4TZ00000006007
Vulnerability from csaf_abb - Published: 2025-10-20 00:30 - Updated: 2025-10-23 00:30Summary
ALS-mini-S4/S8 IP Missing Authentication Vulnerability and its Mitigations
Notes
Summary
ABB is aware of vulnerabilities in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory.
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the pollution of heap memory which potentially takes remote control of the product and performs a write operation to the flash memory to alter the firmware behavior.
Support
For additional instructions and support please contact your local ABB ASKI service organization. For contact information, see https://www.aski-energy.com/en/contact/
Information about ABB’s cyber security program and capabilities can be found at www.abb.com/cybersecurity
Notice
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB.
ABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose.
All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
Mitigating factors
Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed.
– Ensure the product is not exposed to the public internet.
– Within the control system, put the product behind firewall, to strictly control network traffic only from limited whitelisted IPs or alternatively, route the traffic through a secure proxy that enforces authentication and logging.
– Monitor product access using firewall, IDS, or IPS, and configure alerts for any access attempts from non-whitelisted IPs.
– Ensure surrounding systems are fully updated to reduce attack vectors.
Refer to section “General security recommendations” for further advise on how to keep your system secure.
Workarounds
Workarounds are specific measures that a user can take to help block an attack. ABB has tested the following workarounds. Although these workarounds will not correct the underlying vulnerability, they can help block known attack vectors. When a workaround reduces functionality, this is identified below as “Impact of workaround”.
– Physically disconnect the ethernet port if embedded web server is not being used.
Impact of workaround
The embedded web server and all its functionalities, incl. load monitoring, alarms, remote configuration, etc. will not be accessible. However, the product will continue functioning as normal based on configured control parameters.
General security recommendations
For any installation of software-related ABB products we strongly recommend the following (non-exhaustive) list of cyber security practices:
– Isolate special purpose networks (e.g. for automation systems) and remote devices behind firewalls and separate them from any general-purpose network (e.g. office or home networks).
– Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your devices, components, peripheral equipment, and networks.
– Never connect programming software or computers containing programing software to any network other than the network for the devices that it is intended for.
– Scan all data imported into your environment before use to detect potential malware infections.
– Minimize network exposure for all applications and endpoints to ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet unless they are designed for such exposure and the intended use requires such.
– Ensure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system, and firmware patches as well as anti-virus and firewall.
– When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices.
Purpose
ABB has a rigorous internal cyber security continuous improvement process which involves regular testing with industry leading tools and periodic assessments to identify potential product issues. Occasionally an issue is determined to be a design or coding flaw with implications that may impact product cyber security.
When a potential product vulnerability is identified or reported, ABB immediately initiates our vulnerability handling process. This entails validating if the issue is in fact a product issue, identifying root causes, determining what related products may be impacted, developing a remediation, and notifying end users and governmental organizations.
The resulting Cyber Security Advisory intends to notify customers of the vulnerability and provide details on which products are impacted, how to mitigate the vulnerability or explain workarounds that minimize the potential risk as much as possible. The release of a Cyber Security Advisory should not be misconstrued as an affirmation or indication of an active threat or ongoing campaign targeting the products mentioned here. If ABB is aware of any specific threats, it will be clearly mentioned in the communication.
The publication of this Cyber Security Advisory is an example of ABB’s commitment to the user community in support of this critical topic. Responsible disclosure is an important element in the chain of trust we work to maintain with our many customers. The release of an Advisory provides timely information which is essential to help ensure our customers are fully informed.
Frequently asked questions
What causes the vulnerability?
The vulnerability is caused by lack of access controls present in the embedded web server in the ALSmini-S4/S8 IP controllers.
Where to check for serial number?
Product serial number is printed on the side of ALS -mini-S4/S8 IP controllers. Additionally, users can also identify serial number through controller menu, as mentioned in product user manual - page 11.
What is ALS-mini?
It is an intelligent energy controller for load optimization using instantaneous value control.
What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take remote control of the product and change product configuration.
How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?
An attacker could exploit vulnerability by merely accessing the wrongly configured ALS-mini-S4/S8 IP controllers in the network. This would mean that the product is exposed to public Internet, or the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above or apply Workarounds to completely eliminate the attack vector.
Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely?
Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed.
When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?
No, ABB received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.
When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?
No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued.
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"title": "Workarounds"
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"text": "For any installation of software-related ABB products we strongly recommend the following (non-exhaustive) list of cyber security practices:\n\n\u2013 Isolate special purpose networks (e.g. for automation systems) and remote devices behind firewalls and separate them from any general-purpose network (e.g. office or home networks).\n\n\u2013 Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your devices, components, peripheral equipment, and networks.\n\n\u2013 Never connect programming software or computers containing programing software to any network other than the network for the devices that it is intended for.\n\n\u2013 Scan all data imported into your environment before use to detect potential malware infections.\n\n\u2013 Minimize network exposure for all applications and endpoints to ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet unless they are designed for such exposure and the intended use requires such.\n\n\u2013 Ensure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system, and firmware patches as well as anti-virus and firewall.\n\n\u2013 When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices.\n",
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"title": "Purpose"
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"text": "What causes the vulnerability?\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by lack of access controls present in the embedded web server in the ALSmini-S4/S8 IP controllers.\n\nWhere to check for serial number?\n\nProduct serial number is printed on the side of ALS -mini-S4/S8 IP controllers. Additionally, users can also identify serial number through controller menu, as mentioned in product user manual - page 11.\n\nWhat is ALS-mini?\n\nIt is an intelligent energy controller for load optimization using instantaneous value control.\n\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?\n\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take remote control of the product and change product configuration.\n\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?\n\nAn attacker could exploit vulnerability by merely accessing the wrongly configured ALS-mini-S4/S8 IP controllers in the network. This would mean that the product is exposed to public Internet, or the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above or apply Workarounds to completely eliminate the attack vector.\n\nCould the vulnerability be exploited remotely? \n\nYes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed. \n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?\n\nNo, ABB received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.\n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?\n\nNo, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued.",
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"title": "ALS-mini-S4/S8 IP Missing Authentication Vulnerability and its Mitigations",
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"baseScore": 10,
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"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"environmentalScore": 10,
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"scope": "CHANGED",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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