GHSA-J93G-RP6M-J32M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 17:10 – Updated: 2026-06-11 17:10
VLAI
Summary
Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS
Details

Summary

Arc registers Go's net/http/pprof handlers at /debug/pprof/* via app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go, and /debug/pprof is added to PublicPrefixes in cmd/arc/main.go. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication.

Impact

Any network-reachable caller (no token required) can:

  • Fetch /debug/pprof/heap — leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached *TokenInfo (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at auth.go:543).
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2 — leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths.
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N — pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request → minutes of server CPU).
  • Fetch /debug/pprof/trace — long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile.

No authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the seconds parameter.

Patches

https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1

Planned mitigation:

  1. Gate pprof registration behind an env var (ARC_DEBUG_PPROF=1) that defaults to off.
  2. When enabled, bind pprof to a separate localhost-only listener (127.0.0.1:6060 via dedicated net/http server) so it's never reachable from the public API port.
  3. Remove /debug/pprof from PublicPrefixes.
  4. Fix the HasPrefix bug where "/debug/pprofX" matches "/debug/pprof".

Workarounds

  • Block /debug/pprof* at a reverse proxy / load balancer in front of Arc.
  • Restrict Arc's API port to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
  • Patch the running build: comment out app.Use(pprof.New()) in internal/api/server.go and rebuild.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/basekick-labs/arc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260520170331-32a4091fb949"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48050"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T17:10:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nArc registers Go\u0027s `net/http/pprof` handlers at `/debug/pprof/*` via `app.Use(pprof.New())` in `internal/api/server.go`, and `/debug/pprof` is added to `PublicPrefixes` in `cmd/arc/main.go`. The auth middleware short-circuits before the token check on prefix match, so the endpoints are reachable without any authentication.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny network-reachable caller (no token required) can:\n\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/heap` \u2014 leaks in-memory state: live SQL strings, decoded msgpack records, decompressed request bodies, cached `*TokenInfo` (the auth cache keys on SHA-256 of the plaintext token at `auth.go:543`).\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=2` \u2014 leaks call stacks, identifying internal code paths.\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/profile?seconds=N` \u2014 pins a CPU core for arbitrary duration. Trivial DoS amplification (one short HTTP request \u2192 minutes of server CPU).\n- Fetch `/debug/pprof/trace` \u2014 long-duration execution trace, similar DoS profile.\n\nNo authentication, no rate limiting, no resource bound on the `seconds` parameter.\n\n### Patches\n\nhttps://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1\n\nPlanned mitigation:\n\n1. Gate pprof registration behind an env var (`ARC_DEBUG_PPROF=1`) that defaults to off.\n2. When enabled, bind pprof to a separate localhost-only listener (`127.0.0.1:6060` via dedicated `net/http` server) so it\u0027s never reachable from the public API port.\n3. Remove `/debug/pprof` from `PublicPrefixes`.\n4. Fix the `HasPrefix` bug where `\"/debug/pprofX\"` matches `\"/debug/pprof\"`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Block `/debug/pprof*` at a reverse proxy / load balancer in front of Arc.\n- Restrict Arc\u0027s API port to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.\n- Patch the running build: comment out `app.Use(pprof.New())` in `internal/api/server.go` and rebuild.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.",
  "id": "GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m",
  "modified": "2026-06-11T17:10:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-11T17:10:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-j93g-rp6m-j32m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/32a4091fb949f9cf060cdd804a07f6450dc426a8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/releases/tag/v26.06.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS"
}



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