CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
3442 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VPVJ-Q3RF-Q5FH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-17 06:30 – Updated: 2025-04-30 15:30BKG Professional NtripCaster 2.0.39 allows querying information over the UDP protocol without authentication. The NTRIP sourcetable is typically quite long (tens of kBs) and can be requested with a packet of only 30 bytes. This presents a vector that can be used for UDP amplification attacks. Normally, only authenticated streaming data will be provided over UDP and not the sourcetable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42982"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-17T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "BKG Professional NtripCaster 2.0.39 allows querying information over the UDP protocol without authentication. The NTRIP sourcetable is typically quite long (tens of kBs) and can be requested with a packet of only 30 bytes. This presents a vector that can be used for UDP amplification attacks. Normally, only authenticated streaming data will be provided over UDP and not the sourcetable.",
"id": "GHSA-vpvj-q3rf-q5fh",
"modified": "2025-04-30T15:30:38Z",
"published": "2022-11-17T06:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42982"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cve.mahi.be/bkg_ntrip_udp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://igs.bkg.bund.de/ntrip/bkgcaster"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VPVQ-Q686-FM5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-18 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:34A CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability exists that could cause Denial-of-Service when accessed by an unauthenticated user on the Schneider UPS Monitor service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-18T21:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nA CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability exists that could cause\nDenial-of-Service when accessed by an unauthenticated user on the Schneider UPS Monitor\nservice. \n\n \n\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-vpvq-q686-fm5g",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:34:44Z",
"published": "2023-04-18T21:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29413"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2023-101-04\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2023-101-04.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VPWC-V33Q-MQ89
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-06 18:00 – Updated: 2026-06-08 19:50Strawberry up until version 0.312.3 is vulnerable to an authentication bypass on WebSocket subscription endpoints. The legacy graphql-ws subprotocol handler does not verify that a connection_init handshake has been completed before processing start (subscription) messages. This allows a remote attacker to skip the on_ws_connect authentication hook entirely by connecting with the graphql-ws subprotocol and sending a start message directly, without ever sending connection_init.
The graphql-transport-ws subprotocol handler is not affected, as it correctly gates subscription operations on a connection_acknowledged flag. However, both subprotocols are enabled by default in all framework integrations that support websockets, and the subprotocol is selected by the client via the Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header.
Any application relying on on_ws_connect for authentication or authorization is affected.
Mitigation: Upgrade to the patched version, or explicitly disable the legacy graphql-ws subprotocol by setting subscription_protocols=[GRAPHQL_TRANSPORT_WS_PROTOCOL] on your GraphQL view/router.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.312.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "strawberry-graphql"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.312.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35523"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-06T18:00:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T17:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Strawberry up until version `0.312.3` is vulnerable to an authentication bypass on WebSocket subscription endpoints. The legacy graphql-ws subprotocol handler does not verify that a `connection_init` handshake has been completed before processing start (subscription) messages. This allows a remote attacker to skip the `on_ws_connect` authentication hook entirely by connecting with the graphql-ws subprotocol and sending a start message directly, without ever sending `connection_init`.\n\nThe graphql-transport-ws subprotocol handler is not affected, as it correctly gates subscription operations on a connection_acknowledged flag. However, both subprotocols are enabled by default in all framework integrations that support websockets, and the subprotocol is selected by the client via the Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header.\n\nAny application relying on `on_ws_connect` for authentication or authorization is affected.\n\nMitigation: Upgrade to the patched version, or explicitly disable the legacy graphql-ws subprotocol by setting `subscription_protocols=[GRAPHQL_TRANSPORT_WS_PROTOCOL]` on your GraphQL view/router.",
"id": "GHSA-vpwc-v33q-mq89",
"modified": "2026-06-08T19:50:52Z",
"published": "2026-04-06T18:00:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strawberry-graphql/strawberry/security/advisories/GHSA-vpwc-v33q-mq89"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strawberry-graphql/strawberry/commit/0977a4e6b41b7cfe3e9d8ba84a43458a2b0c54c2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/strawberry-graphql/PYSEC-2026-133.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/strawberry-graphql/strawberry"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strawberry-graphql/strawberry/releases/tag/0.312.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "strawberry-graphql: Authentication bypass via legacy graphql-ws WebSocket subprotocol"
}
GHSA-VQ55-X4QG-PQGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-13 21:31Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in ABB AWIN GW100 rev.2, ABB AWIN GW120.This issue affects AWIN GW100 rev.2: 2.0-0, 2.0-1; AWIN GW120: 1.2-0, 1.2-1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13778"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-13T19:53:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in ABB AWIN GW100 rev.2, ABB AWIN GW120.This issue affects AWIN GW100 rev.2: 2.0-0, 2.0-1; AWIN GW120: 1.2-0, 1.2-1.",
"id": "GHSA-vq55-x4qg-pqgj",
"modified": "2026-03-13T21:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T21:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=4JNO000329\u0026LanguageCode=en\u0026DocumentPartId=\u0026Action=Launch"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRXG-GM77-7Q5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 16:46 – Updated: 2026-07-09 21:06HTTP transports expose unauthenticated PowerShell control with wildcard CORS
There is an issue in the SSE and Streamable HTTP transport modes. The default stdio mode is not affected, but the documented HTTP modes expose the MCP control plane without authentication and add wildcard CORS handling around it. The same server exposes the PowerShell tool, which executes caller-controlled commands as the Windows user running Windows-MCP.
Relevant source:
src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:37-42:_http_middleware()installsOptionsMiddlewareandCORSMiddlewarewithallow_origins=["*"],allow_methods=["*"], andallow_headers=["*"].src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:45-72:OptionsMiddlewareresponds to everyOPTIONSrequest with wildcardAccess-Control-Allow-Origin,Access-Control-Allow-Methods, andAccess-Control-Allow-Headers.src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:75-113:_build_mcp()constructsFastMCP(name="windows-mcp", ...)without an auth provider.src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151: bothsseandstreamable-httpcallmcp.run(...)with that middleware and no application-level auth/security settings.src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24: registers thePowerShelltool and passes caller-controlledcommandtoPowerShellExecutor.execute_command.src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204: executes that command through PowerShell-EncodedCommand.README.md:421-424and433-434: documents the HTTP transports and describes Streamable HTTP as network-accessible HTTP streaming.
In an affected configuration, a client that can reach http://localhost:8000/mcp can initialize an MCP session and invoke tools/call for PowerShell. The issue is not just that PowerShell is powerful; it is that the HTTP control plane around that tool is unauthenticated and configured with wildcard CORS.
Root cause
The HTTP transport entry points compose two independent design decisions that fail-open together: the FastMCP instance is built without any authentication provider, and the middleware stack installs blanket wildcard CORS (allow_origins=*, allow_methods=*, allow_headers=*) that explicitly permits cross-origin browsers and any non-browser HTTP client to reach the MCP control plane. Either one alone would be a partial defense; together, the unauthenticated control plane is reachable from arbitrary origins, with no host-validation, no token check, and no DNS-rebinding mitigation between an attacker's request and the registered PowerShell tool. The structural fix is to require an auth provider (token, mTLS, or local-only secret handshake) on the HTTP transports and to scope CORS to a specific operator-configured allowlist rather than applying wildcard policy to a tool surface that includes shell execution.
Auth boundary violated
Boundary: Network trust domain (an unauthenticated remote/cross-origin caller is treated as if it were a trusted local MCP client with rights to invoke privileged shell tools).
Respected at: stdio transport path (src/windows_mcp/__main__.py stdio branch) — the default transport relies on parent-process pipe ownership for caller identity, which is a real OS-level boundary.
Violated at: src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151 (SSE and Streamable HTTP branches call mcp.run(...) with the wildcard-CORS middleware installed at :37-42 and no auth provider attached at :75-113). The boundary is silently dropped: there is no code path between the inbound HTTP request and tools/call for PowerShell (src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24 → src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204) that asserts caller identity or origin.
Minimal protocol proof from a matching FastMCP 3.2.4 harness with the same middleware posture:
$ curl -i -s -X OPTIONS 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp/' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
-H 'Access-Control-Request-Method: POST' \
-H 'Access-Control-Request-Headers: content-type,mcp-session-id'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: *
access-control-allow-headers: *
$ curl -i -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
--data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"evil-page","version":"1"}}}'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/event-stream
mcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043
access-control-allow-origin: *
$ curl -i -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
-H 'Mcp-Session-Id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
--data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"PowerShell","arguments":{"command":"calc.exe","timeout":30}}}'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/event-stream
mcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043
access-control-allow-origin: *
event: message
data: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"executed: calc.exe"}],"structuredContent":{"result":"executed: calc.exe"},"isError":false}}
Impact
For affected HTTP-transport deployments, successful exploitation gives arbitrary PowerShell execution as the user running Windows-MCP. There is an important browser caveat: current Chrome/Edge Local Network Access / Private Network Access behavior may block or prompt for public-site-to-localhost requests because this middleware does not return Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true. The exposure still applies to same-origin/private-origin contexts, browsers or apps without that enforcement, user-approved local-network prompts, browser extensions, and non-browser HTTP clients.
Suggested fix: require authentication for HTTP transports, remove wildcard CORS from MCP control endpoints, restrict origins to explicit trusted clients, and enable/propagate transport security settings such as host validation. If unauthenticated HTTP is retained for development, I would make it an explicit unsafe flag and add regression tests for cross-origin OPTIONS, initialize, and tools/call.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "windows-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48989"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T16:46:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T22:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HTTP transports expose unauthenticated PowerShell control with wildcard CORS\n\nThere is an issue in the SSE and Streamable HTTP transport modes. The default stdio mode is not affected, but the documented HTTP modes expose the MCP control plane without authentication and add wildcard CORS handling around it. The same server exposes the `PowerShell` tool, which executes caller-controlled commands as the Windows user running Windows-MCP.\n\nRelevant source:\n\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:37-42`: `_http_middleware()` installs `OptionsMiddleware` and `CORSMiddleware` with `allow_origins=[\"*\"]`, `allow_methods=[\"*\"]`, and `allow_headers=[\"*\"]`.\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:45-72`: `OptionsMiddleware` responds to every `OPTIONS` request with wildcard `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`, `Access-Control-Allow-Methods`, and `Access-Control-Allow-Headers`.\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:75-113`: `_build_mcp()` constructs `FastMCP(name=\"windows-mcp\", ...)` without an auth provider.\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151`: both `sse` and `streamable-http` call `mcp.run(...)` with that middleware and no application-level auth/security settings.\n- `src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24`: registers the `PowerShell` tool and passes caller-controlled `command` to `PowerShellExecutor.execute_command`.\n- `src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204`: executes that command through PowerShell `-EncodedCommand`.\n- `README.md:421-424` and `433-434`: documents the HTTP transports and describes Streamable HTTP as network-accessible HTTP streaming.\n\nIn an affected configuration, a client that can reach `http://localhost:8000/mcp` can initialize an MCP session and invoke `tools/call` for `PowerShell`. The issue is not just that PowerShell is powerful; it is that the HTTP control plane around that tool is unauthenticated and configured with wildcard CORS.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe HTTP transport entry points compose two independent design decisions that fail-open together: the FastMCP instance is built without any authentication provider, and the middleware stack installs blanket wildcard CORS (`allow_origins=*`, `allow_methods=*`, `allow_headers=*`) that explicitly permits cross-origin browsers and any non-browser HTTP client to reach the MCP control plane. Either one alone would be a partial defense; together, the unauthenticated control plane is reachable from arbitrary origins, with no host-validation, no token check, and no DNS-rebinding mitigation between an attacker\u0027s request and the registered `PowerShell` tool. The structural fix is to require an auth provider (token, mTLS, or local-only secret handshake) on the HTTP transports and to scope CORS to a specific operator-configured allowlist rather than applying wildcard policy to a tool surface that includes shell execution.\n\n## Auth boundary violated\n\n**Boundary:** Network trust domain (an unauthenticated remote/cross-origin caller is treated as if it were a trusted local MCP client with rights to invoke privileged shell tools).\n\n**Respected at:** stdio transport path (`src/windows_mcp/__main__.py` stdio branch) \u2014 the default transport relies on parent-process pipe ownership for caller identity, which is a real OS-level boundary.\n\n**Violated at:** `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151` (SSE and Streamable HTTP branches call `mcp.run(...)` with the wildcard-CORS middleware installed at `:37-42` and no auth provider attached at `:75-113`). The boundary is silently dropped: there is no code path between the inbound HTTP request and `tools/call` for `PowerShell` (`src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24` \u2192 `src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204`) that asserts caller identity or origin.\n\nMinimal protocol proof from a matching FastMCP 3.2.4 harness with the same middleware posture:\n\n```text\n$ curl -i -s -X OPTIONS \u0027http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp/\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Origin: https://attacker.example\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Access-Control-Request-Method: POST\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Access-Control-Request-Headers: content-type,mcp-session-id\u0027\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\naccess-control-allow-methods: *\naccess-control-allow-headers: *\n\n$ curl -i -s \u0027http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Origin: https://attacker.example\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"evil-page\",\"version\":\"1\"}}}\u0027\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: text/event-stream\nmcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\n\n$ curl -i -s \u0027http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Origin: https://attacker.example\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Mcp-Session-Id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"PowerShell\",\"arguments\":{\"command\":\"calc.exe\",\"timeout\":30}}}\u0027\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: text/event-stream\nmcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\n\nevent: message\ndata: {\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"result\":{\"content\":[{\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"executed: calc.exe\"}],\"structuredContent\":{\"result\":\"executed: calc.exe\"},\"isError\":false}}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nFor affected HTTP-transport deployments, successful exploitation gives arbitrary PowerShell execution as the user running Windows-MCP. There is an important browser caveat: current Chrome/Edge Local Network Access / Private Network Access behavior may block or prompt for public-site-to-localhost requests because this middleware does not return `Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true`. The exposure still applies to same-origin/private-origin contexts, browsers or apps without that enforcement, user-approved local-network prompts, browser extensions, and non-browser HTTP clients.\n\nSuggested fix: require authentication for HTTP transports, remove wildcard CORS from MCP control endpoints, restrict origins to explicit trusted clients, and enable/propagate transport security settings such as host validation. If unauthenticated HTTP is retained for development, I would make it an explicit unsafe flag and add regression tests for cross-origin `OPTIONS`, `initialize`, and `tools/call`.",
"id": "GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g",
"modified": "2026-07-09T21:06:20Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T16:46:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/CursorTouch/Windows-MCP/security/advisories/GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48989"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/CursorTouch/Windows-MCP"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/CursorTouch/Windows-MCP/releases/tag/v0.7.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Windows-MCP: HTTP transports expose unauthenticated PowerShell control with wildcard CORS"
}
GHSA-VV3C-V9JV-69WX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 21:32NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause missing authentication for a critical function. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24259"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T21:16:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause missing authentication for a critical function. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-vv3c-v9jv-69wx",
"modified": "2026-07-14T21:32:21Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T21:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-24259"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV62-XM44-43PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-28 00:00Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Nexus Dashboard could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands, read or upload container image files, or perform a cross-site request forgery attack. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-21T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Nexus Dashboard could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands, read or upload container image files, or perform a cross-site request forgery attack. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-vv62-xm44-43pw",
"modified": "2022-07-28T00:00:41Z",
"published": "2022-07-22T00:00:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ndb-mhcvuln-vpsBPJ9y"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VVCR-J24Q-WC29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 03:31 – Updated: 2026-02-20 03:31Sensitive data disclosure and manipulation due to missing authentication. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud Agent (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39870, Acronis Cyber Protect 16 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39938, Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 41800.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30410"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T01:15:59Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Sensitive data disclosure and manipulation due to missing authentication. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud Agent (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39870, Acronis Cyber Protect 16 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39938, Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 41800.",
"id": "GHSA-vvcr-j24q-wc29",
"modified": "2026-02-20T03:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-02-20T03:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security-advisory.acronis.com/advisories/SEC-8641"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VVFF-6WRR-4G7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-24 00:00 – Updated: 2023-02-08 22:41An authorization flaw was found in Foreman Ansible. An authenticated attacker with certain permissions to create and run Ansible jobs can access hosts through job templates. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "foreman_ansible"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3589"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-29T20:01:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-23T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An authorization flaw was found in Foreman Ansible. An authenticated attacker with certain permissions to create and run Ansible jobs can access hosts through job templates. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.",
"id": "GHSA-vvff-6wrr-4g7q",
"modified": "2023-02-08T22:41:33Z",
"published": "2022-03-24T00:00:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theforeman/foreman_ansible/commit/a5e0827bc3ec6c8ab82f968907857a15646305d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-3589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1969265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/foreman_ansible/CVE-2021-3589.yml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theforeman/foreman_ansible"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Foreman Ansible"
}
GHSA-VVW2-CWRQ-MPRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-02 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-02 19:00Insufficient validation of untrusted input in VPN in Google Chrome on ChromeOS prior to 106.0.5249.62 allowed a local attacker to bypass managed device restrictions via physical access to the device. (Chrome security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-3312"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-01T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient validation of untrusted input in VPN in Google Chrome on ChromeOS prior to 106.0.5249.62 allowed a local attacker to bypass managed device restrictions via physical access to the device. (Chrome security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-vvw2-cwrq-mprr",
"modified": "2022-11-02T19:00:24Z",
"published": "2022-11-02T12:00:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3312"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_27.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crbug.com/1303306"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.