cisco PIX and Cisco ASA are prone to multiple denial-of-service vulnerabilities and an unauthorized-access vulnerability. An attacker can exploit these issues to bypass ACL lists and to cause an affected device to reboot or crash. This security advisory outlines details of these vulnerabilities:
- Crafted TCP ACK Packet Vulnerability
- Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability
- Instant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability
- Vulnerability Scan Denial of Service
- Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability
The first four vulnerabilities may lead to a denial of service (DoS) condition and the fifth vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass control-plane access control lists (ACL).
Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device may be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another.
Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Workarounds that mitigate some of these vulnerabilities are available.
This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080604-asa.shtml
Affected Products
Vulnerable Products +------------------
The following are the details about each vulnerability described within this advisory. Software versions prior to 7.1(2)70 on the 7.1.x release, 7.2(4) on the 7.2.x release, and 8.0 (3)10 on the 8.0.x release are affected. Devices running software versions on the 8.0 release that are configured for Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), WebVPN, SSL VPN, or ASDM enabled are affected by this vulnerability.
Note: Devices running IPv4 and IPv6 are affected by this vulnerability. Devices running software versions in the 7.0.x and 7.1.x releases are not vulnerable. Additionally, devices that do not have Instant Messaging Inspection enabled are not vulnerable.
Note: Instant Messaging Inspection is disabled by default.
Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability +----------------------------------------------
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX devices are affected by a vulnerability if the device is configured to use control-plane ACLs and if it is running software versions prior to 8.0(3)9 on the 8.0.x release. Devices running software versions 7.x or 8.1.x are not vulnerable.
Note: Control-plane ACLs were first introduced in software version 8.0(2). The control-plane ACLs are not enabled by default.
The show version command-line interface (CLI) command can be used to determine if a vulnerable version of the Cisco PIX or Cisco ASA software is running.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +--------------------------------
The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. Cisco PIX security appliances running versions 6.x are not vulnerable. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other.
- Only packets destined to the device (not transiting the device) may trigger the effects of this vulnerability. Devices running software versions on the 8.0 release that are configured for Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), WebVPN, SSL VPN, or ASDM enabled are affected by this vulnerability.
The telnet command is used identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts Telnet connections.
ASA(config)# telnet 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0 inside
In the previous example, the Cisco ASA is configured to accept Telnet connections on the inside interface from the 192.168.10.0/24 network.
Note: You cannot use Telnet to the lowest security interface unless you use Telnet inside an IPSec tunnel.
ASDM management sessions are enabled via the http server enable and http commands.
The ssh command is used identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance accepts SSH connections. For example:
ASA(config)# ssh 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0 inside
In the previous example the Cisco ASA is configured to accept SSH connections on the inside interface from the 192.168.10.0/24 network.
Clientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect connections are enabled via the webvpn command. For example, the following configuration shows a Cisco ASA with WebVPN configured and enabled. In this case the ASA will listen for WebVPN connections on the default port, TCP port 443:
http server enable
!
webvpn
enable outside
Note that with this particular configuration, the device is vulnerable to attacks coming from the outside interface.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsm84110 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-2055.
- Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability +----------------------------------
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the replacement for the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. It is a protocol that provides, via cryptography, secure communications between two end-points. In all these scenarios, the PIX and ASA may be affected by a vulnerability in the handling of the TLS protocol that may lead to a reload of the device when it processes specially crafted TLS packets.
Note: Only packets destined to the device (not transiting the device) may trigger the effects of this vulnerability.
The following list contains some of the applications within the Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX devices that use TLS:
- Clientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect Connections
- ASDM (HTTPS) Management Sessions
- Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access
- TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection
Clientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect Connections +------------------------------------------------------------
Clientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect connections are enabled via the webvpn command. For example, the following configuration shows a Cisco ASA with WebVPN configured and enabled. In this case the ASA will listen for WebVPN connections on the default port, TCP port 443:
http server enable
!
webvpn
enable outside
Note that with this particular configuration, the device is vulnerable to attacks coming from the outside interface.
ASDM (HTTPS) Management Sessions +-------------------------------
ASDM management sessions are enabled via the http server enable and http commands. For example, the following configuration shows an ASA configured for remote HTTPS management:
http server enable
http 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 inside
Note that with this particular configuration the device is vulnerable to attacks coming from the inside interface and from the 192.168.0.0/ 24 IP sub-network.
Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access +------------------------------------
The cut-through proxy feature is used to authenticate users before they can access the network. The following is an example of a configuration that requires users to authenticate before they can be granted network access:
access-list auth-proxy extended permit tcp any any eq www
access-list auth-proxy extended permit tcp any any eq telnet
access-list auth-proxy extended permit tcp any any eq https
!
aaa authentication match auth-proxy inside LOCAL
aaa authentication secure-http-client
aaa authentication listener https inside port https
A configuration affected by this vulnerability will contain the
command aaa authentication secure-http-client or aaa authentication
listener https inside port
TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection +---------------------------------------
The TLS proxy for encrypted voice inspection feature allows the security appliance to decrypt, inspect and modify (as needed, for example, performing NAT fixup), and re-encrypt voice signaling traffic while all of the existing VoIP inspection functions for SCCP and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) protocols are preserved. Once voice signaling is decrypted, the plain-text signaling message is passed to the existing inspection engines. The security appliance accomplishes this by acting as a TLS proxy between the IP phone and Cisco Unified CallManager and Cisco Unified Communications Manager, which implies that TLS sessions are terminating on the security appliance. This is done over TCP ports 2443 and 5061. If the output contains the text tls-proxy: active and some statistics, then the device has a vulnerable configuration. The following example shows a vulnerable Cisco ASA Security Appliance:
ASA# show service-policy | include tls
Inspect: sip tls-proxy myproxy, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0
tls-proxy: active sess 0, most sess 0, byte 0
Inspect: skinny tls-proxy myproxy, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0
tls-proxy: active sess 0, most sess 0, byte 0
ASA#
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsm26841 and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-2056.
- Instant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability +--------------------------------------------
The Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX Instant Messenger (IM) inspection engine is used to apply fine grained controls on the IM application usage within your network.
More information on the IM inspection feature and its configuration can be found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa80/configuration/guide/inspect.html#wp1479354
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCso22981 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-2057.
- Certain vulnerability (port) scanners will cause the system to reload.
Note: This vulnerability is affected by traffic destined to the device on TCP port 443. The Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security appliances use TCP port 443 for Clientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, AnyConnect client connections, HTTPS Management Sessions, Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access, and TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection. Please refer to the details of the Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability for additional information on these services.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsj60659 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-2058.
- Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability +-------------------------------------------------
Control-plane ACLs are designed to protect traffic destined to the security appliance.
The following example uses the show running-config | include control-plane command to determine if a control-plane ACL is configured on the device:
ASA# show running-config | include control-plane
access-group 101 in interface inside control-plane
ASA#
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsm67466 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-2059.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CSCsm84110 - Crafted TCP ACK Packet Vulnerability
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsm26841 - Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCso22981 - Instant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsj60659 - Vulnerability Scan Denial of Service
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
CSCsm67466 - Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
Successful exploitation of the first four vulnerabilities may cause a reload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition. Successful exploitation of the fifth vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass control-plane ACLs and successfully send malicious traffic to the device.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
The following list contains the first fixed software release of each vulnerability:
+---------------------------------------+ | | Affected | First | | Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | | | | Release | |---------------+----------+------------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |----------+------------| | | 7.1 | 7.1(2)70 | |Crafted TCP |----------+------------| | ACK Packet | 7.2 | 7.2(4) | |Vulnerability |----------+------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(3)10 | | |----------+------------| | | 8.1 | Not | | | | vulnerable | |---------------+----------+------------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |----------+------------| | | 7.1 | Not | | Crafted TLS | | vulnerable | |Packet |----------+------------| | Vulnerability | 7.2 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |----------+------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(3)9 | | |----------+------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(1)1 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |----------+------------| | Instant | 7.1 | Not | | Messenger | | vulnerable | |Inspection |----------+------------| | Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(4) | | |----------+------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(3)10 | | |----------+------------| | | 8.1 | 8.1(1)2 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |----------+------------| | | 7.1 | Not | | Vulnerability | | vulnerable | |Scan Denial |----------+------------| | of Service | 7.2 | 7.2(3)2 | | |----------+------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(2)17 | | |----------+------------| | | 8.1 | Not | | | | vulnerable | |---------------+----------+------------| | | 7.0 | Not | | | | vulnerable | | |----------+------------| | | 7.1 | Not | | Control-plane | | vulnerable | |Access |----------+------------| | Control List | 7.2 | Not | | Vulnerability | | vulnerable | | |----------+------------| | | 8.0 | 8.0(3)9 | | |----------+------------| | | 8.1 | Not | | | | vulnerable | +---------------------------------------+
Fixed PIX software can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/pix?psrtdcat20e2
Fix ASA software can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/asa?psrtdcat20e2
Workarounds
This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent of each other.
Crafted TCP ACK Packet Vulnerability +-----------------------------------
As a workaround and best practice allow Telnet, SSH, and ASDM connections from only trusted hosts in your network.
Additionally, filters that deny TCP ports 22, 23, 80, and 443 packets may be deployed throughout the network as part of a transit ACL (tACL) policy for protection of traffic which enters the network at ingress access points. This policy should be configured to protect the network device where the filter is applied and other devices behind it. Filters for packets using TCP ports 22, 23, 80, and 443 should also be deployed in front of vulnerable network devices so that traffic is only allowed from trusted clients.
Additional information about tACLs is available in "Transit Access Control Lists : Filtering at Your Edge":
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801afc76.shtml
Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability +-------------------------------
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.
Instant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability
The only workaround for this vulnerability is to disable IM inspection on the security appliance.
Port Scan Denial of Service Vulnerability +----------------------------------------
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.
Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability +----------------------------------------------
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.
Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20080604-asa.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts +-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts +----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
These vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during the troubleshooting of a technical support service request.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080604-asa.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-teams@first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
- comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2008-June-04 | public | | | | release | +---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin)
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4) An unspecified error can be exploited to cause an affected system to reload via specially crafted network traffic (e.g.
SOLUTION: Update to fixed versions (please see the vendor's advisory for details).
PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: Reported by the vendor.
ORIGINAL ADVISORY: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00809a8354.shtml
About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help everybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities.
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Show details on source website
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"data": "Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Cisco PIX security appliance 7.1.x before 7.1(2)70, 7.2.x before 7.2(4), and 8.0.x before 8.0(3)10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted TCP ACK packet to the device interface. Cisco PIX and Cisco ASA are prone to multiple denial-of-service vulnerabilities and an unauthorized-access vulnerability. \nAn attacker can exploit these issues to bypass ACL lists and to cause an affected device to reboot or crash. This security\nadvisory outlines details of these vulnerabilities:\n\n * Crafted TCP ACK Packet Vulnerability\n * Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability\n * Instant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability\n * Vulnerability Scan Denial of Service\n * Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability\n\nThe first four vulnerabilities may lead to a denial of service (DoS)\ncondition and the fifth vulnerability may allow an attacker to bypass\ncontrol-plane access control lists (ACL). \n\nNote: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. A device\nmay be affected by one vulnerability and not affected by another. \n\nCisco has released free software updates that address these\nvulnerabilities. Workarounds that mitigate some of these\nvulnerabilities are available. \n\nThis advisory is posted at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080604-asa.shtml\n\nAffected Products\n=================\n\nVulnerable Products\n+------------------\n\nThe following are the details about each vulnerability described\nwithin this advisory. Software versions prior to\n7.1(2)70 on the 7.1.x release, 7.2(4) on the 7.2.x release, and 8.0\n(3)10 on the 8.0.x release are affected. \nDevices running software versions on the 8.0 release that are\nconfigured for Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), WebVPN, SSL VPN, or ASDM\nenabled are affected by this vulnerability. \n\nNote: Devices running IPv4 and IPv6 are affected by this\nvulnerability. Devices running software versions in the 7.0.x and 7.1.x\nreleases are not vulnerable. Additionally, devices that do not have\nInstant Messaging Inspection enabled are not vulnerable. \n\nNote: Instant Messaging Inspection is disabled by default. \n\nControl-plane Access Control List Vulnerability\n+----------------------------------------------\n\nCisco ASA and Cisco PIX devices are affected by a vulnerability if\nthe device is configured to use control-plane ACLs and if it is\nrunning software versions prior to 8.0(3)9 on the 8.0.x release. \nDevices running software versions 7.x or 8.1.x are not vulnerable. \n\nNote: Control-plane ACLs were first introduced in software version\n8.0(2). The control-plane ACLs are not enabled by default. \n\nThe show version command-line interface (CLI) command can be used to\ndetermine if a vulnerable version of the Cisco PIX or Cisco ASA\nsoftware is running. \n\nProducts Confirmed Not Vulnerable\n+--------------------------------\n\nThe Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) is not affected by any of\nthese vulnerabilities. Cisco PIX security appliances running versions\n6.x are not vulnerable. No other Cisco products are currently known\nto be affected by these vulnerabilities. \n\nDetails\n=======\n\nThis Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. \nThese vulnerabilities are independent of each other. \n\n1. Only packets destined\nto the device (not transiting the device) may trigger the effects of\nthis vulnerability. \nDevices running software versions on the 8.0 release that are\nconfigured for Telnet, Secure Shell (SSH), WebVPN, SSL VPN, or ASDM\nenabled are affected by this vulnerability. \n\nThe telnet command is used identify the IP addresses from which the\nsecurity appliance accepts Telnet connections. \n\n ASA(config)# telnet 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0 inside\n\nIn the previous example, the Cisco ASA is configured to accept Telnet\nconnections on the inside interface from the 192.168.10.0/24 network. \n\nNote: You cannot use Telnet to the lowest security interface unless\nyou use Telnet inside an IPSec tunnel. \n\nASDM management sessions are enabled via the http server enable and \nhttp commands. \n\nThe ssh command is used identify the IP addresses from which the\nsecurity appliance accepts SSH connections. For example:\n\n ASA(config)# ssh 192.168.10.0 255.255.255.0 inside\n\nIn the previous example the Cisco ASA is configured to accept SSH\nconnections on the inside interface from the 192.168.10.0/24 network. \n\nClientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect connections are\nenabled via the webvpn command. For example, the following\nconfiguration shows a Cisco ASA with WebVPN configured and enabled. \nIn this case the ASA will listen for WebVPN connections on the\ndefault port, TCP port 443:\n\n http server enable \n !\n webvpn \n enable outside\n\nNote that with this particular configuration, the device is\nvulnerable to attacks coming from the outside interface. \n\nThis vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsm84110 \nand has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) \nidentifier CVE-2008-2055. \n\n2. Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability\n+----------------------------------\n\nTransport Layer Security (TLS) is the replacement for the Secure\nSocket Layer (SSL) protocol. It is a protocol that provides, via\ncryptography, secure communications between two end-points. In all these scenarios, the PIX and ASA may be affected by\na vulnerability in the handling of the TLS protocol that may lead to\na reload of the device when it processes specially crafted TLS\npackets. \n\nNote: Only packets destined to the device (not transiting the\ndevice) may trigger the effects of this vulnerability. \n\nThe following list contains some of the applications within the Cisco\nASA and Cisco PIX devices that use TLS:\n\n * Clientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect Connections\n * ASDM (HTTPS) Management Sessions\n * Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access\n * TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection\n\nClientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect Connections\n+------------------------------------------------------------\n\nClientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client, and AnyConnect connections are\nenabled via the webvpn command. For example, the following\nconfiguration shows a Cisco ASA with WebVPN configured and enabled. \nIn this case the ASA will listen for WebVPN connections on the\ndefault port, TCP port 443:\n\n http server enable \n !\n webvpn \n enable outside\n\nNote that with this particular configuration, the device is\nvulnerable to attacks coming from the outside interface. \n\nASDM (HTTPS) Management Sessions\n+-------------------------------\n\nASDM management sessions are enabled via the http server enable and \nhttp commands. For example, the following configuration shows an ASA\nconfigured for remote HTTPS management:\n\n http server enable\n http 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 inside\n\nNote that with this particular configuration the device is vulnerable\nto attacks coming from the inside interface and from the 192.168.0.0/\n24 IP sub-network. \n\nCut-Through Proxy for Network Access\n+------------------------------------\n\nThe cut-through proxy feature is used to authenticate users before\nthey can access the network. The following is an example of a\nconfiguration that requires users to authenticate before they can be\ngranted network access:\n\n access-list auth-proxy extended permit tcp any any eq www\n access-list auth-proxy extended permit tcp any any eq telnet\n access-list auth-proxy extended permit tcp any any eq https\n !\n aaa authentication match auth-proxy inside LOCAL\n aaa authentication secure-http-client\n aaa authentication listener https inside port https\n\nA configuration affected by this vulnerability will contain the\ncommand aaa authentication secure-http-client or aaa authentication\nlistener https inside port \u003cport number\u003e. Note that with the\nconfiguration in the preceding example, the device is vulnerable to\nattacks coming from the inside interface. \n\nTLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection\n+---------------------------------------\n\nThe TLS proxy for encrypted voice inspection feature allows the\nsecurity appliance to decrypt, inspect and modify (as needed, for\nexample, performing NAT fixup), and re-encrypt voice signaling\ntraffic while all of the existing VoIP inspection functions for SCCP\nand Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) protocols are preserved. Once\nvoice signaling is decrypted, the plain-text signaling message is\npassed to the existing inspection engines. The security appliance\naccomplishes this by acting as a TLS proxy between the IP phone and\nCisco Unified CallManager and Cisco Unified Communications Manager,\nwhich implies that TLS sessions are terminating on the security\nappliance. This is done over TCP ports 2443 and 5061. \nIf the output contains the text tls-proxy: active and some\nstatistics, then the device has a vulnerable configuration. The\nfollowing example shows a vulnerable Cisco ASA Security Appliance:\n\n ASA# show service-policy | include tls\n Inspect: sip tls-proxy myproxy, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0\n tls-proxy: active sess 0, most sess 0, byte 0\n Inspect: skinny tls-proxy myproxy, packet 0, drop 0, reset-drop 0\n tls-proxy: active sess 0, most sess 0, byte 0\n ASA#\n\nThis vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsm26841 and has\nbeen assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) \nidentifier CVE-2008-2056. \n\n3. Instant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability\n+--------------------------------------------\n\nThe Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX Instant Messenger (IM) inspection engine\nis used to apply fine grained controls on the IM application usage\nwithin your network. \n\nMore information on the IM inspection feature and its configuration\ncan be found at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa80/configuration/guide/inspect.html#wp1479354\n\nThis vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCso22981 and \nhas been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) \nidentifier CVE-2008-2057. \n\n4. Certain vulnerability (port) scanners\nwill cause the system to reload. \n\nNote: This vulnerability is affected by traffic destined to the\ndevice on TCP port 443. The Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security\nappliances use TCP port 443 for Clientless WebVPN, SSL VPN Client,\nAnyConnect client connections, HTTPS Management Sessions, Cut-Through\nProxy for Network Access, and TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice\nInspection. Please refer to the details of the Crafted TLS Packet\nVulnerability for additional information on these services. \n\nThis vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsj60659 and has\nbeen assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier \nCVE-2008-2058. \n\n5. Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability\n+-------------------------------------------------\n\nControl-plane ACLs are designed to protect traffic destined to the\nsecurity appliance. \n\nThe following example uses the show running-config | include\ncontrol-plane command to determine if a control-plane ACL is\nconfigured on the device:\n\n ASA# show running-config | include control-plane\n access-group 101 in interface inside control-plane\n ASA#\n\nThis vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsm67466 and has\nbeen assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier \nCVE-2008-2059. \n\nVulnerability Scoring Details\n=============================\n\nCisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory\nbased on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS\nscoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS\nversion 2.0. \n\nCVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\nseverity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. \n\nCisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then\ncompute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of\nthe vulnerability in individual networks. \n\nCisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding\nCVSS at\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\n\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the\nenvironmental impact for individual networks at\n\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss\n\n\nCSCsm84110 - Crafted TCP ACK Packet Vulnerability \n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - None\n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n\nCSCsm26841 - Crafted TLS Packet Vulnerability\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - None\n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n\nCSCso22981 - Instant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - None\n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n\nCSCsj60659 - Vulnerability Scan Denial of Service\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - None\n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n\nCSCsm67466 - Control-plane Access Control List Vulnerability\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - Complete \n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - None \n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\nImpact\n======\n\nSuccessful exploitation of the first four vulnerabilities may cause a\nreload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation could result in\na sustained Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition. Successful\nexploitation of the fifth vulnerability may allow an attacker to\nbypass control-plane ACLs and successfully send malicious traffic to\nthe device. \n\nSoftware Versions and Fixes\n===========================\n\nWhen considering software upgrades, also consult \nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to \ndetermine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. \n\nIn all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the\ndevices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current\nhardware and software configurations will continue to be supported\nproperly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact\nthe Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted\nmaintenance provider for assistance. \n\nThe following list contains the first fixed software release of each\nvulnerability:\n\n+---------------------------------------+\n| | Affected | First |\n| Vulnerability | Release | Fixed |\n| | | Release |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | 7.0 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 7.1 | 7.1(2)70 |\n|Crafted TCP |----------+------------|\n| ACK Packet | 7.2 | 7.2(4) |\n|Vulnerability |----------+------------|\n| | 8.0 | 8.0(3)10 |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.1 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | 7.0 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 7.1 | Not |\n| Crafted TLS | | vulnerable |\n|Packet |----------+------------|\n| Vulnerability | 7.2 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.0 | 8.0(3)9 |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.1 | 8.1(1)1 |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | 7.0 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n| |----------+------------|\n| Instant | 7.1 | Not |\n| Messenger | | vulnerable |\n|Inspection |----------+------------|\n| Vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(4) |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.0 | 8.0(3)10 |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.1 | 8.1(1)2 |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | 7.0 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 7.1 | Not |\n| Vulnerability | | vulnerable |\n|Scan Denial |----------+------------|\n| of Service | 7.2 | 7.2(3)2 |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.0 | 8.0(2)17 |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.1 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | 7.0 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 7.1 | Not |\n| Control-plane | | vulnerable |\n|Access |----------+------------|\n| Control List | 7.2 | Not |\n| Vulnerability | | vulnerable |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.0 | 8.0(3)9 |\n| |----------+------------|\n| | 8.1 | Not |\n| | | vulnerable |\n+---------------------------------------+\n\nFixed PIX software can be downloaded from:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/pix?psrtdcat20e2\n\nFix ASA software can be downloaded from:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/asa?psrtdcat20e2\n\nWorkarounds\n===========\n\nThis Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities. \nThese vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are\nindependent of each other. \n\nCrafted TCP ACK Packet Vulnerability\n+-----------------------------------\n\nAs a workaround and best practice allow Telnet, SSH, and ASDM\nconnections from only trusted hosts in your network. \n\nAdditionally, filters that deny TCP ports 22, 23, 80, and 443 packets\nmay be deployed throughout the network as part of a transit ACL\n(tACL) policy for protection of traffic which enters the network at\ningress access points. This policy should be configured to protect\nthe network device where the filter is applied and other devices\nbehind it. Filters for packets using TCP ports 22, 23, 80, and 443\nshould also be deployed in front of vulnerable network devices so\nthat traffic is only allowed from trusted clients. \n\nAdditional information about tACLs is available in \"Transit Access\nControl Lists : Filtering at Your Edge\":\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801afc76.shtml\n\nCrafted TLS Packet Vulnerability\n+-------------------------------\n\nThere are no workarounds for this vulnerability. \n\nInstant Messenger Inspection Vulnerability\n\nThe only workaround for this vulnerability is to disable IM\ninspection on the security appliance. \n\nPort Scan Denial of Service Vulnerability\n+----------------------------------------\n\nThere are no workarounds for this vulnerability. \n\nControl-plane Access Control List Vulnerability\n+----------------------------------------------\n\nThere are no workarounds for this vulnerability. \n\nAdditional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco\ndevices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied\nMitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20080604-asa.shtml\n\nObtaining Fixed Software\n========================\n\nCisco has released free software updates that address these\nvulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should\nconsult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature\nset compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. \n\nCustomers may only install and expect support for the feature sets\nthey have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or\notherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound\nby the terms of Cisco\u0027s software license terms found at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, \nor as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml\n\nDo not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for\nsoftware upgrades. \n\nCustomers with Service Contracts\n+-------------------------------\n\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through\ntheir regular update channels. For most customers, this means that\nupgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. \n\nCustomers using Third Party Support Organizations\n+------------------------------------------------\n\nCustomers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through\nprior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,\nsuch as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers\nshould contact that support organization for guidance and assistance\nwith the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. \n\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific\ncustomer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected\nproducts and releases, customers should consult with their service\nprovider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or\nfix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it\nis deployed. \n\nCustomers without Service Contracts\n+----------------------------------\n\nCustomers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco\nservice contract, and customers who purchase through third-party\nvendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through\ntheir point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco\nTechnical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. \n\n * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)\n * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)\n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\n\nCustomers should have their product serial number available and be\nprepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to\na free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be\nrequested through the TAC. \n\nRefer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml\nfor additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone\nnumbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various\nlanguages. \n\nExploitation and Public Announcements\n=====================================\n\nThe Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious\nuse of the vulnerability described in this advisory. \n\nThese vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during\nthe troubleshooting of a technical support service request. \n\nStatus of this Notice: FINAL\n============================\n\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY\nKIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. \n\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that\nomits the distribution URL in the following section is an\nuncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain\nfactual errors. \n\nDistribution\n============\n\nThis advisory is posted on Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at :\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080604-asa.shtml\n\nIn addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice\nis clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the\nfollowing e-mail and Usenet news recipients. \n\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\n * first-teams@first.org\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\n * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com\n\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on\nmailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are\nencouraged to check the above URL for any updates. \n\nRevision History\n================\n\n+---------------------------------------+\n| Revision | | Initial |\n| 1.0 | 2008-June-04 | public |\n| | | release |\n+---------------------------------------+\n\nCisco Security Procedures\n=========================\n\nComplete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco\nproducts, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco, is available\non Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html\nThis includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco \nsecurity notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at \nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.8 (Darwin)\n\niEYEARECAAYFAkhGwG8ACgkQ86n/Gc8U/uAXugCgl3ldbkYO1vTiMqcWSf7NPfNO\noQgAn2DiTO9kCOY0anGos0sdjHU0jAai\n=30Rf\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n. \n\n4) An unspecified error can be exploited to cause an affected system\nto reload via specially crafted network traffic (e.g. \n\nSOLUTION:\nUpdate to fixed versions (please see the vendor\u0027s advisory for\ndetails). \n\nPROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY:\nReported by the vendor. \n\nORIGINAL ADVISORY:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisory09186a00809a8354.shtml\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nAbout:\nThis Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help\neverybody keeping their systems up to date against the latest\nvulnerabilities. \n\nSubscribe:\nhttp://secunia.com/secunia_security_advisories/\n\nDefinitions: (Criticality, Where etc.)\nhttp://secunia.com/about_secunia_advisories/\n\n\nPlease Note:\nSecunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by\nclicking the link. \nSecunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. \nSecunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only\nuse those supplied by the vendor. \n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nUnsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories\nhttp://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.