var-200902-0534
Vulnerability from variot
Cisco Application Networking Manager (ANM) before 2.0 uses a default MySQL root password, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary operating-system commands or change system files. Cisco Application Network Manager (ANM) and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities, including directory-traversal issues, unauthorized access via default credentials, and a privilege-escalation issue. A successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each other. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in unauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is available.
This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml.
Note: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple vulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module software, which is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml.
Affected Products
Vulnerable Products
The following are the products and versions affected by each vulnerability described within this advisory.
+---------------------------------------+ | Vulnerability | Product | Version | | | Affected | Affected | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | ACE | All | | Directory | Device | versions | | Permissions | Manager | prior to | | | | A3(2.1) | |---------------+----------+------------| | Invalid | | All | | Directory | ANM | versions | | Permissions | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Default User | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | MySQL Default | ANM | versions | | Credentials | | prior to | | | | ANM 2.0 | |---------------+----------+------------| | | | All | | Java Agent | | versions | | Privilege | ANM | prior to | | Escalation | | ANM 2.0 | | | | Update A | +---------------------------------------+
Determining ACE Device Manager Software Version +----------------------------------------------
The ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software.
To display the version of system software that is currently running on the device, use the "show version" command. The following example includes the output of the "show version" command on a Cisco ACE appliance running software version A3(2.1):
ACE-4710/Admin# show version
Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW)
TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac
Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by
other third parties and are used and distributed under license.
Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public
License. A copy of the license is available at
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html.
Software
loader: Version 0.95
system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1]
system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin
Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052
---
Determining ANM Software Version +-------------------------------
To display the version of ANM software that is currently installed, login to the ANM server and select the "About" keyword in the upper right. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0 Update A is indicated in the example output below.
Version: 2.0(0), Update: A
Build Number: 709
Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
The Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400 Series and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
ANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules or appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides a browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE appliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE appliance. The following details are provided for each vulnerability addressed in this security advisory.
Invalid Directory Permissions +----------------------------
Versions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version A3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory traversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow unauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system files. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to initially access either product.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs:
- CSCsv66063
- CSCsv70130
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615.
Default User Credentials +-----------------------
Versions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force credential changes during installation.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:
- CSCsu52724
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616.
MySQL Default Credentials +------------------------
ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password during installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when ANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely with default credential authentication and without end-user interaction. The ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL database are encrypted.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:
- CSCsu52632
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617.
Java Agent Privilege Escalation +------------------------------
ANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable vulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration files and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop services. Exploitation of this issue could result in system information disclosure or denial of services.
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:
- CSCsu73001
This vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618.
Vulnerability Scoring Details +----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
- ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063)
CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
- ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130)
CVSS Base Score - 9.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - Single Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
- ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724)
CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
- ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632)
CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
- ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001)
CVSS Base Score - 8.5 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Partial Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
Successful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid directory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to view or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host operating system files. Modification of some system files could result in a denial of service condition.
Exploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database default credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain unauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the default user credentials could result in a denial of service condition.
Successful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability may result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and services with the ability to modify. Modification of these services could result in a denial of service condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the following software table identifies the earliest possible software release that contains the fix listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the release which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory.
+---------------------------------------+ | | First | Recommended | | Vulnerability | Fixed | Release | | | Release | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ACE Device | | | | Manager | | | | Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) | | Directory | | | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 | | Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Permissions | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 | | User | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 | | Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A | | Credentials | | | |---------------+---------+-------------| | ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | | | Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 | | Privilege | A | Update A | | Escalation | | | +---------------------------------------+
ANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin
ACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin
Workarounds
While this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following vulnerability.
ANM Default User Credentials +---------------------------
The ANM user "admin" account password may be modified after installation by following the procedures documented for "Changing the Admin Password" located in the ANM User Guide at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216
Applied Mitigation Bulletin +--------------------------
Additional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
Acknowledgement to the National Australia Bank's Security Assurance team for the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory permissions vulnerability.
The remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-bulletins@lists.first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
- comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release | +------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +--------------------------------------------------------------------
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Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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Cisco Application Network Manager (ANM) and Application Control Engine (ACE) Device Manager are prone to multiple security vulnerabilities, including directory-traversal issues, unauthorized access via default credentials, and a privilege-escalation issue. \nA successful exploit may allow attackers to obtain sensitive information, view or modify files, cause denial-of-service conditions, or gain unauthorized access to the affected application. This may aid in the complete compromise of the underlying computer. These vulnerabilities are independent of each\nother. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in\nunauthorized system or host operating system access. A workaround that mitigates one of the issues is\navailable. \n\nThis advisory is posted at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml. \n\nNote: This advisory is being released simultaneously with a multiple\nvulnerabilities advisory impacting the ACE appliance and module\nsoftware, which is posted at\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-ace.shtml. \n\nAffected Products\n=================\n\nVulnerable Products\n- -------------------\n\nThe following are the products and versions affected by each\nvulnerability described within this advisory. \n\n+---------------------------------------+\n| Vulnerability | Product | Version |\n| | Affected | Affected |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| Invalid | ACE | All |\n| Directory | Device | versions |\n| Permissions | Manager | prior to |\n| | | A3(2.1) |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| Invalid | | All |\n| Directory | ANM | versions |\n| Permissions | | prior to |\n| | | ANM 2.0 |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | | All |\n| Default User | ANM | versions |\n| Credentials | | prior to |\n| | | ANM 2.0 |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | | All |\n| MySQL Default | ANM | versions |\n| Credentials | | prior to |\n| | | ANM 2.0 |\n|---------------+----------+------------|\n| | | All |\n| Java Agent | | versions |\n| Privilege | ANM | prior to |\n| Escalation | | ANM 2.0 |\n| | | Update A |\n+---------------------------------------+\n\nDetermining ACE Device Manager Software Version\n+----------------------------------------------\n\nThe ACE Device Manager is embedded with the ACE appliance software. \n\nTo display the version of system software that is currently running\non the device, use the \"show version\" command. The following example\nincludes the output of the \"show version\" command on a Cisco ACE\nappliance running software version A3(2.1):\n\n ACE-4710/Admin# show version\n Cisco Application Control Software (ACSW)\n TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac\n Copyright (c) 1985-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. \n The copyrights to certain works contained herein are owned by\n other third parties and are used and distributed under license. \n Some parts of this software are covered under the GNU Public\n License. A copy of the license is available at\n http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. \n\n Software\n loader: Version 0.95\n system: Version A3(2.1) [build 3.0(0)A3(2.1) adbuild_14:33:29-2008/11/19_/auto/adbu-rel4/rel_a3_2_1_throttle_build/REL_3_0_0_A3_2_1]\n system image file: (nd)/192.168.65.32/scimitar.bin\n Device Manager version 1.1 (0) 20081113:2052\n ---\n\nDetermining ANM Software Version\n+-------------------------------\n\nTo display the version of ANM software that is currently installed,\nlogin to the ANM server and select the \"About\" keyword in the upper\nright. An informational pop up window will be displayed. ANM Version 2.0\nUpdate A is indicated in the example output below. \n\n Version: 2.0(0), Update: A\n Build Number: 709\n Build Timestamp: 20081031:1226\n\nProducts Confirmed Not Vulnerable\n- ---------------------------------\n\nThe Cisco ACE XML Gateway, Cisco ACE GSS (Global Site Selector) 4400\nSeries and Cisco ACE Web Application Firewall are not affected by any of\nthese vulnerabilities. \n\nNo other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these\nvulnerabilities. \n\nDetails\n=======\n\nANM is a network management application that manages Cisco ACE modules\nor appliances. ANM is installed on customer provided servers with a Red\nHat Enterprise Linux operating system. The ACE Device Manager provides\na browser-based interface for configuring and managing a single ACE\nappliance. The ACE Device Manager resides in flash memory on the ACE\nappliance. The following details are provided for each\nvulnerability addressed in this security advisory. \n\nInvalid Directory Permissions\n+----------------------------\n\nVersions of the Cisco ACE Device Manager prior to software version\nA3(2.1) and Cisco ANM prior software version ANM 2.0 contain directory\ntraversal vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities could allow\nunauthorized access to ACE operating system and host operating system\nfiles. To exploit these vulnerabilities authentication is required to\ninitially access either product. \n\nThis vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs:\n\n * CSCsv66063\n * CSCsv70130\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and\nExposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0615. \n\nDefault User Credentials\n+-----------------------\n\nVersions of Cisco ANM prior to software version ANM 2.0 do not force\ncredential changes during installation. \n\nThis vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:\n\n * CSCsu52724\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and\nExposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0616. \n\nMySQL Default Credentials\n+------------------------\n\nANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 use a default MySQL root user password\nduring installation. The MySQL database is installed by default when\nANM is initially installed. This vulnerability can be exploited\nremotely with default credential authentication and without end-user\ninteraction. \nThe ACE appliance and module device configuration files in the MySQL\ndatabase are encrypted. \n\nThis vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:\n\n * CSCsu52632\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and\nExposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0617. \n\nJava Agent Privilege Escalation\n+------------------------------\n\nANM versions prior to ANM 2.0 Update A contain a remotely exploitable\nvulnerability that could allow an attacker to view configuration\nfiles and modify ANM processes including the capability to stop\nservices. Exploitation of this issue could result in system\ninformation disclosure or denial of services. \n\nThis vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug ID:\n\n * CSCsu73001\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned the Common Vulnerability and\nExposures (CVE) ID CVE-2009-0618. \n\nVulnerability Scoring Details\n+----------------------------\n\nCisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory\nbased on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS\nscoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS\nversion 2.0. \n\nCVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\nseverity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. \n\nCisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then\ncompute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of\nthe vulnerability in individual networks. \n\nCisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding\nCVSS at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\n\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the\nenvironmental impact for individual networks at:\n\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss\n\n* ACE Device Manager invalid directory permissions (CSCsv66063)\n\nCVSS Base Score - 9.0\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - Single\n Confidentiality Impact - Complete\n Integrity Impact - Complete\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 7.4\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n* ANM invalid directory permissions (CSCsv70130)\n\nCVSS Base Score - 9.0\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - Single\n Confidentiality Impact - Complete\n Integrity Impact - Complete\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 7.4\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n* ANM default user credentials during installation (CSCsu52724)\n\nCVSS Base Score - 10.0\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - Complete\n Integrity Impact - Complete\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 8.7\n Exploitability - High\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n* ANM embedded MySQL default credentials (CSCsu52632)\n\nCVSS Base Score - 10.0\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - Complete\n Integrity Impact - Complete\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 8.7\n Exploitability - High\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\n* ANM Java agent privilege escalation (CSCsu73001)\n\nCVSS Base Score - 8.5\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - Partial\n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 7.4\n Exploitability - High\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\nImpact\n======\n\nSuccessful exploitation of the ACE Device Manager and ANM invalid\ndirectory permission vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to\nview or modify the ACE Device Manager or ANM file system, including host\noperating system files. Modification of some system files could result\nin a denial of service condition. \n\nExploitation of the ANM default user credential and ANM MySQL database\ndefault credential vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to gain\nunauthorized system access. Modification of ANM settings with the\ndefault user credentials could result in a denial of service condition. \n\nSuccessful exploitation of the ANM privilege escalation vulnerability\nmay result in unauthorized remote access to system processes and\nservices with the ability to modify. Modification of these services\ncould result in a denial of service condition. \n\nSoftware Versions and Fixes\n===========================\n\nWhen considering software upgrades, also consult\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine\nexposure and a complete upgrade solution. \n\nIn all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the\ndevices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current\nhardware and software configurations will continue to be supported\nproperly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact\nthe Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted\nmaintenance provider for assistance. \n\nEach row of the following software table identifies the earliest\npossible software release that contains the fix listed in the \"First\nFixed Release\" column of the table. The \"Recommended Release\"\ncolumn indicates the release which have fixes for all the published\nvulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. \n\n+---------------------------------------+\n| | First | Recommended |\n| Vulnerability | Fixed | Release |\n| | Release | |\n|---------------+---------+-------------|\n| ACE Device | | |\n| Manager | | |\n| Invalid | A3(2.1) | A3(2.1) |\n| Directory | | |\n| Permissions | | |\n|---------------+---------+-------------|\n| ANM Invalid | | ANM 2.0 |\n| Directory | ANM 2.0 | Update A |\n| Permissions | | |\n|---------------+---------+-------------|\n| ANM Default | | ANM 2.0 |\n| User | ANM 2.0 | Update A |\n| Credentials | | |\n|---------------+---------+-------------|\n| ANM MySQL | | ANM 2.0 |\n| Default | ANM 2.0 | Update A |\n| Credentials | | |\n|---------------+---------+-------------|\n| ANM Java | ANM 2.0 | |\n| Agent | Update | ANM 2.0 |\n| Privilege | A | Update A |\n| Escalation | | |\n+---------------------------------------+\n\nANM 2.0 Update A can be downloaded from:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/netmgmt/anm/1.2/anm2.0-update-A.bin\n\nACE Device Manager A3(2.1) can be downloaded from:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/Software/Tablebuild/doftp.pl?ftpfile=/cisco/crypto/3DES/ans/DNSS/ace4710/c4710ace-mz.A3_2_1.bin\n\nWorkarounds\n===========\n\nWhile this Security Advisory describes multiple distinct\nvulnerabilities, a workaround exists for only the following\nvulnerability. \n\nANM Default User Credentials\n+---------------------------\n\nThe ANM user \"admin\" account password may be modified after installation\nby following the procedures documented for \"Changing the Admin Password\"\nlocated in the ANM User Guide at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/net_mgmt/application_networking_manager/2.0/user/guide/UG_admin.html#wp1053216\n\nApplied Mitigation Bulletin\n+--------------------------\n\nAdditional mitigation techniques that can be deployed on Cisco devices\nwithin the network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation\nBulletin companion document for this advisory:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090225-anm.shtml\n\nObtaining Fixed Software\n========================\n\nCisco has released free software updates that address these\nvulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult\ntheir maintenance provider or check the software for feature set\ncompatibility and known issues specific to their environment. \n\nCustomers may only install and expect support for the feature\nsets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing\nor otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be\nbound by the terms of Cisco\u0027s software license terms found at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html,\nor as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. \n\nDo not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software\nupgrades. \n\nCustomers with Service Contracts\n- --------------------------------\n\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their\nregular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades\nshould be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco\u0027s worldwide\nwebsite at http://www.cisco.com. \n\nCustomers using Third Party Support Organizations\n- -------------------------------------------------\n\nCustomers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior\nor existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such\nas Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should\ncontact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the\nappropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. \n\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific\ncustomer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected\nproducts and releases, customers should consult with their service\nprovider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix\nis the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is\ndeployed. \n\nCustomers without Service Contracts\n- -----------------------------------\n\nCustomers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service\ncontract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are\nunsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale\nshould acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance\nCenter (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. \n\n * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)\n * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)\n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\n\nCustomers should have their product serial number available and be\nprepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a\nfree upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested\nthrough the TAC. \n\nRefer to\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html\nfor additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone\nnumbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various\nlanguages. \n\nExploitation and Public Announcements\n=====================================\n\nThe Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious\nuse of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. \n\nAcknowledgement to the National Australia Bank\u0027s Security Assurance team\nfor the discovery and reporting of the ACE Device Manager directory\npermissions vulnerability. \n\nThe remaining vulnerabilities were identified through internal testing. \n\nStatus of this Notice: FINAL\n============================\n\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY\nANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. \n\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits\nthe distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,\nand may lack important information or contain factual errors. \n\nDistribution\n============\n\nThis advisory is posted on Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090225-anm.shtml\n\nIn addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is\nclear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following\ne-mail and Usenet news recipients. \n\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\n * first-bulletins@lists.first.org\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\n * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com\n\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing\nlists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged\nto check the above URL for any updates. \n\nRevision History\n================\n\n+------------------------------------------------------------+\n| Revision 1.0 | 2009 February 25 | Initial public release |\n+------------------------------------------------------------+\n\nCisco Security Procedures\n=========================\n\nComplete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in\nCisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco, is available\non Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. \nThis includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security\nnotices. All Cisco security advisories are available at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. \n\n+--------------------------------------------------------------------\nCopyright 2008 - 2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.