GHSA-MR8G-2MJ4-PCQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 22:32 – Updated: 2026-06-23 22:32Impact
POST /two-factor had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (config/google2fa.php window=1), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted.
After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (two_factor_enabled='1'), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via POST /account/profile with two_factor_optin=0. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (='2'), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset additionally clears another user's 2FA secret.
Patches
Patched in v8.6.0
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "snipe/snipe-it"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49870"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T22:32:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n`POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted.\n\nAfter a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled=\u00271\u0027`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`=\u00272\u0027`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user\u0027s 2FA secret.\n\n### Patches\nPatched in v8.6.0",
"id": "GHSA-mr8g-2mj4-pcq2",
"modified": "2026-06-23T22:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T22:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-mr8g-2mj4-pcq2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Snipe-IT\u0027s TOTP is Brute-Forceable Due to Missing Rate Limiting on `POST /two-factor`"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.