Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

3406 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-3VHQ-CJ93-8R2V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-19 21:32 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in J.N. Breetvelt a.K.A. OpaJaap WP Photo Album Plus.This issue affects WP Photo Album Plus: from n/a through 8.5.02.005.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-49812"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-19T21:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in J.N. Breetvelt a.K.A. OpaJaap WP Photo Album Plus.This issue affects WP Photo Album Plus: from n/a through 8.5.02.005.",
  "id": "GHSA-3vhq-cj93-8r2v",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:26Z",
  "published": "2023-12-19T21:32:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-photo-album-plus/wordpress-wp-photo-album-plus-plugin-8-5-02-005-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3WCX-PX3J-79F4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-07 09:31
VLAI
Details

The Booking for Appointments and Events Calendar – Amelia plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.3. This is due to the UpdateProviderCommandHandler failing to validate changes to the externalId field when a Provider (Employee) user updates their own profile. The externalId maps directly to a WordPress user ID and is passed to wp_set_password() and wp_update_user() without authorization checks. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Provider-level (Employee) access and above, to take over any WordPress account — including Administrator — by injecting an arbitrary externalId value when updating their own provider profile.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5465"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T07:16:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Booking for Appointments and Events Calendar \u2013 Amelia plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.3. This is due to the `UpdateProviderCommandHandler` failing to validate changes to the `externalId` field when a Provider (Employee) user updates their own profile. The `externalId` maps directly to a WordPress user ID and is passed to `wp_set_password()` and `wp_update_user()` without authorization checks. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Provider-level (Employee) access and above, to take over any WordPress account \u2014 including Administrator \u2014 by injecting an arbitrary `externalId` value when updating their own provider profile.",
  "id": "GHSA-3wcx-px3j-79f4",
  "modified": "2026-04-07T09:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T09:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5465"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ameliabooking/tags/2.1.3/src/Application/Commands/User/Provider/UpdateProviderCommandHandler.php#L146"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ameliabooking/tags/2.1.3/src/Application/Commands/User/Provider/UpdateProviderCommandHandler.php#L219"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ameliabooking/tags/2.1.3/src/Application/Commands/User/Provider/UpdateProviderCommandHandler.php#L239"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ameliabooking/tags/2.1.3/src/Application/Controller/User/Provider/UpdateProviderController.php#L30"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3499608/ameliabooking/trunk/src/Application/Commands/User/Provider/UpdateProviderCommandHandler.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a4204099-1065-4167-8b42-3da25945236c?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3WG7-R7Q5-R2JF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-16 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-21 17:12
VLAI
Summary
Indico Insecure Access
Details

A Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in Indico v3.2.9 allows attackers to access sensitive information via sending a crafted POST request to the component /api/principals.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "indico"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.9"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-50633"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-201",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-16T20:09:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-16T18:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in Indico v3.2.9 allows attackers to access sensitive information via sending a crafted POST request to the component /api/principals.",
  "id": "GHSA-3wg7-r7q5-r2jf",
  "modified": "2025-01-21T17:12:43Z",
  "published": "2025-01-16T18:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cetinpy/CVE-2024-50633/issues/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cetinpy/CVE-2024-50633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/indico/indico"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Indico Insecure Access"
}

GHSA-3WR4-2WWF-JJXW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-29 12:31
VLAI
Details

The MasterStudy LMS WordPress Plugin – for Online Courses and Education plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.14. This is due to the stm_lms_delete_cover() function lacking ownership validation on the file_id parameter before passing it to wp_delete_attachment(). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Instructor-level access and above, to delete arbitrary attachments belonging to any user by enumerating sequential attachment IDs.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5060"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T11:16:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The MasterStudy LMS WordPress Plugin \u2013 for Online Courses and Education plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.14. This is due to the `stm_lms_delete_cover()` function lacking ownership validation on the `file_id` parameter before passing it to `wp_delete_attachment()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Instructor-level access and above, to delete arbitrary attachments belonging to any user by enumerating sequential attachment IDs.",
  "id": "GHSA-3wr4-2wwf-jjxw",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T12:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T12:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5060"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/masterstudy-lms-learning-management-system/tags/3.7.14/_core/lms/classes/user.php#L2093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/masterstudy-lms-learning-management-system/tags/3.7.14/_core/lms/classes/user.php#L2107"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3501788%40masterstudy-lms-learning-management-system%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3496678%40masterstudy-lms-learning-management-system%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/de11c9ad-0b9f-4934-8dc9-dc324d77d702?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3WXG-F3WJ-3X8P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-05 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in WooCommerce WooCommerce Stripe Payment Gateway.This issue affects WooCommerce Stripe Payment Gateway: from n/a through 7.6.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-51502"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-05T08:15:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in WooCommerce WooCommerce Stripe Payment Gateway.This issue affects WooCommerce Stripe Payment Gateway: from n/a through 7.6.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-3wxg-f3wj-3x8p",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:42Z",
  "published": "2024-01-05T09:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51502"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/woocommerce-gateway-stripe/wordpress-woocommerce-stripe-gateway-plugin-7-6-1-unauthenticated-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3X79-282M-JH8F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-16 06:30 – Updated: 2026-01-16 06:30
VLAI
Details

The Shield: Blocks Bots, Protects Users, and Prevents Security Breaches plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 21.0.9 via the MfaGoogleAuthToggle class due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to disable Google Authenticator for any user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15370"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-16T05:16:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Shield: Blocks Bots, Protects Users, and Prevents Security Breaches plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 21.0.9 via the MfaGoogleAuthToggle class due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to disable Google Authenticator for any user.",
  "id": "GHSA-3x79-282m-jh8f",
  "modified": "2026-01-16T06:30:15Z",
  "published": "2026-01-16T06:30:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-simple-firewall/tags/21.0.8/src/lib/src/ActionRouter/Actions/MfaGoogleAuthToggle.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3438647/wp-simple-firewall"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d777014a-5397-4062-af39-7ea86589a0d0?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3XW3-W36P-RJCW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33
VLAI
Details

The Admin and Customer Messages After Order for WooCommerce: OrderConvo plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 14. This is due to a flawed permission check in the REST API permission callback that returns true when no nonce is provided. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to impersonate any WordPress user and inject arbitrary messages into any WooCommerce order conversation by directly calling the REST endpoint with controlled user_id, order_id, and context parameters.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13452"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T08:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Admin and Customer Messages After Order for WooCommerce: OrderConvo plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 14. This is due to a flawed permission check in the REST API permission callback that returns true when no nonce is provided. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to impersonate any WordPress user and inject arbitrary messages into any WooCommerce order conversation by directly calling the REST endpoint with controlled user_id, order_id, and context parameters.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xw3-w36p-rjcw",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:59Z",
  "published": "2025-11-25T09:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13452"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/admin-and-client-message-after-order-for-woocommerce/tags/14/includes/wprest.class.php#L113"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/admin-and-client-message-after-order-for-woocommerce/tags/14/includes/wprest.class.php#L56"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/admin-and-client-message-after-order-for-woocommerce/trunk/includes/wprest.class.php#L113"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/admin-and-client-message-after-order-for-woocommerce/trunk/includes/wprest.class.php#L56"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3439999"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2c1dd87c-cc28-43b3-8378-4583dc6de195?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3XX2-MQJM-HG9X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 22:49 – Updated: 2026-04-16 22:49
VLAI
Summary
Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API key IDOR in `/agents/:id/keys` routes allows full victim-company compromise
Details

Summary

The GET, POST, and DELETE handlers under /agents/:id/keys in the Paperclip control-plane API only call assertBoard(req), which verifies that the caller has a board-type session but does not verify that the caller has access to the company owning the target agent. A board user whose membership is limited to Company A can therefore list, create, or revoke agent API keys for any agent in Company B by supplying the victim agent's UUID in the URL path. The POST handler returns the newly-minted token in cleartext, which authenticates subsequent requests as {type:"agent", companyId:<CompanyB>}, giving the attacker full agent-level access inside the victim tenant — a complete cross-tenant compromise.

Details

The three vulnerable routes are defined in server/src/routes/agents.ts:2050-2087:

router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                       // <-- only checks actor.type === "board"
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
  res.json(keys);
});

router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                       // <-- same
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
  // ... activity log ...
  res.status(201).json(key);              // returns cleartext `token`
});

router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                       // <-- same
  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
  const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
  if (!revoked) { res.status(404).json({ error: "Key not found" }); return; }
  res.json({ ok: true });
});

assertBoard in server/src/routes/authz.ts:4-8 is intentionally narrow:

export function assertBoard(req: Request) {
  if (req.actor.type !== "board") {
    throw forbidden("Board access required");
  }
}

It does not consult req.actor.companyIds or req.actor.isInstanceAdmin. Company-scoping is handled by a separate helper, assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId) (same file, lines 18-31), which the key-management routes never call.

The service layer is also unauthenticated. In server/src/services/agents.ts:580-629:

createApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) => {
  const existing = await getById(id);
  if (!existing) throw notFound("Agent not found");
  // ... status checks only ...
  const token = createToken();
  const keyHash = hashToken(token);
  const created = await db
    .insert(agentApiKeys)
    .values({
      agentId: id,
      companyId: existing.companyId,       // <-- copied from the victim agent
      name,
      keyHash,
    })
    .returning()
    .then((rows) => rows[0]);
  return { id: created.id, name: created.name, token, createdAt: created.createdAt };
},

listKeys: (id: string) => db.select({ ... }).from(agentApiKeys).where(eq(agentApiKeys.agentId, id)),

revokeKey: async (keyId: string) => {
  const rows = await db.update(agentApiKeys).set({ revokedAt: new Date() }).where(eq(agentApiKeys.id, keyId)).returning();
  return rows[0] ?? null;
},

Neither the agent id on POST/GET nor the key id on DELETE is cross-checked against the caller's company membership.

The returned token becomes a full-fledged agent actor in server/src/middleware/auth.ts:151-169:

req.actor = {
  type: "agent",
  agentId: key.agentId,
  companyId: key.companyId,      // <-- victim's company
  keyId: key.id,
  runId: runIdHeader || undefined,
  source: "agent_key",
};

assertCompanyAccess (lines 22-30 of authz.ts) only rejects an agent actor when req.actor.companyId !== <target-companyId>. Because the token the attacker just minted carries the victim's companyId, it sails through every company-access check in Company B — every endpoint that an agent in Company B is authorized to hit.

No router-level mitigation exists: api.use(agentRoutes(db)) in server/src/app.ts:155 mounts the router with only boardMutationGuard (which enforces read-only for some board sessions, not tenancy). The adjacent POST /agents/:id/wakeup route at line 2089 and POST /agents/:id/heartbeat/invoke at line 2139 correctly load the agent and call assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId) — the key-management routes simply forgot this check. Commit ac664df8 ("fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes") hardened several other routes in this same file family but did not touch the three key routes.

Agent UUIDs are routinely exposed to any authenticated board user through org-chart rendering, issue listings, heartbeat/activity payloads, and public references, so the "unguessable id" is not a practical barrier; further, the DELETE path only requires a keyId, which is returned by the equally-broken GET /agents/:id/keys for any target agent.

PoC

Preconditions: attacker is a board user with membership only in Company A. They know (or learn via the listable agent surfaces) a UUID of an agent in Company B.

Step 1 — Authenticate as the Company-A board user and mint a key for a Company-B agent:

curl -sS -X POST https://target.example/api/agents/<VICTIM_COMPANY_B_AGENT_ID>/keys \
  -H 'Cookie: <attacker-board-session>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"pwn"}'

Expected (and observed) response:

{"id":"<new-key-id>","name":"pwn","token":"<CLEARTEXT_AGENT_TOKEN>","createdAt":"2026-04-10T..."}

The server never consulted the attacker's companyIds — only the URL path — and returns the cleartext token whose companyId column is set to Company B's id.

Step 2 — Use the stolen agent token as a first-class agent principal in Company B:

curl -sS https://target.example/api/agents/<VICTIM_COMPANY_B_AGENT_ID> \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <CLEARTEXT_AGENT_TOKEN>'

middleware/auth.ts sets req.actor = {type:"agent", agentId:<victim>, companyId:<CompanyB>, ...}. Every route that does assertCompanyAccess(req, <CompanyB>) now passes.

Step 3 — The listing and revocation routes are broken in the same way:

# Enumerate every key on a victim agent (learn keyIds):
curl -sS https://target.example/api/agents/<VICTIM_COMPANY_B_AGENT_ID>/keys \
  -H 'Cookie: <attacker-board-session>'

# Revoke a legitimate Company-B key, denying service to the real operator:
curl -sS -X DELETE https://target.example/api/agents/<ANY_AGENT_ID>/keys/<VICTIM_KEY_ID> \
  -H 'Cookie: <attacker-board-session>'

revokeKey only matches on keyId (server/src/services/agents.ts:622-629), so even the agentId in the URL is decorative — the keyId alone is the authority.

Impact

  • Full cross-tenant compromise. Any board-authenticated user can mint agent API keys inside any other company in the same instance and then act as that agent — executing the workflows, reading the data, and calling every endpoint that agent is authorized for inside the victim tenant.
  • Listing leak. Key metadata (ids, names, lastUsedAt, revokedAt) for every agent in every tenant is readable by any board user.
  • Cross-tenant denial of service. The same primitive revokes legitimate agent keys in other companies by keyId.
  • Scope change. The vulnerability is in Company A's scoping checks, but the impact is complete confidentiality/integrity/availability loss within Company B's tenant — a classic scope-change cross-tenant boundary breach.
  • The attacker needs only the most minimal valid account on the instance (any company membership with board-type session) and a victim agent UUID, which is routinely exposed through agent listings, issues, heartbeats, and activity feeds.

Recommended Fix

Require explicit company-access checks on all three routes before touching the service layer. For POST/GET, load the agent first and authorize against agent.companyId. For DELETE, load the key row first (or join through it) and authorize against key.companyId to avoid leaking via keyId guessing.

router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const agent = await svc.getById(id);
  if (!agent) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Agent not found" });
    return;
  }
  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);
  res.json(await svc.listKeys(id));
});

router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const agent = await svc.getById(id);
  if (!agent) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Agent not found" });
    return;
  }
  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);
  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
  await logActivity(db, { /* ... */ });
  res.status(201).json(key);
});

router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);
  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
  // Add a getKeyById(keyId) helper that returns { id, agentId, companyId }.
  const keyRow = await svc.getKeyById(keyId);
  if (!keyRow) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Key not found" });
    return;
  }
  assertCompanyAccess(req, keyRow.companyId);
  await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
  res.json({ ok: true });
});

Defense-in-depth: push the authorization down into the service layer as well, so any future caller (e.g. a new route, a job, or an RPC) is unable to create, list, or revoke an agent key without proving company access. Add regression tests mirroring the ones added in ac664df8 for the sibling routes to pin the behavior.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@paperclipai/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.416.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:49:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `GET`, `POST`, and `DELETE` handlers under `/agents/:id/keys` in the Paperclip control-plane API only call `assertBoard(req)`, which verifies that the caller has a board-type session but does not verify that the caller has access to the company owning the target agent. A board user whose membership is limited to Company A can therefore list, create, or revoke agent API keys for any agent in Company B by supplying the victim agent\u0027s UUID in the URL path. The `POST` handler returns the newly-minted token in cleartext, which authenticates subsequent requests as `{type:\"agent\", companyId:\u003cCompanyB\u003e}`, giving the attacker full agent-level access inside the victim tenant \u2014 a complete cross-tenant compromise.\n\n## Details\n\nThe three vulnerable routes are defined in `server/src/routes/agents.ts:2050-2087`:\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                       // \u003c-- only checks actor.type === \"board\"\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);\n  res.json(keys);\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                       // \u003c-- same\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n  // ... activity log ...\n  res.status(201).json(key);              // returns cleartext `token`\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                       // \u003c-- same\n  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n  const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n  if (!revoked) { res.status(404).json({ error: \"Key not found\" }); return; }\n  res.json({ ok: true });\n});\n```\n\n`assertBoard` in `server/src/routes/authz.ts:4-8` is intentionally narrow:\n\n```ts\nexport function assertBoard(req: Request) {\n  if (req.actor.type !== \"board\") {\n    throw forbidden(\"Board access required\");\n  }\n}\n```\n\nIt does **not** consult `req.actor.companyIds` or `req.actor.isInstanceAdmin`. Company-scoping is handled by a separate helper, `assertCompanyAccess(req, companyId)` (same file, lines 18-31), which the key-management routes never call.\n\nThe service layer is also unauthenticated. In `server/src/services/agents.ts:580-629`:\n\n```ts\ncreateApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) =\u003e {\n  const existing = await getById(id);\n  if (!existing) throw notFound(\"Agent not found\");\n  // ... status checks only ...\n  const token = createToken();\n  const keyHash = hashToken(token);\n  const created = await db\n    .insert(agentApiKeys)\n    .values({\n      agentId: id,\n      companyId: existing.companyId,       // \u003c-- copied from the victim agent\n      name,\n      keyHash,\n    })\n    .returning()\n    .then((rows) =\u003e rows[0]);\n  return { id: created.id, name: created.name, token, createdAt: created.createdAt };\n},\n\nlistKeys: (id: string) =\u003e db.select({ ... }).from(agentApiKeys).where(eq(agentApiKeys.agentId, id)),\n\nrevokeKey: async (keyId: string) =\u003e {\n  const rows = await db.update(agentApiKeys).set({ revokedAt: new Date() }).where(eq(agentApiKeys.id, keyId)).returning();\n  return rows[0] ?? null;\n},\n```\n\nNeither the agent id on `POST`/`GET` nor the key id on `DELETE` is cross-checked against the caller\u0027s company membership.\n\nThe returned token becomes a full-fledged agent actor in `server/src/middleware/auth.ts:151-169`:\n\n```ts\nreq.actor = {\n  type: \"agent\",\n  agentId: key.agentId,\n  companyId: key.companyId,      // \u003c-- victim\u0027s company\n  keyId: key.id,\n  runId: runIdHeader || undefined,\n  source: \"agent_key\",\n};\n```\n\n`assertCompanyAccess` (lines 22-30 of `authz.ts`) only rejects an agent actor when `req.actor.companyId !== \u003ctarget-companyId\u003e`. Because the token the attacker just minted carries the victim\u0027s `companyId`, it sails through every company-access check in Company B \u2014 every endpoint that an agent in Company B is authorized to hit.\n\nNo router-level mitigation exists: `api.use(agentRoutes(db))` in `server/src/app.ts:155` mounts the router with only `boardMutationGuard` (which enforces read-only for some board sessions, not tenancy). The adjacent `POST /agents/:id/wakeup` route at line 2089 and `POST /agents/:id/heartbeat/invoke` at line 2139 correctly load the agent and call `assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId)` \u2014 the key-management routes simply forgot this check. Commit `ac664df8` (\"fix(authz): scope import, approvals, activity, and heartbeat routes\") hardened several other routes in this same file family but did not touch the three key routes.\n\nAgent UUIDs are routinely exposed to any authenticated board user through org-chart rendering, issue listings, heartbeat/activity payloads, and public references, so the \"unguessable id\" is not a practical barrier; further, the `DELETE` path only requires a `keyId`, which is returned by the equally-broken `GET /agents/:id/keys` for any target agent.\n\n## PoC\n\nPreconditions: attacker is a board user with membership only in Company A. They know (or learn via the listable agent surfaces) a UUID of an agent in Company B.\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Authenticate as the Company-A board user and mint a key for a Company-B agent:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -X POST https://target.example/api/agents/\u003cVICTIM_COMPANY_B_AGENT_ID\u003e/keys \\\n  -H \u0027Cookie: \u003cattacker-board-session\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"pwn\"}\u0027\n```\n\nExpected (and observed) response:\n\n```json\n{\"id\":\"\u003cnew-key-id\u003e\",\"name\":\"pwn\",\"token\":\"\u003cCLEARTEXT_AGENT_TOKEN\u003e\",\"createdAt\":\"2026-04-10T...\"}\n```\n\nThe server never consulted the attacker\u0027s `companyIds` \u2014 only the URL path \u2014 and returns the cleartext token whose `companyId` column is set to Company B\u0027s id.\n\nStep 2 \u2014 Use the stolen agent token as a first-class agent principal in Company B:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS https://target.example/api/agents/\u003cVICTIM_COMPANY_B_AGENT_ID\u003e \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cCLEARTEXT_AGENT_TOKEN\u003e\u0027\n```\n\n`middleware/auth.ts` sets `req.actor = {type:\"agent\", agentId:\u003cvictim\u003e, companyId:\u003cCompanyB\u003e, ...}`. Every route that does `assertCompanyAccess(req, \u003cCompanyB\u003e)` now passes.\n\nStep 3 \u2014 The listing and revocation routes are broken in the same way:\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate every key on a victim agent (learn keyIds):\ncurl -sS https://target.example/api/agents/\u003cVICTIM_COMPANY_B_AGENT_ID\u003e/keys \\\n  -H \u0027Cookie: \u003cattacker-board-session\u003e\u0027\n\n# Revoke a legitimate Company-B key, denying service to the real operator:\ncurl -sS -X DELETE https://target.example/api/agents/\u003cANY_AGENT_ID\u003e/keys/\u003cVICTIM_KEY_ID\u003e \\\n  -H \u0027Cookie: \u003cattacker-board-session\u003e\u0027\n```\n\n`revokeKey` only matches on `keyId` (`server/src/services/agents.ts:622-629`), so even the `agentId` in the URL is decorative \u2014 the `keyId` alone is the authority.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Full cross-tenant compromise.** Any board-authenticated user can mint agent API keys inside any other company in the same instance and then act as that agent \u2014 executing the workflows, reading the data, and calling every endpoint that agent is authorized for inside the victim tenant.\n- **Listing leak.** Key metadata (ids, names, lastUsedAt, revokedAt) for every agent in every tenant is readable by any board user.\n- **Cross-tenant denial of service.** The same primitive revokes legitimate agent keys in other companies by `keyId`.\n- **Scope change.** The vulnerability is in Company A\u0027s scoping checks, but the impact is complete confidentiality/integrity/availability loss within Company B\u0027s tenant \u2014 a classic scope-change cross-tenant boundary breach.\n- The attacker needs only the most minimal valid account on the instance (any company membership with board-type session) and a victim agent UUID, which is routinely exposed through agent listings, issues, heartbeats, and activity feeds.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRequire explicit company-access checks on all three routes before touching the service layer. For `POST`/`GET`, load the agent first and authorize against `agent.companyId`. For `DELETE`, load the key row first (or join through it) and authorize against `key.companyId` to avoid leaking via `keyId` guessing.\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n  if (!agent) {\n    res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n    return;\n  }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n  res.json(await svc.listKeys(id));\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n  if (!agent) {\n    res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n    return;\n  }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n  await logActivity(db, { /* ... */ });\n  res.status(201).json(key);\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n  // Add a getKeyById(keyId) helper that returns { id, agentId, companyId }.\n  const keyRow = await svc.getKeyById(keyId);\n  if (!keyRow) {\n    res.status(404).json({ error: \"Key not found\" });\n    return;\n  }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, keyRow.companyId);\n  await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n  res.json({ ok: true });\n});\n```\n\nDefense-in-depth: push the authorization down into the service layer as well, so any future caller (e.g. a new route, a job, or an RPC) is unable to create, list, or revoke an agent key without proving company access. Add regression tests mirroring the ones added in `ac664df8` for the sibling routes to pin the behavior.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xx2-mqjm-hg9x",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T22:49:46Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T22:49:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-3xx2-mqjm-hg9x"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API key IDOR in `/agents/:id/keys` routes allows full victim-company compromise"
}

GHSA-3XXW-CPF8-X9HQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-22 03:30 – Updated: 2025-07-22 03:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in jshERP up to 3.5. Affected is an unknown function of the file /user/delete of the component Account Handler. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to improper authorization. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-7947"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-266",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-22T01:15:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in jshERP up to 3.5. Affected is an unknown function of the file /user/delete of the component Account Handler. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to improper authorization. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xxw-cpf8-x9hq",
  "modified": "2025-07-22T03:30:34Z",
  "published": "2025-07-22T03:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jishenghua/jshERP/issues/124"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.317088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.317088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.619276"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-422Q-PPW8-Q3F5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-13 03:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33
VLAI
Details

The BuddyPress Builder for Elementor – BuddyBuilder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.4 via the 'elementor-template' shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts crated by Elementor that they should not have access to.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10778"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-13T02:15:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The BuddyPress Builder for Elementor \u2013 BuddyBuilder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.4 via the \u0027elementor-template\u0027 shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts crated by Elementor that they should not have access to.",
  "id": "GHSA-422q-ppw8-q3f5",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:39Z",
  "published": "2024-11-13T03:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10778"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3187364%40stax-buddy-builder%2Ftrunk\u0026old=2935606%40stax-buddy-builder%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/stax-buddy-builder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/067dde3a-f2d6-44c6-b64e-c8a850dd4d37?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.